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Abstract
Taking a pragmatic, systems engineering approach, this thesis identifies a 
number of fundamental issues that presently arise in risk management, 
primarily as a result of the overly complex and somewhat outdated approach 
conventionally taken in process definition and a lack of coherence within the 
current risk management vocabulary. It is suggested that many recent 
developments in systems engineering have largely been ignored by the risk 
management community.
The objective of this work is to develop a formalised approach to the 
management of risk using a model based approach this will enable a 
fundamental simplification of the risk management process, resulting - 
amongst other things - in an improved understanding of the associated 
terminology.
An object oriented modelling approach, now widely exploited in systems 
engineering, has been used to provide an insight into many existing risk 
management standards considering the approaches they present and 
terminology used. It has also been used to derive both a set of processes for 
risk management and a methodology for implementation. Alongside this, a 
consistent, inter-related terminology as been proposed for use with these 
processes.
The outcome of this work is a formalised but pragmatic approach to risk 
management including the definition of processes, ontology for risk 
management and a pragmatic methodology for the application of the 
processes. This approach has been validated in a number of case studies of 
varying depth and breadth, covering health & safety, business, project and 
individual needs, showing that the proposed processes and terminology can 
be used effectively in different organisations and industries.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background
The consideration of risk is a day-to-day phenomenon used by individuals, 
Small to Medium Enterprises (SME's) to large national, multinational or global 
organisations. Although in many instances risks may be 'mitigated' this does 
not mean that complex issues have been well understood.
Risk Management proposes to be a solution to understanding and removing 
the worry associated with issues which may arise in the future. As a discipline 
Risk Management has existed since the 1960's emerging from an historic 
need and desire to insure. From the 1980's clear reference can be made to a 
process for risk management which has remained relatively unchanged.
There are many tools available to assist in the modelling of complex systems. 
Modelling allows simplification of the system to allow the complexity to be 
understood or at least to aid the recognition that there is a complex issue. 
These tools vary from high level business strategy identification to Failure 
Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) examining the detail associated with 
failures of components in a system.
Risk can be a very personal thing; people generally understand risk in slightly 
different ways due to their own experiences. This view of risk is not directly 
associated with numbers, probabilities and specific outcomes. It is about the 
chance that the individual may lose something of value. The situations where 
people think about risk are around us all the time from investments to flying or 
crossing the road to bungee jumping. The question is how do people think 
about risk? Generally as life progresses new challenges arise, situations 
which have not been encountered previously. In the case of these new 
situations people tend toward caution, taking things slowly trying to ensure the 
best outcome. Once the situation has been tried and tested confidence grows 
and it is possible to start to believe that there is no danger or risk as the 
situation has been encountered many times and has always ended well.
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People are happy to build up these perceptions about their situations although 
the perceptions can be changed in an instant. No relationship between the 
mind changing event and the situation need exist. For example after 
September 11th 2001 the perception of safety of air travel changed 
dramatically.
There is an inherent psychological impact on the way people understand risk 
however this psychology is outside the scope of this work.
Many industries recognise risk and the need for risk management. The 
railway industry for example has a defined and documented regime for 
addressing risk. This regime is documented and controlled through the use of 
standards such as EN 50126:1999 (CENELEC 1999) Railway applications - 
The specification and demonstration of Reliability, Availability, Maintainability 
and Safety (RAMS). RAMS introduces risk as a safety concept within the 
standard which can be seen to run throughout a project lifecycle.
However many industries have not recognised either the importance of 
formalising risk management and the surrounding issues or that the 
technology they are working with has associated risk. This lack of recognition 
can impact many dimensions including legal, personal and technological.
1.2 Context/Scope
Observations made whilst working with Aerospace, Rail, Defence and 
Government organisations have shown a number of issues with the 
implementation of current risk management best practice. In some cases 
these issues arise due to a lack of willingness to carry out thorough risk 
management or to react when risks are revealed. However in many cases 
these managerial issues are compounded by fundamental issues of 
complexity and lack of pragmatism associated with the risk management 
process. Inhibiting the resolutions of many of these issues is the lack of 
understanding and agreement on terminology used to describe and discuss 
risk.
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Issues include:
• consideration of risk management as a support process,
• differing desires of stakeholders,
• the need to re-create existing documents or designs to enable risk
management to be carried out,
• the multitude of possible routes through the risk management process 
and
• the variation in meaning associated with the word 'Risk' and other risk
management terminology
The view of risk management as a support process causes issues as there is 
a view that support processes are add-on processes armoured in 
documentation which provide no real purpose other than to delay the project 
until after the prescribed deadline.
There may be a number of reasons for the image associated with these 
support processes. One may be that they are in fact much more integral to the 
work than most would like to admit. As such many of the activities are carried 
out as a matter of course. In relation to these activities the risk management 
process duplicates work adding rather than removing the likelihood of errors 
or failure.
Not only can the process duplicate work already carried out it can also deliver 
an inconsistent view of the order in which the risk management steps should 
or could be carried out. The process is generally wrapped in catchall activities 
relating to all steps ensuring that no assumed flow can be guaranteed.
All of these issues stand in the way of considering the information regarding a 
'risk' which as a word means something different almost every time it is used.
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1.2.1 Formalisation
These issues, duplication of information, complexity of process and 
incoherence of terminology, drive the need for a more formalised approach to 
risk management. To ensure that complexity is reduced rather than increased 
a tried and tested method of understanding complex, diverse and multi­
faceted systems must be applied.
Formalisation, in this work, means to emphasise the logical approach taken 
towards the understanding and definition of risks. This approach in turn 
supports the validity of the risk. Within the current engineering and economic 
climate this logical approach must provide a visualisation which is consistent, 
repeatable and view based and pragmatic.
The software/IT domain has been using these kinds of formalised techniques 
for many years. In the last 15 years there has been a move to provide 
consistency across these techniques. One of the results of this need for 
consistency is the Unified Modelling Language (UML). The UML has been 
used in many applications from project management to real-time critical 
system design making use of its syntax, ability to communicate and provide 
consistency both internally, between visualisations and externally through 
links to real examples and scenarios.
As the UML provides a consistent, graphical multi-view approach to 
understanding complex, diverse and multi-faceted systems its application to 
the concepts of risk enable a consistency, formalisation and visual 
representation of the terminology and process of risk management. Many of 
the diagrams, shown using the UML, within this work provide interpretations of 
the original work rather than the work itself, where this is not the case full 
references are provided. These interpretations, as well as providing a 
consistent understanding of diverse works, provide an independent view of 
the work enabling an overview to be gained and faster access to relevant 
areas within the work.
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Having a consistent, formalised approach supports repeatability within a 
formalised approach by focusing on modularisation and re-use without 
forgetting the overall need s of the whole.
The use of modularisation within risk management enables the pragmatic 
application of the processes required to carry out risk management. 
Pragmatic application is achieved through the timely execution of relevant 
processes, this may mean that one processes is carried out many times whilst 
another is only used once or twice. The pragmatic application of the process 
has the added advantage of improving the accuracy of project plans and 
records.
There are three main areas which must be addressed prior to the application 
of a formalised approach these areas are the ontology, processes and 
methodology.
• The ontology provides the definitions of terms, as per a glossary or 
dictionary, and well defined relationships between the terms (which is 
lacking in many cases).
• Each process provides a concise set of activities to be carried out 
showing which artefacts, documents or information, are consumed and 
produced by each activity. Relationships between artefacts are also 
defined.
• The methodology provides the ordering for application of the processes. 
This ordering can show planned or actual ordering enabling 
consideration and improvement in planning.
There are two key long term benefits to a formalised approach to risk 
management which are:
1. Improved application of risk management on current and future projects
2. Improved education for those who will apply risk management enabling 
further improvements in 1.
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1.3 Objectives
The primary aim of this thesis is to develop a formalised approach to the 
management of risk using a model based approach. This will address the 
problem of a lack of formalisation across risk management in many industries, 
applications and education.
To achieve the overall aim both terminology and processes related to risk 
must be understood and formalised. Formalised ontology and processes will 
be developed and demonstrated through a number of threads abstracted from 
a case study.
The aims and objectives outlined here will be addressed throughout the 
thesis; the main contribution of each chapter to these objectives is:
• Chapter 2 - to review and understand the terminology and processes 
related to risk management.
• Chapter 3 -  to present the methodology for the research.
• Chapter 4 - to discuss the requirements for a model based framework 
for the formalisation of risk management and propose a framework 
which fulfils the requirements.
• Chapter 5 - to define risk and present an ontology for risk management.
• Chapter 6 - to define the processes required to carry out risk 
management using a multi-view approach.
• Chapter 7 - to demonstrate the applicability of the processes and 
ontology.
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1.4 Thesis plan and structure
This thesis makes extensive use of the Unified Modelling Language (UML) as 
an approach to understanding and describing concepts and systems. The 
approach is born out of the Object Oriented (00) world of systems 
understanding and can be used to describe system needs, structure, 
hierarchy, state and activity at many different viewpoints and levels of 
abstraction. It is not, however, the intention here to provide a detailed survey 
of UML, but brief introduction to the notation is given in Appendix B. Further 
detailed references are found in Stevens and Pooley (2005), Holt (2005) and 
Holt (2008).
The following gives a more general overview of the thesis defining what is 
discussed in each chapter:
This chapter introduces the need for this work covering complexity, risk 
related to people, industry and standards. It defines the aims and objectives of 
the work and provides an overview of the thesis
Chapter two investigates the processes defined for risk management, the 
terminology defined along side these processes and tools and techniques 
used to examine and create the data required to understand risks.
Chapter three presents the methodology for the research considering the use 
of empirical vs theoretical and phenomenological vs positivist approaches.
Chapter four discusses the use of the Unified Modelling Language (UML) as a 
visual, multi-view modelling approach and shows that this language is a 
relevant language to use for understanding and implementing risk 
management and analysis. It does this through defining the requirements for 
the notation to be used and investigating a number of applications of the UML.
Chapter five presents the generic terminology of risk and the relationships 
between the terms, by way of an ontology. Sections of the ontology are
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compared with definitions and terminology discussed in chapter two.
Chapter six presents the set of processes which can be used to manage risk, 
it presents a number of views of these processes giving confidence that they 
have been fully defined. This is supported by a set of examples showing 
possible outputs from the processes. This chapter also defines a methodology 
providing theoretical and practical application sequences for the processes.
Chapter seven presents two examples, from a case study, of the application 
of the ontology defined in chapter 4 and the processes defined in chapter 5 to 
verify the processes and ontology.
Chapter eight presents conclusions drawn from the project as a whole with 
recommendations for areas of further work.
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2 Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
The objective of this chapter is to provide the background understanding of 
risk, which will be achieved by reviewing relevant literature. Much of the 
literature relating to risk management is specific industry, application and tool. 
This work is focused on the process of risk management and associated 
terminology, therefore the literature in this review will be considered in three 
groups, those relating to the process, terminology and tools/techniques for 
risk management
Process based literature will be reviewed exploring empirical and 
standardised approaches to risk management. Approaches based on 
standards will be used to give a baseline or current best practice in risk 
management, tools and techniques will be discussed in order to understand 
their relevance and place within risk management. As well as considering 
terminology through each piece of literature a focused discussion on overall 
set of terminology will be given with a view to defining a consistent 
understanding and set of terminology to provide a foundation for a successful 
risk management approach.
2.2 Process
There are many understandings of the term process. This section focuses on 
understanding what risk experts and standards mean when they discuss the 
'Risk Management Process'. The focus will be on those authors who have 
defined a process and standards which present a baseline approach to risk 
management.
In his tutorial on software risk management Boehm (1989) presents a number 
of steps which are aimed at identifying, addressing and eliminating software 
risks before they cause re-work or failure. This work was carried out when 
software risk management was considered to be an emerging discipline, 
however many of the concepts are still applied.
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Boehm has defined both the steps for risk management and a life cycle The 
spiral model' (Boehm 1988) in which the steps can be applied. The spiral 
model evolved over a number of years. It is based on the waterfall model with 
a number of refinements applied to it.
This model is defined to provide an approach to development which is risk 
driven and reflects the incremental nature of most development projects.
The spiral model (Figure 2-1) provides an incremental approach to defining 
requirements, architecture and design through the re-use of the four main 
elements 'Determine objectives, alternatives, constraints', 'Evaluate 
alternatives; identify, resolve risks', 'Develop, verify next level product' and 
'Plan next phases'. There are further refinements and detail provided within 
each phase or element and a revised spiral model was also produced 
expanding on the detail within the 'Plan next phases' element.
Boehm (1989) states that "Software Risk management is an emerging 
discipline whose objectives are to identify, address, and eliminate software
Determine objectives, 
alternatives and 
constraints /
Evaluate alternatives, 
identify resolve risks
Risk
analysts
Risk
analysis
Risk
analysis \ .  O p e ra -\.Prototype 3 \  tional 
\  \  protoypePrototype 2
Risk
analysis Proto­
type!REVIEW
Requirements plan 
life-cycle plan
Simulations, models, benchmarks 
Concept of /  f
Operation /
-^requirements/  Product /  '
design /  Detailed /  
Requirement s ' /  design /
v a l i d a t i o n /
Development
plan
Integration 
and test plan Integration 
test ^Acceptance
test Develop, verify 
next-level product
Figure 2-1 - Spiral Model (Boehm 1988)
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risk items before they become either threats to successful software operation 
or major sources of software rework." he provides steps to support these 
objectives.
based on 
results of
risks
from
Risk control Risk Assessment
Risk Management
risk exposure 
risk leverage 
com pound risk reduction
Risk prioritisation
Risk Resolution
prototypes ()
s im ulations()
benchmark()
analysesQ
staffing()
track m ilestones() 
track top ten() 
re -assess risk() 
corrective actions ()
Risk Monitoring
check lists
decis ion driver analysis 
assum ption  analysis 
decom position
Risk identification
Performace m odels 
cost m odels 
network analysis 
decis ion analysis 
quality factor analysis
Risk Analysis
buying info()
risk avoidance()
risk transfer()
risk reduction()
risk e lem ent planning()
risk plan integrationQ
Risk management 
planning
Figure 2-2 - Risk management (Boehm 1989)
Boehm defines two primary steps (Figure 2-2), within risk management, of risk 
control and risk assessment. Three sub-steps exist within each; risk control 
covering management, monitoring and resolution and risk assessment 
involving identification, analysis and prioritisation. These steps are further 
defined with some explanation of the items which may be produced by the 
step as well as typical techniques.
The disadvantage of the spiral model, this works interpretation of which is 
abstracted in Figure 2-3, is that it specifies the work to be completed in each 
step: this constrains the flexibility of the model and therefore its application to 
other areas. Another way of explaining this would be to say that it begins to 
pre-define the project plan.
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:Plan next PhaseService :Develop, verify 
next-level product
Evaluate alternatives;
identify, resolve risks
Determine objectives, 
alternatives and
constraints
Figure 2-3 - Spiral life cycle model
Boehm has provided a differentiation between the management, which he 
called control, in 'risk management' and the assessment in 'risk assessment' 
providing in many cases a useful delineation between the work of identifying 
and fully defining risks and the plans and controls which need to be in place to 
ensure that risks are dealt with effectively.
Together the spiral model and risk management steps provide an approach 
for the business to incorporate risk management into projects (Figure 2-4)
applied during
Risk Management
Step
Evaluate alternatives; 
identify, resolve risks
Figure 2-4 - Summary
Overall Boehm's model provides a sensible way forward when addressing risk 
in the software environment giving a general overview from a management or 
project perspective.
Lee et al (2009) use Boehm's work with others to generalise risk management 
into four phases: classification and identification, risk assessment, risk 
analysis and risk control. Lee applies Bayesian Belief networks (Aven 2003)
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within the phases incorporating uncertainty into risk management. Although 
some technical risks are identified the majority of the work is focused on 
management issues associated with the company and project rather than the 
impact of technical issues.
Hughes and Cotterell (1999) have extended Boehm's model of risk 
management, starting with a re-partitioning of the risk management steps 
(Figure 2-5).
Risk directing
Risk staffing
Risk evaluation Risk Monitoring
Risk Estimation
Risk Engineering
Risk Planning Risk control
Risk Analysis
Risk
identification
Risk Management
Figure 2-5 - Risk engineering (Hughes and Cotterell 1999)
They also provide two primary areas within risk; Risk Analysis and Risk 
Management. The management area groups all planning, staffing, directing, 
monitoring and control activities whilst the Analysis area focuses on the 
identification, estimation and evaluation of risk.
Re-sectioning Boehm's risk management steps separates the analysis of risk 
from its management whereas Boehm's model looked at assessment and 
control. It is believed that many of the changes are in the meaning of the word 
'management'. In Boehm's work the use of 'risk management' was used to 
signify the whole area of risk assessment, analysis and control whereas 
Hughes and Cotterell are using management to specify only the control, 
planning and resource issues leaving identification, estimation and evaluation 
being grouped as Risk Analysis.
It is unclear in this model how the identification, estimation and evaluation will
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be carried out, where the techniques to be used will be selected, again the 
focus is on the management of risk rather than the definition and analysis of 
technical risk. Kirchsteiger (2008) takes a similar view when he explains risk 
assessment as the 'fact finding' and administrative follow up measures as risk 
management.
Redmill (2002) highlights the three stages most consider to be included in risk 
analysis, hazard identification, hazard analysis and risk assessment (or 
evaluation). He goes on to expand these steps by adding a 'definition of 
scope', highlighted in Figure 2-6, concerned with the planning of the work to 
be carried out during the risk analysis. Jenkins et al (2009), Mohaghegh et al 
(2009) and Olsen and Lindoe (2008) all use the concept of context or 
viewpoints within their work. Olsen and Lindoe use context to understand the 
implications of transferring technology between contexts. Jenkins et al use 
dimensions to develop a management framework and Mohaghegh uses 
perspectives and multilevel framing to ensure the relevant aspects are 
included in the analysis.
Stage
Risk Analysis
Hazard
Identification
Hazard
Analysis
Definition of 
scope
Risk Assessment 
(or evaluation)Added by Redmill
Figure 2-6 - Redmill’s Risk Analysis
Further to each of these stages Redmill discusses many of the tools which 
can be used within these stages to carry out the detailed work required, he 
uses this to highlight the areas where subjectivity can enter into the provision 
of a full analysis for a project or product.
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Redmill’s work from 2002 seems to lack the breadth and depth of definition 
found in Boehms work from 1989. This lack of consistency is symptomatic of 
the lack of connectivity across disciplines when it comes to the understanding 
of Risk.
It is useful that he reflects on the issues from project management in terms of 
cost and time in relation to the detail required from a technique used to define 
hazards within the risk analysis stages.
It is also noticeable that Redmill is predominantly concerned with hazards or 
causes and that risk is the end point of understanding hazards where others 
including Boehm (1989) the risk process has been focused on effects rather 
than causes. Woodruff (2005) argues that the focus on consequence and 
hazard ensure that decisions are not based on overall risk which he suggests 
is leading to risk averse stakeholders defining the level of acceptable or 
tolerable risk.
Redmill’s work seems to be behind the mark in relation to Boehm however 
this may be due to the relative maturity of risk management across different 
industries. The benefit Redmill adds is by ensuring that the scope of the 
assessment is defined.
The variation in definition between Boehm and Redmill, including the focus on 
cause or effect, highlights a need to consider standard practice. It will be 
important io note whether the standards are industry specific or cross 
discipline.
2.3 Standards
Mainly concerned with the approach to Risk Management numerous 
standards can be consulted to see what is claimed to be best practice. 
Standards may be company, national, or international some of which are used 
as much outside the expected boundary as with AS-NZS 4360 (2004) an 
Australian standard which is recognised in Canada by the Canadian 
Information Processing Society (CIPS) Risk Management document (CIPS 
2007), mainland Europe through European projects such as CORAS (Lund et 
al 2004) and in the UK within the Fishing industry.
Page 15 of 214
There are many differing views on what constitutes risk management, 
analysis and assessment hence the need for standardisation across 
industries and domains. This section will investigate whether standards have 
provided a common understanding and approach to risk management.
Many professional bodies and industry organisations provide guidance, codes 
of practice and principles for risk management. These include the Institute of 
chartered accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) (2002), the Institute of 
Risk Management (IRM) with the Association of Insurance and Risk 
Managers (AIRMIC) (2002) and CIPS (2007) to name a few.
ICAEW in its briefing on Risk management for SMEs (2002) identifies the 
need to apply risk management across the organisation expanding from the 
previous narrow financial view it took.
Risk grouping
Financial Environmental
Compliance
Strategic
Operational
Figure 2-7 - Risk groupings
The briefing goes on to describe five headings, described in Figure 2-7, under 
which risk maybe grouped or assessed. The groupings are;
• Strategic - risks from industry or geographically areas,
• Operational - risks from operations and administrative procedures,
• Financial - risks from the financial structure and third party transactions,
• Compliance - risks from law and regulation including Health and Safety,
• Environmental - risks could be covered under compliance.
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Monitoring
approaches
implementing
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Learn from 
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rank risk from 
strategy
Select
appropriate
approaches
Figure 2-8 - Process steps
The briefing goes on to state that the risk management process will normally 
involve the following steps
• Identifying and ranking the risks inherent in the company's strategy 
(including its overall goals and appetite for risk);
• selecting the appropriate risk management approaches and transferring 
or avoiding those risks that the business is not competent or willing to 
manage;
• implementing controls to manage the remaining risks;
• monitoring the effectiveness of risk management approaches and 
controls; and
• learning from experience and making improvements.
Following this it suggests four ways of controlling risks known as the four T's; 
tolerate, transfer, treat or terminate.
Expressing that risk should be cross business rather than purely financial is a 
step in the right direction but it misses the opportunity to explain whether 
'business' is only the management side of an organisation or whether it is
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intended to cover the whole organisation including technical project and 
development. It is limited in its consideration of these areas when applying the 
categories of risk, shown in Figure 2-7, it has defined.
As a briefing document this is forward thinking and open, providing a good
basis for improvement. However, the similarity between the risk management
requirements and process means that the standard misses the opportunity to 
explain or justify why risk management should be carried out, whether it is a 
core business process or not, it only succeeds in defining the activities that 
the process must deliver.
The IRM et al (2002) have defined 'A risk management standard' which it is 
stated "is the result of a team drawn from the major risk management 
organisation in the UK" The standards sets out risk management as "a rapidly 
developing discipline" which has a need for a standard to ensure that there is 
an agreed:
• terminology related to the words used
• process by which risk management can be carried out
• organisation structure for risk management
• objective for risk management
The standard begins by defining the drivers of risks.
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Figure 2-9 - Examples of the Drivers of Key Risks (IRM et al 2002)
The standard shows the drivers for risk, as represented in Figure 2-9, in terms 
of internal and external factors and further categorises these into types of risk 
which are financial, strategic, operational and hazards. It uses this picture to 
provide a Venn diagram of the drivers in relation to their categorisations.
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Risk Treatm ent
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Risk Analysis
Risk Identification 
Risk Description 
Risk Estimation
Risk Evaluation
Figure 2-10 - The Risk Management Process (IRM et al 2002)
The standard focuses firstly on risk analysis and evaluation from the ISO 
guide 73 (2002) definition of risk assessment before discussing the following 
steps of the process. It does not however return to discuss the first step The 
organisation's strategic objectives'.
The basic process, shown in Figure 2-10, is again similar to many that have 
already been mentioned by ICAEW, Boehm etc with the added specification 
of nested processes. This is seen as a hierarchy of processes - within the risk 
management process is the risk assessment process, within risk assessment 
there is risk analysis and risk evaluation, risk analysis in turn has its own set 
of processes. The standard suggests that risk identification, description or 
estimation can not be carried out without the con-current execution of the 
parent processes, running three processes at the same time; this supposition
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is not pragmatic or practical, a risk will be described when it is recognised this 
may be in conversation or formal review. The rest of the risk management 
process and all of its sub processes do not need to be executed to carry out 
this activity.
The standard also defines methods and tools although in the situation where 
all processes are nested it is not clear where these fit into the overall structure 
of applying risk management. Another issue with using a nested structure in 
this way is that it is unclear how to start or end the work - if each process 
opens up into a plethora of more detailed processes the complexity, cost, 
resource needs and value of the task could be hidden or lost.
When investigating the detail of this process other issues arise, in many cases 
the document seems to be unsure which process it is talking about. It refers to 
risk assessment in a number of places where estimation or evaluation would 
appear to be the focus of the statement. The sheer number of relationships 
and transitions which can be followed within the process mean that it 
becomes meaningless which is compounded by the use of terms including 
'Hazard risks' which are difficult to interpret.
Much of the terminology used in the standard is defined in ISO/IEC Guide 73 
(2002) which is a positive move to ensure that a shared set of terminology is 
used within risk management. However it also states in at least one place that 
it doesn't agree with the terminology in the ISO guide and so uses the term to 
mean something else.
IRM are proposing the same Risk Management process which companies 
have been refusing or failing to implement for nearly 20 years and in light of 
the recent credit crunch has failed again. However this is similar to the 
information in many national and international standards. CIPS (2007) have 
taken a more general view recognising some of the issues with risk 
management best practice, organisational view and scope of management 
responsibility. Based on these issues they provide a guide to aid in 
recognising, within their responsibility, what is required of an IT professional
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when assessing and managing risk.
There are three main ways that risk management is considered when it is 
expressed in a standard. One is to describe the lifecycle of risk management, 
the second considers risk management as a process and the last is a 
variation of the two, not really sure if risk management is process or lifecycle 
based. This section investigates four standards, IEC 61508, ISO 15288, 
AS/NZS 4360 and ISO 31000, understanding the approach each takes and 
the benefits and issues associated with the standard.
IEC 61508, which is focused on equipment, does not provide a risk 
management process or discuss risk management. It focuses on the 
equipment being used to provide specific functions and considers whether the 
equipment may cause harm.
General
Requirements
IEC 61508
I
Definitions &
Abbreviations
Specific
Requirements
I
suggests how to apply
Guidelines on 
Application
Examples of 
Methods
Hardware
Requirements
Software
Requirements
i suggests how to apply
Overview of 
Tehniques and 
Measures
Figure 2-11- IEC 61508 Overview
The focus on equipment can be seen from an overview of the standard shown 
in Figure 2-11, the requirements in the standard are aimed at software and 
hardware, more specifically those pieces of hardware or software which 
provide safety related functions.
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Clause 7.4 of IEC 61508 highlights the need for hazard and risk analysis for 
which it defines a number of objectives including:
• Determine the hazards and hazardous events of the equipment under
control (EUC) and the EUC control system for all reasonably 
foreseeable circumstances, including fault conditions and misuse.
• Determine the event sequences leading to the hazardous event
• Determine the EUC risks associated with the hazardous event
The standard carries on to define a set of requirements for the hazard and risk 
analysis ensuring that the hazards and hazardous events are defined, event 
sequences determined, hazard eliminations considered, likelihood of 
hazardous events evaluated, potential consequences determined and that the 
EUC risk shall be determined.
The relationship between hazard, hazardous event and risk can create some 
interesting reading. It is good to see a clear line between the hazards and risk 
with the hazardous event being the situation where a person is harmed; risk is 
the probability of the harm and the severity.
The standard states that 'risk shall be evaluated, or estimated, for each 
hazardous event. When considering hazardous events and risks together the 
clear relationship appears to blur as it is known that - in an hazardous event a 
person is harmed so the probability of occurrence of harm is 1. The risk from 
above is the probability of the harm and the severity therefore risk = 1 x 
severity which could also be expressed as risk = severity of the harm. This 
statement does not support the added value required of risk management 
although it is unlikely that the statement is the one the authors intended to 
make.
The approach the standard takes, only defining the requirements to be 
fulfilled, leaves an organisation to select and implement its own choice of risk 
management approaches or indeed to define its own. This can be
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advantageous for those with multiple approaches dependant on project or 
product, but can make demonstration of compliance complicated.
The standard provides a good overall set of ideas for the consideration of 
safety related systems, it does not consider risk management but does feed 
forward into many domain specific standards including EN 50126 (CENELEC 
1999), focused on the rail industry, which like IEC 61508 do not define a 
specific risk management approach or process.
Rather than provide a risk management process they provide a lifecycle which 
has an element of risk analysis integrated within.
ISO 15288 (2002) is arguably the most widely used systems engineering 
standard in the world. ISO 15288 was defined provide a set of systems 
engineering processes, in doing this it attempts to render obsolete a number 
of existing standards including EIA 632 (EIA 1999), IEEE 1220 (1998) and 
SECAM (INCOSE 1996) thus removing a some of the complexity of the 
framework quagmire described by Sheard (1997). ISO 15288 provides 
processes for systems engineering and a suggested structure in which the 
processes can be applied.
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Figure 2-12 - System Life Cycle Stages - Process Structure View
This diagram, Figure 2-12, shows the structure of the System Life Cycle 
Stages taken from the standard. A framework is used to model the System 
Life Cycle Process Processes and is constructed from stages made up of a 
number of processes applied throughout each stage. The life cycle is made 
up of stages and the life cycle model provides the sequence in which the 
stages are executed. The System Life Cycle Processes are categorised into 4 
Process groups: Enterprise, Technical, Project and Agreement.
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Figure 2-13 - Project - Process Content View
Figure 2-13 shows the project processes of which there are seven: 
Configuration Management, Decision-making, Information Management, 
Project Assessment, Project Control, Project Planning and Risk Management, 
it also provides detail of the risk management process. The detail takes the 
form of expected outcomes and tasks, these are shown in the two boxes 
below the process name and are abstracted from the text of the standard.
ISO 15288 is not a risk specific standard. However it still considers risk 
management a necessary part of a system life cycle and as such defines the 
outcomes and tasks which should be performed. It does not in any way define 
a flow for these tasks leaving it to the organisation to tailor as is applicable, as 
it does with all processes throughout the standard.
The standard provides a very good overall framework for understanding 
system lifecycles and presents an approach to defining them which enables 
processes to be re-used throughout the lifecycle rather than used once as 
some lifecycles would suggest.
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Historically the application of lifecycles has been a topic of great discussion 
and is presented by Royce (1970) and McConnell (1996). ISO 15288 reflects 
much of the learning discussed in these papers and is considered the key 
standard for understanding systems lifecycles by many including the 
International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE) whose systems 
engineering handbook (2007) is based on the standard. More recent texts 
focus on the project planning effort (Zwikael and Sadeh 2007) or managing 
the supply chain (Wu and Olson 2008) and (Neiger et al 2009). Although 
these perspectives provide useful research they do not provide an overall 
approach to applying the risk management process.
The tasks within the process are presented in the same terminology as the 
other standards which have already been considered. Two main differences 
exist; the first is that as no flow has been defined the user is not presented 
with an excess of bi-directional relationships; secondly there are no oversized 
steps which connect to every other step here only given tasks which relate to 
risk e.g. communicate risk treatment actions' are presented. This provides a 
useful transferable module which can be integrated with other processes.
ISO 15288 does not provide a deep and all encompassing explanation of risk 
management but it does provide a good overview to work from within a 
framework which can be applied in most situations and organisations. The risk 
management process it describes is commensurate with those from other 
standards and best practice models including those already discussed. This 
standard is aimed at providing capability for the whole organisation rather 
than a single risk management focus.
AS/NZS 4360 (2004) is an Australia/New Zealand national standard which is 
applied internationally including use in Europe on the CORAS project (Lund et 
al 2004) as risk management process on which the work is based.
The standard provides a set of guidance which is aimed at assisting an 
organisation in the improvement of its risk management activities. It achieves 
this by defining terminology, a risk management process, a detailed version of
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the process and providing some thoughts on assessing current practices and 
planning.
Increase confidence and' 
rigour for decision making] 
and planning
rovide guidance 
to ...
Improved incident 
managementimprove 
compliance with 
legislation
improve
corporate
governance
improved 
stakeholder 
confidence and 
trust
improve 'v'\<dnciude>> 
identification of 
ipportunities anc 
threats
_ _ _ variability
nsure pro-active\" "«Include > 
management
«include
Improved use of 
resource
includ?^
reduction in 
insurance 
premiums
Figure 2-14 - AS/NZS 4360 Purpose
An abstraction of the purpose defined in the standard is shown in Figure 2-14, 
this shows that the purpose of the standard is to provide a generic set of 
guidance which is focused on improving identification of opportunities and 
threats, ensuring pro-active management, improving incident management, 
improving stakeholder confidence and trust, improving compliance with 
legislation and improving corporate governance.
Along side this breadth of objectives it is aimed at many different activities, 
organisations and communities.
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Figure 2-15 - Risk Management Process - Overview (AS/NZS 2004)
Within the standard the risk management process, shown in Figure 2-15, is 
defined by seven main elements:
1. Communicate and consult - with internal and external stakeholders
2. Establish the context - Internal, external & risk contexts to be defined. 
Evaluation criteria and the structure of the analysis also to be defined.
3. Identify risks - Identify where, when, why and how events could prevent, 
degrade, delay or enhance the achievement of the objectives.
4. Analyse risks - Identify and evaluate controls. Determine consequences 
and likelihood and hence the level of risk, whilst considering a range of 
potential consequences.
5. Evaluate risks - Compare levels of risk against the criteria and consider 
the balance between potential benefits and adverse outcomes.
6. Treat risks - Develop and implement specific strategies and plans for 
increasing potential benefits and reducing potential costs.
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7. Monitor and review - Monitor the effectiveness of all steps of the risk 
management process. Risks and the effectiveness of treatment 
measures need to be monitored to ensure changing circumstances do 
not alter priorities.
To consider this process in more detail elements 2-6 have been extracted and 
are shown in Figure 2-16. This diagram shows the theoretical or expected 
flow through the process.
Treat risks
(AS/NZS 4360 process::)
Evaluate risks
(AS/NZS 4360 process::)
Analyse risks
(AS/NZS 4360 process::)
Establish the context
(AS/NZS 4360 process::)
Identify risks
(AS/NZS 4360 process::)
Figure 2-16 - Process - assumed flow
What looks like a simple approach, a flow of five activities, has a number of 
issues including the lack of decisions, in-ability to re-visit work, no clear start 
and end (this is currently assumed) and no artefacts.
The lack of artefacts appears to be an issue with the overall approach to the 
definition of this process. The artefacts which are missing will hold information 
which it is imperative to value of carrying out the process. The need to record 
the process is left to an additional statement outside the process.
The overall picture becomes more unclear when reading the text relating to 
each element, in section 3 of the standard, this talks of steps, activities and
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stages of the risk management process leaving the reader at an overall loss 
to know how this process is constructed.
Monitor and review
(AS/NZS 4360 process::)
Establish the context
(AS/NZS 4360 process::)
Treat risks
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Analyse risks
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Identify risks
(AS/NZS 4360 process::)
Evaluate risks
(AS/NZS 4360 process::)
Communicate and 
consult
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Figure 2-17 - Process - additional flows
This once simple flow has been transformed, through the addition of elements 
1 and 7 to the diagram (Figure 2-17), into a set of flows which can not be 
comprehended let alone calculated. Further to the sheer number of options 
and paths that can be taken there are also questions as to the meaning of the 
numerous two way relationships between elements.
The sheer complexity within this process starts to suggest that this is not a 
process at all but something much larger and more complicated. Although a 
bad example for integrating activities and information flow the standard does 
try to remind the reader and sets a good example for integrating with other 
processes within the organisation.
Twenty seven terms are defined for use within the standards risk 
management process some of which have cross references to other terms 
within the list. Each term is accompanied by explanatory text and notes giving 
some context to the term presented.
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There is a breadth to these terms ranging from 'Event' to 'risk management 
framework' and 'Stakeholders' giving a grasp of the terms used across risk 
management and organisations in general. There is also depth to the terms 
considering 'Control assessment', 'Frequency' and 'Risk sharing'.
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Figure 2-18 - AS/NZS 4360 Terminology Quagmire
Figure 2-18 shows a diagrammatic interpretation of the definitions proposed in 
AS 4360:2004. It also shows the relationships based on the references given 
in the text. These definitions and relationships highlight some fundamental 
issues:
• Some terms are not related to any of the other terminology defined.
• Where they are related it is unclear what the relationship is e.g. risk 
and risk management framework.
• Unclear relationships also exist e.g. risk avoidance is related to risk 
although the definition describes a 'risk situation'. It is not clear in this 
case whether it is the risk or the situation which is being withdrawn 
from; also risk reduction references risk as being associated with 
consequence and likelihood but this association is not mentioned in
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risk, consequence or likelihood leaving a confusion as to the nature of 
the relationship.
• A number of terms which would generally be related to risk have not 
been, specifically consequence and likelihood - although the 'risk 
reduction' definition does suggest that there may be a relationship 
between them.
• Duplication of definition risk reduction and risk treatment either lessen 
or modify risk, the difference between them seems to be only the level 
at which they are applied; one to risk the other to likelihood and 
consequence
Many of these issues could be resolved with a simple review based on the 
diagram above. It is too often the case that list of terms and definitions are 
created and published without a full understanding of the relationships.
This standard sets out with a good set of goals, focused at supporting and 
guiding organisations through risk management, a summary of the standards 
intentions is shown in Figure 2-19. This is considered as one of the best 
examples of a risk management standard and is well referenced across the 
world.
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Figure 2-19 -  AS/NZS 4360 Summary
Even though this is considered one of the best examples of a risk 
management standard the detail it presents leaves questions and confusion 
as to which way the user of the standard should proceed. This coupled with 
the volume of unconnected terminology can only lead to wildly different 
interpretations of the standard. The final flaw is the add-on record keeping 
which reduces the perceived formality and value provided by carrying out risk 
management.
As a new overarching risk management standard ISO 31000 (2008a) is in a 
position to clearly define 'Risk Management' its needs and processes. The 
standard claims to recognise "the variety of the nature, level and complexity of 
risks and provide generic guidelines on principles and implementation of risk 
management." and describe the relationship between the principles for 
managing risk, the risk management framework and the risk management 
process.
ISO 31000 provides a framework which enables a business level view of risk 
management to be taken.
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5 3 2 Risk management policy
5.3.3 Integration into organizational processes
5.3 4 Accountability
5.3 5 Resources
5.3 6 Estabtahmg internal communication and reporting mechanwms
5.3 7 Establishing external communication and reporting mechanisms
S.6 Continual improvement of the framework
5.4 Implementing risk management
5.4 1 Implementing the framework for managing risk 
54 2 Implementing the risk management process
5.S Monitoring and review of the framework
Figure 2-20 - Framework (ISO 2008)
The framework, shown in Figure 2-20, is designed to enable a business to 
implement the risk management process whilst integrating risk management 
into its existing management systems. The framework is comprised of five 
components:
• Mandate and commitment
• Design of framework for managing risk
• Implementing risk management
• Monitoring and review of the framework
• Continual improvement of the framework
Within the implementation of risk management component the standard 
promotes an iterative approach specifying multiple instances of the risk 
management process will be required.
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Figure 2-21 - Risk Management Process (ISO 2008)
The risk management process shown in Figure 2-21 has five activities to be 
carried out:
• communication and consultation,
• establishing the context,
• risk assessment,
• risk treatment and
• monitoring and review
The risk assessment activity is further defined by three sub-activities; risk 
identification, risk analysis and risk evaluation as defined in the ISO guide 73 
(2007).
The Framework defined by the standard adds a level of business integration 
which has not been observed previously in other standards. Although it is 
similar in style to the spiral model defined by Beohm (1988) which provides a 
project level framework for software risk management, the ISO 31000 
framework should enable a level of senior management buy-in and action 
which has not been in evidence previously at an organisational level.
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The specification of multiple instances of the risk management process is an 
improvement. Many other standards including BS 6079 (BSI 2000) leave the 
reader to decide whether to use the process once per risk, once per project or 
once per organisation. The standard also specifies that risk identification is 
only carried out once for each instance of the process which leaves risks 
identified later in a project or execution without the ability to be considered or 
analysed.
The standard suggests that whenever a risk assessment is carried out risk 
identification, analysis and evaluation will also be carried out. This may be an 
issue with the terminology used in the standard, which is based on ISO Guide 
73 (2007) to be discussed in more detail later. In many cases risk 
identification, analysis and evaluation have to be carried out separately due to 
issues like volume of information and time.
Overall the Risk Management process specified is very similar to AS/NZS 
4360 and exhibits the same advantages and disadvantages, mainly the 
inability to follow a process flow.
Although still in draft form this standard does not currently exhibit the clear 
concise views which have been missing from the risk management domain 
and are required to direct risk management across industries in this global 
society. The use of guide 73 for the terminology provides a single reference 
point for risk terminology although the clarity of the terms and their 
relationships needs to be investigated further.
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2.4 Terminology
Issues with terminology have already been highlighted along with the 
importance of having a consistent set of terminology on which to base 
practices. This section will investigate literature which defines general risk 
terminology focusing on guide 73 a key reference. The section will also focus 
on the definition of a risk which itself provides much confusion.
The ISO Guide 73 Risk management - vocabulary provides the basic 
definitions of risk management generic terms. The aims of the guide are to 
"encourage a mutual and consistent understanding, a coherent approach to 
the description of activities relating to the management of risk, and use of risk 
management terminology in processes and frameworks dealing with the 
management of risk."
The guide is split into four groups of terms:
• Basic Terms %
• Terms related to people or organisation affected by risk
• Terms related to risk assessment
• Terms related to risk treatment and control
This work focuses on the basic terms referencing specific relationships where 
relevant.
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Figure 2-22 - Risk management vocabulary
The guide defines 17 basic terms many of which have multiple definitions 
including risk which has one main definition and two variations. Each 
definition provides references to other defined terms used within.
The diagram in Figure 2-22 shows the terms and their relationships as defined 
by the guide and has been defined in this way to enable consideration of the 
terms and relationships defined within the standards. It will also be used to 
enable a comparison to be carried out between the terminology within guide 
73 and AS/NZS 4360. The figure shows that more than half of the terms 
defined related directly to the definition of risk. The number of direct 
relationships to the definition of risk presents issues when factoring in the 
general lack of relationship from these terms to any other definition. The main 
issue is that many of the terms appear only to be related to the definition of 
risk as they include the word risk. This concern is supported by the repetition 
of relationships, two relationships 'direct' and 'control' risk, three relationships 
provide intentions, policies, procedures or decisions relating to the 
management of risk.
Within Figure 2-22 there are also two relationships marked as « im p lie d »  
these are not stated by reference but is suggested by the notes associated
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with the definition.
When the same modelling principle is applied to the other sets of terminology 
similar results are achieved, risk treatment for example is referred to as a 
process, activity and a measure (solution) in ISO 16085 (2006)
On the whole the definitions are unimaginative and unclear for instance "Risk 
Management System - management system to direct and control and 
organization with regard to risk 3.1.1". The re-use of the defined term in the 
definition only leaves six words to define the term. This only reference is to 
Risk, not to the risk management process, plan or policy which the notes 
suggest.
The Australian standard AS/NZS 4360:2004 provides its own set of 
terminology, Figure 2-23, which has been discussed earlier in this chapter. 
The issues discussed will be used to provide a comparison for those in the 
ISO Guide 73.
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actions taken to 
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Loss
Risk retention
Control
Likelihood
Risk criteria
Probability
Organization
Monitor
Ftesidual risk
Stakeholders
Risk
Risk avoidance
Ftisk Treatment
Fiisk evaluation
Risk
identification
Control
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Ftisk
Ftisk
management
Ftisk
Management
Process
Ftisk
management
framework
Figure 2-23 - AS/NZS 4360
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Many of the issues are exhibited by both standards.
• Much of the terminology being related directly and only to risk rather 
than other relevant terminology from the set.
• The lack of direct relationship between risk and consequence and
likelihood as in both standards it is implied that there is a direct
relationship but this is not clear within the definitions.
Both standards have their own advantages.
• ISO 31000 provides relationships from all of its terms which is a step 
forward from AS/NZS 4360
• AS/NZS 4360 incorporates process terminology where ISO 31000 
separates it into a different set of definitions.
There are other similarities which may be useful to note.
• The relationships between consequence and event are almost identical
• They both provide detail regarding the composition of risk
• They both ignore the composition of most terms other than risk.
The fact that both standards have similar issues with the definition of risk and 
the direct relationships they try to assert between management terms and risk 
highlight the need for a formalised approach to the definition of domain 
terminology.
The Unified Modelling Language (UML) Profile for Modelling Quality of 
Service and Fault Tolerance Characteristics and Mechanisms Specification 
(OMG 2008b) provides a UML profile based on the AS/NZS 4360 (1999) 
terminology, within this profile a risk is defined as being made up of a 
frequency and a consequence. This definition is shown in a note and in the 
2004 version of the standard.
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Figure 2-24 - QoS UML profile (OMG 2008b)
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60
It can be seen by the clarity and volume of relationships between terms in 
Figure 2-24 that this profile provides a better related set of terminology than 
either standard considered above. This profile provides a useful meta model 
to support IT Quality of service and the approach may be of use in supporting 
a more generic model of risk terminology.
Mazouni and Aubry (2007) use the UML in a similar way but rather than 
defining a profile he has defined an ontology for Preliminary Hazard Analysis 
(PHA). PHA is a specific tool used for hazard identification, this case applied 
in the rail industry.
0 ..T
Q,.f
SEVERITY
tewxirejevcK): aisr
Figure 2-25 - PHA ontology (Mazouni and Aubry 2007)
This work again improves the clarity of the use and relationships between risk 
terminology and provides a definition of risk specific to PHA's. This definition 
includes occurrence, exposure and severity shown in Figure 2-25 taken from 
Mazouni and Aubry’s paper.
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2.4.1 Risk Definitions
The numerous definitions of risk and its surrounding terminology along side 
the lack of consistency in the relationships between terms provide a large and 
complex issue. To further understand the root cause of this issue focus will be 
placed on the on the central terminology 'Risk' to which authors and standards 
seem more able to relate detail.
This work will consider a number of risk definitions from texts and standards 
prior to drawing conclusions regarding overall issues with the definition of risk.
The financial definition taken from Harvey's financial glossary (2008) provides 
a succinct definition, depicted in Figure 2-26.
against ►
Asset
Risk
Degree of 
uncertainty
Figure 2-26 - Finance risk
This definition is focused on the loss of money, the Asset is providing a return 
and it is the uncertainty of the return that is in questions.
Leveson (1995) provides a number of definitions including risk and hazard. 
Leveson defines risk by saying, "Risk is the hazard level combined with (1) 
the likelihood of the hazard leading to an accident (sometimes called danger) 
and (2) hazard exposure or duration (sometimes called latency)."
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Figure 2-27 - Leveson risk
"Hazard exposure" requires an understanding of how long something will be 
exposed.
Although when in time an event may occur cannot be told, it could be after 
five minutes or one year. The point is that the same outcome could occur but 
with this definition it appears that the risk will be different. The point Leveson 
is trying to make is that the longer you are in a hazardous state, the more 
likely an accident is to occur e.g. the longer you sit in a tree the more likely 
you are to fall out.
Roland and Moriarty (1990) states "risk is associated with likelihood or 
possibility of harm. Put another way, it is the expected value of loss."
Value
HarmPossibility
Loss
Risk
Figure 2-28 -  Roland and Moriarty's risk
"Risk" may still exist if either "Possibility" or "Value" is not present; the empty 
diamond denotes this. This definition shows two very different ideas of what 
risk is, although Roland and Moriarty have used one as an example of 
another. They are saying that the "Value" of "Loss" is equivalent to 
"Possibility" of "Harm".
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Storey (1996) in his book on safety critical computer systems also defines 
both risk and hazard. Storey poses a definition which is that "risk is a 
combination of the frequency or probability of a specified hazardous event, 
and its consequence."
M  of combined
withEvent Frequency
Risk
Consequence
Figure 2-29 - Storey risk
It is the "Frequency" of an "Event" combined with the "Consequence" that 
makes up "Risk". There is a problem, which can be seen in this diagram, the 
use of the word 'combination'. The problem here is that there is no 
explanation of how to combine the relevant information. It is unclear as to 
whether the subjects are added, subtracted, multiplied or combined by 
another means.
BS 6079 (BSI 2000) describes risk as the 'uncertainty inherent in plans and 
the possibility of something happening that can affect the prospects of 
achieving business or project goals'.
that can affect prospect of 
achieving
contingency Goals
Risk
Project Business
Uncertainty inherent 
 In plans_____
Possibility of 
something happening
Figure 2-30 - BS 6079 risk definition
This definition uses vague terminology - it is not difficult to agree that there is 
'the possibility of something happening'. This definition is bordering on the 
possibilistic discussed by Clarke (2007).
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BS 8444 (BSI 1996) defines risk as the 'combination of the frequency, or 
probability, of occurrence and the consequence of a specified hazardous 
event'.
of specified ►
Risk
Frequency or 
probability
Occurence and 
consequence
Hazadous
event
Figure 2-31 - BS 8444 risk
An interpretation of the definition in BS 8444, shown in Figure 2-31, provides 
an understanding of a strong relationship between 'hazardous event' and 
'occurrence and consequence', it is strange however that Occurrence and 
consequence are combined as there could be many possible consequences 
for any one occurrence.
EN 50126 (CENELEC 1999) defines risk as 'the probable rate of occurrence 
of a hazard causing harm and the degree of severity of the harm'.
of occurence causing ^
Risk
Hazard
Probable rate
Harm
Degree of 
severity
Figure 2-32 - EN 50126 risk Definition
Figure 2-32 shows a level of separation between the probability (Probable 
rate) and the harm. This separation raises questions as to which probability is 
specified in the definition. It is not clear whether it is the probability of the 
Hazard occurring or the harm.
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Seven definitions of risk have been considered and a number of similarities 
can be identified including; use of probability, focus on outcomes, use of 
hazard, dependency on timing and multiple interpretations.
The first of these similarities the use of probability can be seen in many of the 
definitions through the use of words like frequency, likelihood and uncertainty. 
These terms all infer the use of probability in risk. For probability to mean 
something in terms of risk it must be relevant to its mathematical definition 
and therefore the sum of all probabilities must equal one.
The definitions above all in some way refer to an outcome. Some consider 
this to be harm, accident or consequence. The problem with accident and 
harm is that they only take into account one view of the argument - the 
negative effect. To gain a fuller picture future (Hollnagel 2008) and positive 
(Flage and Aven 2009) consequences must also be considered.
A number of the definitions incorporate Hazard, a word which could be 
considered to have as many definitions as risk. In general it is used to signify 
an event pre-ceding the outcome or consequence under scrutiny (Woodruff 
2005, Stevens and Thevaranjan 2009 and Gamper and Turcanu 2009).
The use of words like consequence and hazard ensure that a reader of the 
definitions will be considering issues beyond or before the 'event' that is the 
focus as suggested by Woodruff (2005). Considering the chance of an 
individual being rushed to hospital, as a consequence, has very little to do 
with the risk that this is the consequence of.
The last point, interpretation, is amplified by Roland and Moriarty (1990) as 
they provide two definitions within one. Their definition discusses possibility 
and harm and talks about Value and loss as an example. This implies that 
value would relate to possibility and loss to harm. Although this sounds 
reasonable the value of loss, say £5,000 by itself cannot be linked to any 
probability. This may be a bad example on their part but it goes to show risk is 
easily misunderstood.
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Remenyi and Heafield (1996) summaries this discussion well by stating that 
"Risk is a challenging concept to define, understand and ultimately to 
manage. This is primarily because risk often means different things to 
different people." This is supported by Aven and Kristensen (2005) through 
the statement of their view "that the concept of risk, risk assessment and risk 
management have not yet been sufficiently developed".
There are however a number of commonalities between the ideas discussed 
above; one of these is that to understand risk a value must be provided 
(whether numerical or descriptive) detailing the chance of occurrence of an 
outcome. Another is that there must be a set of outcomes in order to 
understand fully the whole set of risk. There will always be events that occur 
prior to and soon after the outcome that is of concern. Finally, every outcome 
must be traceable from its cause or hazard.
2.4.2 Terminology Summary
In summary there are a number of issues with the term risk and the 
terminology which is associated with it. Initially there is a lack of coherence 
between authors and standards including those yet to be published. Those 
authors or standards providing definitions of more than one term very rarely 
enable a user to navigate through the terms and the inclusion of timing in the 
definition of risk, through the use of hazard and consequence, reduces the 
focus on identifying and defining a risk before it is analysed.
A solution too many of these issues would be to provide an ontology for risk 
defining the terminology and the relationships between those terms defined. 
This would enable users to understand the scope of each term individually 
and provide the associated terms which they would expect to hear in relation 
to those initially defined.
Each set of terminology along with each industry has its own tools and 
techniques which will also be impacted by this terminology and would benefit 
from a single unified source.
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2.5 Tools and techniques
Much of the focus of risk management research past and present is on tools 
and techniques; tools are the software, hardware and document templates in 
and through which data is captured to give meaning and/or understanding to a 
risk or hazard. Techniques are the approaches or methodologies used to 
gather the data and calculate the results for specific risks. Tools and 
techniques are often grouped together as it can be difficult to differentiate one 
from the other.
Many types of tool and technique exist to support the definition of a risk, 
understand causes of risks and to understand consequences. Leveson 
(1995), The IRM and AIRMIC's risk management standard (2002) and ISO 
31010 (2008b) all provide list of tools and techniques. Leveson provides a 
critical analysis of each whilst ISO 31010 provides a matrix showing in which 
areas of risk each tool or technique can be applied.
These three references provide a list of 73 tools, techniques or methods. The 
IRM categorise their list into risk Identification techniques and risk analysis 
methods and techniques. These categories equate to the areas incorporated 
in risk assessment according to ISO guide 73 (2002). The latter of the two, 
risk analysis methods and techniques, groups the techniques into upside risk, 
both and downside risk.
ISO 31010 states that four of the methods identified apply to all steps in the 
risk management process these methods are Failure, Modes, Effects and 
Criticality Analysis (FMECA), Reliability centred maintenance, Structured 
What If (SWIFT) and Environmental risk assessment. It is more likely that 
these tools provide information related to terminology which is used in each 
step rather than as the standard implies - if you have used this method risk 
management has been carried out satisfactorily.
Many of the tools, techniques or methods provided by the references above 
have been tailored for specific applications or industries including
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• human factors Cacciabue (2005) and human health Davis et al (2008)
• political acceptance criteria Ale (2005) and local empowerment Nilsen 
(2008)
• supply chain disruptions Adhitya et al. (2007), procurement Aggarwal 
and Ganeshan (2007) and operational risk (Dalla Valle and Giudici 
2008)
• International project risk management Han et al. (2008) and post project 
learning Dikmen et al (2008)
• Pedestrian surface evaluation Hunt-Sturman and Jackson (2009)and 
water treatment Hess and Bernard (2008)
In many cases such as with Kirchsteiger (2008) the use of a tool or 
methodology is referred to as 'Risk assessment'.
In truth 'Risk assessments' provide a variable output dependant on the user. 
This is discussed in detail by Leveson (1995) when concluding her tools and 
techniques discussion. In this discussion she explores results from 
independent groups applying the same methods to a system and finds 
inconsistent results with too much variation to be the tool alone.
Tools, methods and techniques provide detailed information regarding a risk 
or the approach to calculating risk. Many authors are trying to further refine 
these risk assessments for specific industries and applications. In many cases 
they are re-defining the terminology of risk along side their tailoring of the risk 
assessment.
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2.6 Conclusions
A number of issues with the existing process and terminology associated with 
risk management have been identified during the investigation the purpose of 
which was to review and understand the terminology and processes related to 
risk management.
The lack of change in the risk management process is a major issue and can 
be seen throughout this chapter from Bohems definition to the yet un­
published ISO 31000 standard. The lack of change shows that there is little or 
no recognition that the risk management process may not be fulfilling its aims. 
The lack of any updates to the process and the inability of the process to fulfil 
its aims suggest a re-evaluation using a pragmatic approach is required. To 
ensure that the relevant level of rigour is also incorporated a formal approach 
incorporating the definition of terminology and artefacts would also be 
advantageous.
The lack of clear well related definitions hinder progress in risk management. 
There does not appear to be any recognition that in this semantic world/age 
loose relationships between terminology do not provide enough definition or 
scope to the terminology in question. Both authors and standards must 
recognise that definitions by themselves are no longer enough; ontologies 
must be defined and published to show relationships between terms as well 
as their definition.
Due to the variation in scope and depth of application no further work on tools 
and techniques is proposed. The issues with risk management process and 
terminology suggest that it is the wider, system view which needs 
improvement and formalisation. Chapter three will investigate an approach to 
providing the formalised view of risk management required.
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3 Research Methodology
3.1 Introduction
This chapter outlines the philosophical and practical approach taken toward 
the development and implementation of this work. It discusses the 
appropriateness of phenomenological and positivist perspectives discussed 
by Remenyi (1998) and selects a research strategy before identifying tactics 
which may be used for the identification of solutions and the demonstration of 
the application of the solution proposed. It also considers the implications of 
generalisation and validation.
3.2 Methodology
3.2.1 Strategy
It is envisaged that the initial research question will be developed through the 
understanding of literature providing a document based approach to the initial 
questions. These questions will be tested through the interpretation of a 
number of cases. The intention is to take a cross sectional view of these 
cases providing a variety of contexts in which issues may be identified.
In this way the research will be of an empirical nature understanding concepts 
based on the experience of the researcher and the processes identified 
through the initial studies.
It is anticipated that one of the issues within the research area is the lack of 
ability to recognise and integrate the positivist and phenomenological mind 
sets, with many people unable to release their positivist scientific 
backgrounds. With this in mind the intention is to ensure that this work takes a 
phenomenological approach enabling the identification of those areas which 
are currently lacking.
Although a mainly phenomenological approach is suggested it is likely that the 
final study although phenomenological in outlook and application will be
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positivist in nature -  the intention will be to search for cases in which the 
proposed solution does not work.
3.2.2 Tactics
Specific research tactics will be applied within the initial evidence gathering 
case studies and the final application study. The tactics are likely to include:
• Case study
• Action research
• Ethnography
• Participant observer
It is envisaged that a number of issues may arise during the execution of this 
work due to the implementation of these tactics. Issues include the inevitable 
bias due to the researcher being part of the team within the case studies and 
the cultural acceptance of a phenomenological approach within positivist 
domains.
Where issues with the mind set of participants is an issue case studies may 
be excluded or discontinued due to the resource and time available to change 
the organisational culture. Participant observation and researcher in the team 
issues will be unavoidable as it will be necessary to transfer the knowledge of 
the proposed solution to other participants, in some cases the participants 
may not know that research is being carried out, in these cases there will be a 
long term ethnographic type relationship with the organisations in question.
3.2.3 Generalisability
It is anticipated that this work will provide a generalised approach to the 
management of risk from a phenomenological viewpoint. Generalisation of 
evidence based on a phenomenological approach is not usually 
recommended however in this case the work will be carried out in relation to 
the already generalised definitions of risk management. These existing 
general definitions will enable direct comparison between the options 
proposed within this work and current understandings.
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4 Application
4.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the requirements for a model based 
framework for the formalisation of risk management and propose a framework 
which fulfils the requirements.
The chapter begins by defining the requirements for and choice of 
formalisation framework. It continues by providing reasoning behind the 
choice through the use of some basic concepts and their relationships to 
specific applications.
The Unified Modelling Language (UML) is selected and introduced as a high 
level formalisation tool. To show that the UML can be used as a tool for 
providing a formalised view of risk management a number of existing 
applications of the UML are identified and the role of the UML within the 
application discussed.
The first group of applications is taken from the IT/IS domain, the UML's 
domain of origin, showing the breadth of application within its domain. Next, 
various applications from a group of domains not traditionally associated with 
the use of the UML are discussed, The aim is to show that the UML not only 
applies to IT/IS but it has also been applied to the formalisation of other 
domains.
Each existing application will be related to a number of systems concepts to 
show the breadth and depth of the use of the UML.
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4.2 Technique selection
To provide a consistent understanding of risk management it is desirable to 
have a common approach to the consideration of all concepts being 
investigated and defined.
The framework selected to carry out the formalisation of risk management 
must:
• use a modelling approach
• be capable of providing an understanding of the current terminology of 
risk management
• be capable of providing an understanding of
• be applicable to the definition of ontologies and taxonomies and
• be an accepted approach for the definition of processes.
Use a modelling 
. approach
✓ ^ r o r m a l is e N . Constrain
approach to the \  
managem ent of J  
N  risk > /
Look at current 
definitions
in c lu d e
Terminology
include.
include*
X  Provide >  
understanding of 
information for risk 
Nwmanagement^/
Define ontology
Look at current 
processes
include^
ind u ct
[Define processes]
Figure 4-1 - Requirements
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These detailed requirements abstracted from the leaf use cases in Figure 4-1 
describe the uses of the framework. The framework itself must still fulfil the 
needs of formalisation including enabling, consistency, repeatability, multiple 
views and pragmatism.
4.2.1 Framework Selection
Options for the provision of the framework required will now be considered. 
These options focus on modelling languages as languages provide an 
abstraction from specific applications.
Table 4-1 lists 10 graphical modelling languages showing their ability to model 
current terminology and processes, define terminology and processes, and 
provide a formal output.
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Table 4-1 - Framework Options
Name/Ref Description Termino
Current
logy
Defn.
Process
Current Defn.
Formal
Business Process Modeling 
Notation (BPMN) (OMG 2008a)
A general process Modelling language. N N Y Y N
EXPRESS and EXPRESS-G (ISO 
2004)
An international standard general-purpose data modelling 
language.
Y Y N N Y
Extended Enterprise Modeling 
Language (EEML) (Krogstie 2008)
A multi layer approach to modelling business processes 
including goals and resources.
UML UML Y Y ?
Flowchart (ISO 1985) A schematic representation of an algorithm or process, N N Y Y N
IDEF A family of modelling languages, including IDEF3 for business 
process modelling and IDEF5 for modelling ontologies.
IDEF 5 
Y
IDEF 5 
Y
IDEF 3 
Y
IDEF 3 
Y
N
Object Role Modeling (ORM) 
(Halpin 2008)
A method for relational modelling, that can be used for 
information and rules analysis.
Y Y N N N
Petri nets (Girualt 2002) A technique for the description and analysis of processes, 
specifically focused on concurrent processes in distributed 
systems.
N N Y Y Y
Specification and Description ^  
Language(SDL) (ITU-T 1999)
A specification language targeted at the behaviour of 
distributed systems.
N N Y Y Y
Systems Modelling Language 
(SysML) (OMG 2008c)
A domain-specific modelling language for systems engineering 
that is defined as a profile of the UML.
Y Y Y Y Y
Unified Modeling Language (UML) 
(OMG 2007)
A general-purpose modelling language that is an industry 
standard for specifying software-intensive systems. UML 2.0, 
the current version, supports thirteen different diagram 
techniques, and has widespread tool support.
Y Y Y Y Y
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Based on the information shown in Table 4-1 the UML and SysML are the 
only languages able to fulfil the requirements stated above, specifically the 
ability to define both process and ontology. As the SysML is a profile of the 
UML with some specific additions it is possible to select both. The main work 
of defining ontology and process will be carried out using the UML and use 
concepts from the SysML where relevant.
To further support the use of the UML a number of example applications have 
been investigated. These example applications have been categorised by 
industry and are related to a general set of terms which can be used to 
describe concepts within a systems understanding.
is a use of UML 
-fef-i---------------------
taken
fromOrganises ►
Development
Industry
Application
Software
Development
Life Cycle 
Model
Life Cycle 
Concept
Software 
Development 
Process Definition
Figure 4-2 - UML Concepts Usage view
The diagram in Figure 4-2 shows the basic concepts to which this chapter 
relates the applications it describes. The major concepts are Life cycle 
concept and Development. The Life Cycle Concept provides all of the 
organisation tools including life cycles, life cycle models and the processes 
which are executed within them. In this diagram the Software Development 
Process Definition has been shown as software is the recognised origin of the 
UML. The need for the Life Cycle Concept lies in the need to organise the 
work being carried out, this work has been captured with the use of the term 
Development. Development in this case is the activity of the people carrying 
out the work whether organised by life cycle and process or not.
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Deployment/Commissioning
Figure 4-3 - Development
Development can be considered a wide concept, a statement with which 
NATO agrees based on its definition of the software development process, 
from their standard AQAP-150 (NATO 1997), the process by which user 
need/requirements are translated into a software product. Somerville (2007) 
suggests that software development is where the software is designed and 
programmed. However he surrounds this definition with the concepts of 
specification, validation and evolution.
Using these definitions as a basis a set of activities likely to occur within a 
development has been proposed in Figure 4-3. These abstracted activities 
are; requirements, architectures, design, implementation, testing and 
deployment. The activities may sound like processes or life cycle phases: in 
this case they represent the natural practices which people will carry out even 
without a process or lifecycle in place.
These two diagrams showing the concepts and the activities within a 
development can be used together to relate example applications to the life 
cycle concepts and development. The examples will firstly be taken from the 
IT/IS domain followed by defence, rail and then science/education each 
application will have a brief explanation outlining its work and highlighting the 
areas that were aided through formalisation using the UML.
The first area to be investigated is the IT/IS domain. It has been named IT/IS 
to ensure that some of the wider issues associated with Information Systems 
can be captured as well as those associated with the technology itself.
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Figure 4-4 - UML IT/IS Usage view
Four IT applications of the UML have been considered including associations 
with the life cycle concepts and development activities. It can be seen in 
Figure 4-4 that these four applications apply to different aspects of the 
development and Life cycle concepts the main points from each application 
are detailed below.
Code Generation and Software Patterns:-Peckham and MacKellar (2001) 
used the UML to record design patterns from the database community, once 
recorded the known good patterns were incorporated into high level 
conceptual models for new software. The re-use of design patterns enabled 
speedier design and implementation.
Semantic web:- Baclawski et al (2001) investigates the use of the UML as an 
ontology development language by comparing it with existing markup 
languages. He concludes that incompatibility issues can be resolved through 
the definition of a UML profile.
The Unified Process:-The Unified Process (Jacobson et al 1999) defines a 
Life Cycle Model as an iterative and incremental model meaning that the 
stages in the life cycle are carried out once, with the processes being run
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many times within each stage.
Use Case Based Requirements:-Some (2005) defines an approach using Use 
Cases along side a number of domain models 'Class diagrams' to provide a 
formalisation of the requirements engineering process. This has been carried 
out to improve the link between customer need and the system design and 
implementation.
CORAS:-The CORAS project (Vraalsen et al 2004) applied the UML to risk 
analysis of security-critical IT systems and provides a tool-supported 
methodology for model-based analysis. This tool has been designed to apply 
across all development activities.
From these examples it is reasonable to conclude that the UML is accepted 
across the IT/IS domain as a tool which provides a level of formalisation and 
consistency which is not inherent in other system definition tools.
4.2.2 Application by Industry
This section provides a number of non-IT/IS applications of the UML. For 
each example it describes how the UML has been used to aid in formalisation, 
consistency and communication.
The first of these areas is defence where, with so many organisations 
contracting for and supplying equipment, a clear consistent approach to 
communication and system definition is imperative.
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Figure 4-5 - UML Defence Usage view
It can be seen from Figure 4-5 that three defence applications have been 
considered. These applications apply to different aspects of the development 
and Life cycle concepts the main points from each are detailed below.
Company A:-Company A uses the UML to define its life cycles and processes. 
When following the processes for system development all relevant information 
and artefacts are also developed and delivered through the medium of UML. 
This company is doing this to improve its Systems Engineering capability. It 
sees the use of the UML as providing consistency and formalisation to the 
work they are carrying out.
MODAF:-MODAF (2007) provides an Architectural framework for the UK 
Ministry of Defence (MOD). This framework is used to format information 
which in turn supports communication between the MOD and its suppliers. 
The MOD have suggested that the UML and SysML can be used to deliver a 
number of the views within the framework due to the level of formalisation 
offered by the UML.
Modeling framework:-Nicola et al (2007) discusses the Conceptual Modeling 
Framework-Ontology, this discussion is included as a chapter in the book 
Enterprise Engineering
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The use of the UML in military acquisition shows that there is an appreciation 
of the breadth of application which the UML can have. It is not only being 
applied to IS/IT projects but to any system delivery project within the MOD.
The rail industry has been an established industry for over 200 years. The 
safety culture that comes with this industry was not far behind. The reasons 
for this culture as discussed by Faith (2000) include a long history of rail 
accidents. As the world moves forward with both technology and expectation 
the rail industry must also improve.
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Application 
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Figure 4-6 - UML Rail Usage view
This work has considered three example applications from the rail industry. It 
can be seen from Figure 4-6 that these applications apply to different aspects 
of the development and Life cycle concepts.
Company W:-Company W use the UML for their system development this 
enables them to produce the minimum number of external artefacts by holding 
all of the system information in one central project repository.
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Interlocking Systems:-Modelling Interlocking System Requirements in UML 
(Bayley 2004). Interlockings are the safety system behind railway signalling. 
Their purpose is to inhibit a situation where two trains could be in the same 
place at the same time. Bayley discusses an abstract model of the European 
Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS) which can be simulated at the 
requirements level. This work enabled communication through the 
formalisation of the understanding of the ERTMS
PHA ontology:-Mazouni and Aubry (2007) uses the UML as a tool to define an 
ontology for Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA). This provides terminology 
which may be used to describe accident scenarios, risk calculation, severity 
calculation and risk reduction.
Standards Modelling:-Barrow (2005) applies UML to the modelling of 
standards to show the benefits that can be gained through a more formal 
structure and common communications medium. In this example standards 
modelling was applied to train activated warning systems and ERTMS.
The UML has been used in the rail industry to improve clarity, abstract 
multiple views and improve communications with suppliers effectively 
shortening supply time.
Science and education are aimed at formalisation, understanding and 
teaching. Bloom (1956) made a large contribution to this when they developed 
their taxonomy of education which sets out a number of levels of learning 
along with learning domains.
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Figure 4-7 - UML Science/Education Usage view
Four Science and Education applications of the UML and their associations 
with the life cycle concepts and development activities can be seen in Figure 
4-7. These applications apply to different aspects of the development and Life 
cycle concepts the main points from each are detailed below.
Cell Biology:-Webb and White (2005) used the UML to develop models and 
improve understanding of Cell biology
Cognitive Mapping:-McNellis (2005) used the UML to represent cognitive 
mapping methods improving the consistency within the maps.
Seven Views Approach:-The seven views approach to process modelling 
defined by Holt (2005) is adopted by the BSI as the best practice approach for 
modelling processes. This approach, defined using the UML, provides a 
formalisation and completeness to process modelling.
Stumpi:- Holt (2004) uses the UML to provide a tailored life cycle complete 
with life cycle processes. This approach enables university students to 
understand the importance of Life cycles and processes before carrying out 
their degree projects following a defined life cycle model.
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4.2.3 Application Overview
When considering all the applications discussed in one view the breadth of 
application, based on basic concepts, can be appreciated.
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Figure 4-8 - UML Developed Usage view
Figure 4-8 is based on only the applications from the four domains discussed, 
however it provides an overview of the breadth of application of the UML in its 
use as a formalisation framework. It has shown that the UML can be used to 
define both terminology and approach.
The UML provides a multi view language based on the use of up to 13 
different types of diagram. The diagrams are inter-related, the relationships 
provide the ability to carry out consistency checks between diagrams enabling 
confidence in the concepts defined to grow. Both views and consistency are 
routed in an object oriented approach. Object orientation itself is not a concept 
which has been defined to aid in software development. It can be traced to 
Descartes thinking on human perception, well before software was 
considered. The use of object orientation providing multiple views, 
consistency and repeatability enables the UML to be used as a framework for 
formalisation. The following sections describe the way in which the UML will 
be applied to the visualisation and formalisation of ontology and process.
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4.3 Ontology Modelling
Examples of domain specific uses of the UML for defining ontologies have 
already been shown in the applications above. What is required in this case is 
an approach which in not related to domain.
IDEF 5 (1994) provides a generic approach to the definition of ontology using 
its own schematic and elaboration languages. The schematic language within 
IDEF 5 enables the definition of initial visual versions of ontologies however, it 
provide a large number of detailed constructs which could be considered too 
complicated for any initial version. The IDEF approach provides three 
schematic views Classification, Object state and Composition along with 
symbols which can be deployed onto the schematics. The main symbols are 
Kind, Individual an instance of a kind, process and relationship it goes on to 
define many types of relationship covering state relationships to physical 
parts.
Others including Cranefield and Purvis (1999) have been investigating the use 
of the UML as an ontology modelling language. Cranefields approach is to 
use the UML to describe an ontology and compare this with the advantages 
and dis-advantages of existing ontology representation languages used for 
knowledge based reasoning. Cranefield uses UML class and object diagrams 
to obtain what he describes as "both a highly structured model that could 
support automated reasoning and an expressive language that it would not be 
practical to attempt general-purpose reasoning wtih."
The approaches taken by Cranefield, use of class diagrams and IDEF5, 
definition of kinds and relationships, can be abstracted to fulfil the generic 
needs of defining an ontology, which is not focused on the use of automated 
reasoning, using the UML.
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Figure 4-9 - Ontology concepts & realisation
A generic definition of an ontology, as presented in Figure 4-9, shows 
Concepts which may be Terms or Relationships: the relationships relate terms 
to each other. The stereotypes, shown within the chevrons, define the UML 
elements which will be used to represent these Concepts on an Ontology.
4.4 Process Modelling
The approach to defining an ontology discussed above will provide an 
understanding of the concepts of risk and its management although alone 
they will not be enough. An Ontology will not explain how to carry out risk 
management as it only defines the terminology to be used in it as suggested 
by Spies (2006).
To provide an approach to the management risk we must define the 
behaviours and artefacts. The best way to achieve this is through the 
application of a process modelling technique. A number of techniques exist 
including BPMN (OMG 2008) and IDEF3 (1995) however, neither of these use 
the UML and therefore would reduce the ability to ensure consistency within 
the formalised approach.
Holt (2005) has provided an approach to using the UML as a process 
modelling approach known as the Seven Views Approach. Perry (2006) has 
conducted a comparison between the Seven Views Approach and the BPMN
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showing that the approach covers all of the views from the BPMN and 
provides extras to ensure that a consistent model can be created.
This section will provide an overview and introduction to the Seven Views 
Approach by presenting the concepts behind the approach and the way in 
which it is realised in the UML.
4.4.1 Process Concepts
There are three main concepts involved. The first is the Source, namely 
where the process knowledge is held. Knowledge may be tacit or previously 
recorded. The second Presentation; is the way the process is delivered to the 
end user. The presentation may have to vary for users who have different 
reasons for looking at the process. The third and possibly most important is 
Understanding this is where the process knowledge is captured and 
interpreted to develop a consistent and complete model of the process.
Presentation |UnderstandingSource
is formatted 
according topresents 
stakeholder's view oforganizes
Document TemplateProcess Document~~l Process ModelProcess Knowledge
describes 
purpose of
satisfies ^
Requirements SetProcess
d( sc ibes
Section
Customer
Author User
Supplier
Stakeholder
Domain Expert
Process
Validation
Process
Description
Figure 4-10 - Process Concepts View (Holt 2005)
The problem that occurs is the way that the Source and Presentation are 
related. In most cases, the person who has the tacit knowledge of the process 
records what they know and this record becomes the presentation. This is 
where the Understanding becomes important, to fully understand the process
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knowledge one needs a model to organise the thoughts, this model must 
explain why the process is needed and provide a clear and consistent 
description of the process.
The realisation view further expands the description of the process; it also 
relates the process modelling terminology to the concepts from the UML that 
will be used to realise them. The main advantage to this approach is that it is 
not relevant where one starts collating information. The fact that the 
relationships have been navigated is the most important point about this 
model as navigating the relationships ensures a complete and consistent 
model for the process.
The realisation view provides the overview of the seven views along with a 
number of the relationships which provide consistency when building up the 
detail within the views.
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Figure 4-11 - Process Realization View (Holt 2005)
A full picture of the process can be developed by producing these seven 
views (Figure 4-11):
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The Requirements View presents the need for the process: this can be very 
useful for checking whether a process is still relevant or requires updating as 
the needs may change over time.
The Process Content View provides a static view of the process, it shows the 
Process along with the Artefacts which are used and produced by the Process 
and the Activities which use and create the Artefacts. This view can be very 
useful in compiling a library of processes.
The Information View shows the relationships between the Artefacts within a 
Process: it can also be used to show the relationships between Artefacts in 
different Processes. This is very useful for understanding the documentation 
required from the process and provides a powerful method of reviewing the 
documentation to eliminate replication of documents, remove unused 
documents and show documentation updates over time.
The Process Behaviour View is the view of the process which everyone 
expects to see first and is the main view presented by BPMN (OMG 2008). It 
shows the order in which the Activities are carried out, any decision points 
within the process and where the Artefacts flow. It can also be used to show 
the Stakeholder responsible for ensuring that the Activities have been carried 
out.
The Stakeholder View presents the roles to be fulfilled in relation to the 
process, these will be consistent with the Stakeholders on the Process 
Behaviour View and Requirements View.
The Process Instance View is used to show the order in which the processes 
can be run, from a theoretical point of view, or have been run, as a way to 
record their execution on a project. Process Instance Views are also used in 
the development of project plans ensuring that the project relates to the 
processes which exist within an organisation.
Page 72 of 214
The Process Structure View shows the structure and terminology to be used 
within a process for an organisation. It can also be used to show the 
relationship between processes and life cycles.
In this work the basic structure shown in the diagram above will be used as 
the Process Structure View meaning that a Process will always be made up of 
Artefacts and Activities.
4.5 Conclusions
This chapter has discussed the breadth of application of the UML as a 
formalisation tool, presented an ontology for risk, a set of definition mappings 
to show the relationships between the ontology and existing standards and 
shown an approach to process modelling.
The applications of the UML have shown both breadth of usage across the 
IT/IS domain as well as three other industries, education, rail and defence. It 
has also shown a depth of usage with some applications applying to the 
whole development and others to specific aspects within. On the whole this 
chapter has shown that the UML can be used as a formalisation tool in many 
domains and as it provides a consistency within the language, improved 
communication and reduction in complexity.
The objectives of this chapter were to discuss the requirements for a model 
based framework for the formalisation of risk management and propose a 
framework which fulfils the requirements.
This chapter has achieved these objectives by defining the needs of a 
formalisation approach, selecting the UML as the formalisation framework, 
showing that the UML can be used in many and varying applications and as 
such is relevant for both ontology and process modelling, it has also 
described the way in which the UML will be used to model both ontological 
elements and processes. This work will continue by defining an ontology for 
risk management using the UML as a definition medium.
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5 Ontology
5.1 Introduction
The previous chapter selected the UML as an appropriate tool for the defining 
ontology, taxonomy and processes. The literature review, Chapter 2, showed 
the lack of consistency in terminology from national and international 
standards.
The objective of this chapter is to use the UML to define risk and present an 
ontology for risk management. This means defining the terms which can be 
used in the context of their relationships to other terminology. This will be 
achieved by firstly defining a risk and then widening the scope and 
incorporating some of the wider terminology which is associated with a risk.
5.2 Risk Definition
The following section presents a formalisation of the terminology and 
concepts of a risk, including a definition of a risk. Once defined this definition 
of a risk will be compared with a number of definitions discussed in chapter 2 
before presenting some advantages of this definition.
The section will be concluded with a description of an ontology for risk 
showing the relationships between the terminology discussed.
provides
probability of
Risk
Chance to Occur Outcome
Figure 5-1 - Generic risk
This abstracted definition (see Figure 5-1) has been written to apply to any 
situation or industry. In contrast most of those discussed in chapter 2 are 
industry specific.
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The definition shows that for a risk to exist there must be a Chance to occur 
and an Outcome. The Chance to occur provides the probability of the 
Outcome occurring. The Outcome described refers to the unwanted event. 
Outcome in many cases including Hollnagel (2008) and Aven and Kristensen 
(2005) is used interchangeably with consequence.
This definition has been purposely kept simple and, more importantly, 
singular. The singularity is to provide more clarity and consistency, if 
discussing a risk then it must be one risk. It would be counter intuitive to then 
refer to multiple outcomes in a risk. The Chance to Occur is also singular as it 
is logical that there can only be one Chance to Occur for any one Outcome. 
This singularity adds an orthogonal view when asking, have all outcomes 
been considered. For all outcomes to have been considered the sum of all the 
associated Chance to Occur must equal 1, assuming that Chance to Occur is 
presented as a probability. This suggests that a set of risks will be collated 
creating a 'Risk Set' which itself would need to be verified. A full investigation 
into the verification of completeness of a 'Risk Set' is beyond the scope of this 
work.
Risk Set
1 . . *
Risk
I
Chance to Occur
provides 
probability of
provide
Perceptionclassification
Outcome
shows the 
severity of the 
▼
Figure 5-2 - Risk Composition
Once a risk has been defined it is possible to apply a Classification to the 
Outcome. Classification in most cases is related to the idea of the severity of 
the Outcome when considering people and injuries, classifications are likely to 
include Insignificant, Marginal, Critical and Catastrophic. Classifications such 
as these are often related to the effect on people or a system and tend to 
focus on industry specific issues Kristensen et al (2006) discusses a number
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of classification schemes. Where people are concerned classification is rarely 
the only consideration it may also be necessary to understand stakeholder 
feelings towards the Outcome and Classification these feelings are known as 
the Perceptions.
Perceptions may help to define classifications but are one of the most 
dangerous aspects to understanding and treating risk; a perception is a view 
of the severity of the outcome from a specific stakeholder's understanding, 
this is discussed in depth by Belzer (2001) in his paper on grin and bear it 
practices in risk management. Perception is the focus of Pezzullo and De 
Filippo (2009) paper on emergency management in Hazmat logistics and is 
alluded to by Clarke (2007) when discussing probabilistic and possibilistic risk.
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Rnance Business
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Non Critical
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Figure 5-3 - Taxonomy of Outcomes
One approach to categorising systems and the types of risk that relate to 
them is to categorise the outcome (Figure 5-3)
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• Firstly is the outcome positive or negative? Most will no longer consider 
an outcome to be part of a risk once they have established that this 
outcome will benefit them. Hessami (1999) considered this in his paper 
on Risk a missed opportunity? Also Flage and Aven (2009) discuss the 
need to balance positive and negative outcomes through the use of 
portfolios.
• Once it has been defined as negative - is it critical or non-critical? Again 
non-critical outcomes tend to be forgotten.
• For critical outcomes is there a safety implication? This is where most 
start to consider outcomes as risks it is also the point at which most 
standards begin.
In many areas critical systems or safety critical systems are discussed. In 
these cases it is the Classification of the Outcome which is being used to 
select the category of risk. In many cases the category will then be 
transposed onto the name of the system to highlight possible outcomes and 
therefore the need for a more rigorous approach to the system definition and 
development.
One problem here is that in many instances there is no differentiation between 
the categorisation of a system and the classification of an outcome. 
Classifications may be assumed due to the categorisation of the system.
There is a need to be consistent about classification and categorisation of 
risk.
• Classification - relates to severity of outcome
• Categorisation - relates to the separating out types of outcome i.e. 
financial, marketing etc.
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Figure 5-4 - System vs Outcome
This diagram (Figure 5-4) has also linked these categorisations of the 
outcome to terminology which is used to describe systems - it must be 
remembered that there is no hard and fast rule as to how a system and an 
outcome are related, the words are generally used interchangeably and 
hence, one should be extremely careful with their use.
5.3 Associated Terminology
The following defines relationships between risk and some of the broader 
terms which are often associated and sometimes confused with risk.
5.3.1 Causal terminology
This work has not set out to define all of the terminology associated with risk. 
However, there are concepts which need to be considered to ensure the 
scope of risk management can be understood, hazard is one of those terms, it 
has been used here to group the terms from chapter 2 which cover the idea of 
events leading up to the occurrence of an Outcome.
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Figure 5-5 - Causal analysis
There are many ways to consider stimuli which precede the outcome defined 
in this work these will be called Hazards, Figure 5-5. The diagram also shows 
that the relationship between the Hazard and the Outcome is via Causal 
Scenarios, the fact that this is a scenario means that there could be many 
hazards leading up to the Outcome and it is important that these are recorded 
as they will be required for both causal analysis and definition of mitigations. 
The two salient points to be remembered about hazards are that they must be 
recorded and they must happen before the outcome, the Effect will happen 
afterwards, this is characterised by the bow tie model (Delvosalle et al. 2005).
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5.3.2 Consequence Terminology
Consequences or effects are all of the things that happen or need to happen 
after an Outcome has occurred.
provides 
probability of has an ►
relates to the 
probability of
Effect
Effect Scenario
Outcome
Risk
Chance to Occur
Figure 5-6 - Effect Analysis
Effect analysis is in essence opposite to the Hazard or causal analysis. It 
provides an understanding of what happens after an outcome has occurred 
Figure 5-6. Again it is important to record effects as they will, for those 
Outcomes which can't be removed, become the basis for the policies and 
procedures acting as mitigation.
5.4 M appings
As discussed in Chapter 2 there are already many definitions of risk; any new 
definition will need to have a justifiable difference. The difference in this case 
is that using the UML as a common language highlights similarities and 
contrast across existing standards and approaches enabling a dialogue to be 
held between risk experts in different industries. It may also provide a 
common base knowledge of risk before specialising in one area. This section 
presents four mappings between the definitions presented in this chapter and 
those discussed in chapter 2.
Mappings will be separated in to those which map directly to the definition of 
risk and wider mappings to the associated terminology. The mappings will 
highlight the differences between the terminology within the definitions which
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had previously been considered to be commensurate.
5.4.1 Definition mappings
The definitions which have been mapped include financial, project and 
technical. The technical definitions cover both safety and non-safety 
categorisations.
Rnancial Generic definition
Risk
Asset System
Return Outcome
Classification
Risk
Perception
Chance to OccurDegree of 
uncertainty
against
Figure 5-7 - Financial
Two direct mappings can be made from the financial definition, taken from 
Harvey’s financial glossary (Harvey 2002), to the generic definition, there is 
also a mapping to the wider concepts, Figure 5-7; direct mappings are 
between:
• Degree of Uncertainty and Chance to Occur,
• Return and Outcome - Return is the only outcome that the financial 
definition is concerned with.
The wider mapping is between:
• Asset and System - System has been added from the wider model to 
show the relationship to Asset. The concept of an asset has not been 
included in the generic definition in this way as it suggests ownership 
related to the outcome where other definitions may be concerned with
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Outcomes relating to people or property which isn't owned.
This mapping shows some interesting points regarding the financial definition 
of risk, firstly the sector has included the Outcome that it is concerned about 
in its definition. This means in terms of the generic definition that there is only 
ever one outcome to be considered and that is Return. Secondly the definition 
includes the system, this focuses the view to be taken of the system to purely 
financial, although this isn't a problem in the financial sector but would be for 
example in the railways where the safety consideration is key.
Project
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that can affect prospect of 
achieving
contingency
Uncertainty 
inherent in 
plans
Possibility of 
something 
happening
Generic definition
Perception
Classification
Outcome
A
leads to
Chance to Occur
Figure 5-8 - Project
Two direct mappings are possible between the project related risk definition, 
taken from BS6079 (BSI 2000), and the generic, there is also one wider 
mapping, Figure 5-8; direct mappings are:
• Possibility of Something Happening to Chance to Occur and
• Goals to Outcome
The wider mapping is between:
• Uncertainty Inherent in Plans and Hazard - in this case Hazard has been 
included from the wider model to show the relationship of Uncertainty to 
the causal effects of risks.
The fact that hazards are included in the definition shows that there is a
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dynamic aspect to the definition, it is telling you to consider the events leading 
up to the outcome as part of the definition of the outcome itself. The usage of 
the word goal in the definition is interesting as it provides a positive view of 
the outcome, a desired achievement, rather than the negative view which is 
taken in most cases where risk is considered.
Generic definitionSafety
Risk
Probable rate
Harm
Hazard Hazard
Risk
Outcome
Perception
Chance to Occur
leads to
of occurence of
causing
Figure 5-9 - Safety
There are three direct mappings between the safety based definition, taken 
from EN 50126 (CENELEC 1999), and the generic definition and one wider 
mapping, Figure 5-9; direct mappings are:
• Probable Rate to Chance to Occur
• Harm to Outcome and
• Degree of Severity to Classification
The wider mapping is:
• Hazard to Hazard
Similarly to the project definition hazard is incorporated here, again giving a 
dynamic complication to the definition. Severity which is also included 
provides classifications for the outcome, this has been included as a non­
mandatory part of the generic definition. It is much easier to define a relevant
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set of classifications within a well established industry, however if setting out 
on a risk management exercise for the first time it is unlikely to add value to 
the initial work.
Non-safety Generic definition
Effect
Risk
Hazard
Risk
Classification
Perception
Outcome
Chance to OccurFrequency or 
probability
Hazadous
event
Occurence and 
consequence
leads to
has an
specified
Figure 5-10 - Non-safety
There are two direct mappings and one mapping to the wider concept when 
considering a non-safety based risk taken from BS8444 (BSI 1996), Figure 
5-10. The two direct mappings are between:
• Frequency or Probability and Chance to Occur and
• Occurrence and consequence and Outcome - this is only a partial 
mapping as the Non-safety definition also relates to the effect of the 
Outcome after it has occurred.
• Occurrence and consequence and Outcome - maps specifically to the 
consequence element.
The wider mapping is between:
• Hazardous Event and Hazard.
This definition considers both the hazards and the effects of the outcome 
which makes a risk something almost impossible to consider as it includes all 
possible pre and post scenarios. This definition is closer to a definition of risk 
analysis rather than risk.
Page 84 of 214
5.4.2 Mapping considerations
Many of these definitions have inherent time considerations within them, 
these are generally seen through the use of the term 'Hazard' or 
'Consequence' which focus the reader on the pre-ceding and post outcome 
happenings. The definition presented here has removed this time 
consideration from the basic risk definition to focus the reader on the main 
issue the problem outcome. Obviously timing is still important and will be 
incorporated through relationships with the wider terminology and 
implementation of the associated processes.
Hazard has come up a lot in the mappings but does not play such a central 
role in the definition of a Risk, this work has chosen to eliminate the 
complexity of timing within the definition of Risk, hence the relationship to 
hazards which can then be investigated through causal evaluation.
There is still an unresolved issue with the term 'hazard' which may need to be 
replaced with a more general term which does not imply a negative. In many 
situations there is a level of synergy between hazard and risk which needs to 
be investigated further but is outside the scope of this work.
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5.5 Risk Ontology
Having defined the terms within risk and the relationships to surrounding 
terms this final diagram, Figure 5-11, relates the terms already discussed to 
the concepts within the processes and can be considered as a generic 
ontology for risk.
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, may 
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Causal Scenario
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Stimulus
Effect
relates to the probability of
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Figure 5-11 - Risk Ontology
A clear definition of terminology of risk including the relationships between the 
terms is imperative. Without understanding these relationships it is impossible 
to consistently discuss or manage risk. When compared with the Risk sub­
model within the OMG quality of service and fault tolerance profile for IT 
(OMG 2008b) discussed in Chapter 2 this provides a clear and usable set of 
terms and relationships which for risk for any industry or application.
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5.6 Conclusions
The objective of this chapter was to define risk and present an ontology for 
risk management.
Using the UML as a formalisation tool this chapter has presented a generic 
definition of risk and placed it within an ontology for risk management. The 
ontology provides the relationships between the definition and associated 
terminology.
The ontology is central to understanding relationships between other risk 
standards, to aid with this understanding mappings have been developed 
between the generic risk definition and the standards discussed in chapter 2. 
From these mappings a number of salient points were highlighted including 
the over complication of the definition.
The chapter has also shown mappings between the definition of risk 
discussed here and definitions discussed in chapter 2, this has enabled 
further clarity and questioning of the meanings of terminology from specific 
industries and how they relate to each other.
Understanding the terminology and ontology of risk and risk management 
provides a good grounding enabling a clearer expansion across the risk 
domain. Mappings further support detailed industry specific approaches by 
enabling recognition and supporting the understanding of relationships 
between generic and industry specific ontologies. However, this work can not 
stop at terminology - without a consistent approach to the management of risk 
the terminology and ontology will be of use for discussion but serve no 
purpose in practical application.
This work will continue by providing a formalisation of the risk management 
approach and methodology using the UML and the seven views approach.
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6 Processes
6.1 Introduction
Chapter 5 presented an ontology for risk, formatted through the use of the 
UML, presenting the terminology of risk management. It highlighted that this 
terminology although useful in its own right can not be used without processes 
to realise it.
The purpose of this chapter is to define the processes required to carry out 
risk management using a multi-view approach. This will be achieved by using 
the 'Seven Views Approach', discussed in chapter 4, to define the processes, 
behaviours, information and methodology for risk management. The chapter 
presents the six risk management processes defined by this work. After 
defining the processes a guide is given as to the expected outputs of the 
processes.
6.2 Process Formalisation
This section presents the Requirements View, Process Content View and 
Information View giving an overview of the all of the processes, it also 
presents the Process Behaviour View for three of the processes; that of 
Concern Identification, Risk definition and Evaluation. It is expected that these 
processes will be implementable within the framework proposed by the draft 
ISO 31000 Risk management - Principles and guidelines on implementation.
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6.3 Requirements View - Risk Management Requirements
The Requirements View provides an understanding of the things that need to 
be done to manage risk and the things that need to be understood.
Risk Management Requirements
Improve
enterprise Understand
context
Record
information ... structure
: constrains
constrains ... behaviourgorfstrains
Understand 
system ...
i-<£L" " "^constrains
Manage risk Identify risk
in c lu d e '~  ■•'VOrganisation include^
Define risks
Calculate risk 
values
include;include:
incl\jdi
Analyse r is k ...
... causes
Control/mitigate 
. risk
... effects
Figure 6-1 - Risk Management Requirements
Once it has been stated it is obvious that defining, analysing and controlling 
risk are things that must be completed to manage risk. However, the 
recording of such a fundamental concept of ’why this is being carried out' can 
often be missed BPMN (OMG 2008a) for example does not provide the ability 
to record why a process is being carried out. It is also easy to miss or forget 
those things which need to be understood; it is the act of recording them 
which provides focus.
The diagram above (Figure 6-1) provides a view of the reason for carrying out 
Risk Management in this case it is to improve an enterprise. In other 
situations it may be for health and safety, project planning or financial 
reasons. With an understanding of why risk management is being carried out 
the context in which it is being applied must also be considered. The context
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will ensure that the risk management has the right focus e.g. the risks to be 
considered are mostly related to people, technical or marketing questions.
6.4 Process Content View - Risk Processes
The Process content view provides a static representation of the processes 
showing the activities to be carried out and the artefacts to be produced or 
consumed.
System Modelling
System model 
Tailored context 
Source
Select system model() 
Enhance system model()
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Risk list
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Define perspective() 
Formalise list()
Evaluation
Tailored context 
Risk list
Evaluation outcome 
System model
Select risk()
Select Context/system model() 
Evaluate within current context() 
Formalise evaluation))________
Context ID Concern ID
Generic context 
Tailored context 
Source
Concern list 
System model 
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Elicit context concerns()
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Risk Treatment
Evaluation outcome 
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Figure 6-2 - Risk Processes
This approach to the definition of risk management processes has provided a 
set of processes, Figure 6-2, rather than the single process provided in most 
standards. This use of multiple processes each used as and when required 
enables a more flexible and realistic approach to risk management. It means 
that one process, Concern ID for example, could be used multiple times whilst 
the Risk Definition process may only used once.
A brief overview of each process is given here before the behavioural view for 
each process and overall information view are presented.
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Context ID:-This presents and discusses the contexts, the needs and scope, 
associated with an entity such as a company. These contexts provide the 
different points of view from which risk can be understood. They also show 
the relationships between different contexts.
System Modelling:-This retrieves or provides the relevant system models, 
these may be static or behavioural. The system models must relate to the 
relevant contexts.
Concern ID:-This process provides hazard, risks, causes, outcomes or 
worries based on context and system models. The use of context and system 
models to identify concerns provides a repeatable approach without relying on 
tacit knowledge.
Risk Definition:-This process is used to provide as much detail regarding a 
risk as possible this may include applying assessment techniques providing 
knowledge and detail of the risks.
Evaluation:-The Evaluation process applies a risk to the contexts being 
investigated this will provide an understanding of the risk on the system or the 
system on the risk.
Cause Evaluation:-The Cause evaluation process applies a risk to the 
contexts being investigated to provide an understanding of the effect of the 
system on the risk. i.e. it is looking backwards or into the system to see what 
in the system will cause or affect the outcome before it has happened.
Effect Evaluation:-The Effect evaluation process applies a risk to the contexts 
being investigated providing an understanding of the effect of the risk on the 
system, i.e. it is looking forward to see what happens in the system after the 
outcome has occurred.
Risk Treatment:-This process enables the decision as to whether any 
mitigation is necessary or to be considered. Once this has been agreed it 
provides possible mitigations for evaluation.
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Having defined the purpose of each process the behaviour also needs to be 
defined showing who the process is achieved.
6.4.1 Context Identification Process
This presents and discusses the contexts associated with any entity. These 
contexts provide the different points of view from which risk can be 
understood. They also show the relationships between different contexts.
There are a number of points to remember when defining contexts firstly, and 
this goes for all of the processes, they don't have to be finished at the end of 
the first run through the process - the process can and should be run again to 
add detail to the information. In addition to ensure that the contexts do not 
become over complicated it is worth applying Miller's magic number (Miller 
1956) for both the number of contexts and the needs defined within.
Requirements engineer
Source
.Generic Context
Tailor
context
(Context ID::)
:Tailored Context
Select generic 
context
(Context ID::)
Figure 6-3 - Context ID
• Select generic context - Selecting Generic contexts may be achieved
through the review of context libraries. In the case where sufficient
knowledge of the domain exists this activity may create a list of the context 
names to be fully defined later.
• Tailor context - Tailoring a context defines the boundary, stakeholders and
internal needs of a viewpoint. This tailoring relies on the ability to focus on
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the development of needs from a specific point of view. In the situation 
where contexts already exist this activity may only be a check to see that 
the contexts are still applicable. Where there is in-sufficient domain 
knowledge it is preferable to define a simple set of needs to be improved 
later when more information will be available.
6.4.2 System Modelling Process
This retrieves or provides the relevant system models, these may be static or 
behavioural. The system models must relate to the relevant contexts.
This process has not been defined to re-develop any system models that may 
exist, but to ensure that the benefit of re-use is gained in as many areas as 
possible existing models should be used and further developed where they do 
not provide sufficient detail in the area of focus.
System modeller
System Model
Source
Tailored Context
Select system 
model
(System Modelling::)
Enhance system 
model
(System Modelling::)
Figure 6-4 - System Modelling
• Select system model - The activity identifies the relevant models from the 
Source for specific Tailored Contexts. This activity is based on the premise 
that a system model will already exist for the defined contexts, for a 
system it may be the architecture or behaviour, for a company it could be
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the enterprise architecture (EA) or process model.
• Enhance system model - This activity ensures that the selected System 
Models match the boundaries, stakeholders and needs of the Tailored 
Contexts. This may involve changes to the models to ensure consistency. 
Notes should be made as to why changes have been made and record 
any issues which may affect the Source.
6.4.3 Concern Identification Process
This process provides hazard, risks, causes, outcomes or worries based on 
the Contexts and systems models.
A number of external factors are also generally considered here, they tend to 
include environment, Health & Safety, Human Factors, etc. if these have not 
been captured in a context or as external relationships on the system model. 
It is always important to capture the source of the concern so that more 
information can be obtained to ensure that full consideration is given when 
carrying out the risk definition process.
Risk manager
Formalise
concerns
(Concern ID::)
Concern List
Tailored Context
System Model
Elicit context 
concerns
(Concern ID::)
Elicit system 
model 
concerns
(Concern ID::]
Figure 6-5 - Concern ID
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• Elicit context concerns - During this activity any concerns based on the 
Tailored Contexts are identified, the Concerns may be linked to conflicting, 
missing, additional or unfulfilable needs. At this point a concern need not 
be a risk or a problem it can be any question that someone wants to ask 
about the system and although it would be preferred that it is based on the 
Tailored context or System Model this isn't a pre-requisite, other questions 
may in-turn provide improvements to the Tailored contexts or System 
Models.
• Elicit system model concerns - During this activity any concerns based on 
the System Models are identified, the concerns may be linked to parts of 
the system, communications within the system or the behaviour of the 
system. This could be as detailed as to question every relationship, 
attribute and behaviour.
• Formalise concerns - During this activity the concerns identified within the 
other activities will be recorded formally, this means that they must be 
named, numbered, referenced and described.
6.4.4 Risk Definition Process
The Risk Definition process is used to define risks and provide as much detail 
regarding each risk as possible this may include applying assessment 
techniques providing knowledge and detail of the risk.
It is important to note that this process has been defined to look at the risk 
from a static point of view, the inclusion of dynamics will be considered when 
carrying out the evaluation process.
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Figure 6-6 - Risk Definition
• Assess concern - During this activity each concern is reviewed and
categorised. The main category of interest is Risk i.e. this concern can be
considered to be a Risk. Other categories may be Hazard or Effect these 
could be used to signify the need to consider these concerns when 
carrying out the evaluations. A concern will be selected as a risk if it can 
be shown to be one of the main areas for concern. It would be nice to 
make this more scientific however this doesn't seem possible at the 
moment due to the wide variety of systems and organisations to which 
these processes may be applied.
• Define outcome - During this activity the outcome associated with the Risk
will be identified and recorded. This may required the use of a tool or
technique aimed at the identification of outcomes.
• Define chance to occur - During this activity the Chance to Occur of the
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Outcome will be calculated and recorded. This is likely to require the use 
of an assessment technique aimed at the definition of probability, it may be 
possible to choose an assessment technique from those referenced in 
Chapter 2. In some cases the Chance to Occur will be very difficult or 
expensive to calculate, in these cases there is a tendency to let the 
classification or perception lead rather than having a full definition. This in 
itself can be dangerous, however the values will depend on the 
assessment technique employed.
• Define classification - During this activity the classifications of the Risk will
be identified and recorded. Classification are discussed in the generic
definition of risk in chapter 2 however, specific classifications relevant to 
the situation may need to be developed. The classifications are defined as 
part of the generic risk terminology.
• Define perspective - During this activity the perspective of different
stakeholders related to the Risk will be identified and recorded. 
Understanding the perspective of a stakeholder or stakeholder group is a 
subject in its own right and has been discussed by many including Belzer 
(2001) in his paper on grin and bear it practices in risk management and 
alluded to by Clarke (2007) when discussing probabilistic and possibilistic 
risk.
• Formalise list - During this activity the information defined relevant to each 
risk will be recorded formally, this means that as much of the information 
as possible is complete and at a minimum each risk must be named, 
numbered, described and have an Outcome and Chance to Occur.
6.4.5 Evaluation Process
The Evaluation process applies a risk to the contexts under investigation 
providing an understanding of the risk on the system or the system on the 
risk.
This process has been defined with two specific types in mind, causal 
evaluation and effect evaluation. Causal evaluation provides consideration of 
all the events that occur leading up to the occurrence of the outcome. Effect
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evaluation provides the ability to consider the events that occur after the 
outcome, this may include exit procedures, notification of emergency services 
and clean up.
As the process for each, cause and effect, is the same other than the focus of 
pre-ceding or following events the overall process of evaluation will be 
described.
Risk Analyst
:Risk
Tailored Context
System Model
[More conte 
to assess]
Select risk
(Evaluation::)
Select 
Context/system model
(Evaluation::)
Evaluate within 
current context
(Evaluation::)
Formalise
evaluation
(Evaluation::)
:Evaluation
Outcome
Figure 6-7 - Evaluation
• Select risk - This activity chooses the Risk to be evaluated from the Risk 
List
• Select Context/system model - Selects a context and relevant system 
model within which the Risk will be evaluated. This is to ensure that the 
relevant evaluation is carried out, there is no point in carrying out a 
financial evaluation for a technical Risk before the technical evaluation has 
been carried out.
• Evaluate within current context - This activity applies the risk to relevant 
scenarios from the context to the system model. This will be carried out in
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conjunction with the use of any specific techniques identified. The result of 
the activity will be an increased understanding of the relationship between 
the risk and the system. This activity is defined as 'current context' as once 
evaluated for one context it is possible to follow the relationships between 
contexts and apply the Evaluation Outcome to the next context. This also 
provides an approach to effect analysis.
• Formalise evaluation - This activity ensures that a full record of the effect 
of a risk on a context has been kept.
Due to the use of tailoring applied to this process the cause and effect 
evaluation processes have not been described individually an example of 
each analysis is shown in section 6.7. The relationship between cause and 
effect is also investigated by Restrepo et al (2008) whilst understanding how 
different causes of accidents are associated with consequence measures.
6.4.6 Risk Treatment Process
This process enables the decision as to whether any mitigation is to be 
considered. If it is agreed that mitigation is required then the process provides 
Suggested Mitigations for evaluation.
It is important to remember that the development of mitigations may be 
projects or programmes in their own right, this process is designed to be a 
place holder to ensure that the relevant projects are developed in response to 
the risks and their evaluation. However, this does not mean that all project 
developments should relate directly back to risks or their treatment.
Risk Treatment in this manner could be considered to be the art of System 
Engineering in practice. Using the information gathered and derived through 
all of the other processes as a basis will provide all of the inputs to a standard 
Systems Engineering approach. It is important to ensure that treatments aren't 
defined for there own sake and remember that some risks can not be 
removed.
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Figure 6-8 - Risk Treatment
• Categorise evaluation - This enables the evaluation to be assessed 
effectively deciding whether the Risk is undesirable enough to require 
action to stop it occurring or reduce the effect.
• Develop mitigation - This activity allows for the development of mitigations 
to the risk, mitigations are changes to the current system that reduce or 
remove causes and effects of the Risk. The development of a mitigation 
may require anything from 5 seconds thought to a full system 
development, in some cases this could mean the creation of a new 
organisation.
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6.5 Information View - Risk Processes Artefacts
The processes described above have detailed activities to be carried out, they 
have also defined information and artefacts that will be used and developed 
within the management of risk. This information needs to be drawn together to 
ensure that it will be used and is not just adding red tape.
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Figure 6-9 - Process Artefacts
All of the Artefacts from the processes, Figure 6-9, must be related together to 
give an understanding of the reason for any one Artefacts existence, this 
could also go on to show external relationships where a document may exist 
for an audit or delivery purpose.
It is clear that the contexts and system models are related to understanding 
the source information, it is hoped that in many cases that the relevant source 
information already exists to maximise on re-use and remove redundancy in 
the duplication of existing models. Highlighting the fact that a concern and a 
risk are not the same thing is the difference in the detail required to 
understand each. A Concern is something that has a little information 
associated, it can be named and described but not much more where as a 
Risk has much more understanding and information associated with it.
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It is worth noting here that in comparison with the standard processes 
discussed in Chapter 2 there is a lack of communications and monitoring 
Artefacts. These artefacts have been omitted as it is expected that these will 
be part of an organisations standard process set and as such to re-define 
them in risk management would create redundancy within the organisations 
processes. If it is desirable to monitor the Risk to verify that it is still accurate 
then the Risk Definition Process should be executed at defined intervals for 
the specific risk or the whole list as required.
6.6 Process Instance View - Methodology
It is expected that for any set of processes there is a prescribed order of 
application. However, one of the main advantages of using object oriented 
process definition is that the processes can be used in many different orders 
providing flexibility to an organisation. This section describes two ways of 
applying the processes the first shows the theoretical ideal, as if starting from 
nothing, the second shows a more pragmatic approach accepting the fact that 
some information will already exist and that if there were no concerns then it 
is unlikely that the organisation would be carrying out risk management.
:Context ID iSystem
Modelling
:Concern ID :Risk Definition Evaluation :Risk Treatment
cr
Figure 6-10 - Theoretical ideal
When considering the theoretical ideal the first step would be to ensure that 
the scope of the work and the areas to be investigated were understood, this 
would move on to ensuring a consistent view of the system as it stands. With 
a full understanding of the scope of work and the system in place concerns 
with the system could be identified before specific risks defined. An evaluation 
of the risks would be carried out with a view to defining mitigations for them. 
This waterfall type approach, Figure 6-10, is presented by many as the 
approach to projects and life cycles, it has also been shown to work well on 
small well defined projects but not on large multidisciplinary undertakings, 
Royce (1970) defines the waterfall approach before saying that it is 'risky and 
invites failure'. For larger projects (or organisations) a more flexible and 
cyclical approach is needed.
lj
:Risk
Treatment
:Context ID Evaluation:Risk Definition:Concern ID:System
Modelling
Figure 6-11 -  Pragmatic approach
An example of a more pragmatic approach, Figure 6-11, would be to start by 
understanding the concerns first and based on these develop or retrieve the 
relevant sections of the system understanding. The contexts can then be 
developed with the knowledge of the areas to be considered before fully 
defining the risks. All of this work could be carried out multiple times before 
any evaluation is carried out or treatment defined.
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6.7 Process Support
The processes defined above detail the activities and artefacts required to 
carry out risk management. This section provides further guidance in the 
application of the ID Context, Risk Definition and Risk Evaluation processes.
6.7.1 Risk Contexts
It is well known that different types of risk exist in any organisation or entity. 
This is re-enforced by concepts such as balanced scorecard (Kaplan and 
Norton 1992) which identifies the need to consider the effects of Finance, 
Learning and Growth and Customer and Business Processes on the vision 
and strategy of the company. Zachman (1997) discusses different views 
within an Enterprise architecture framework looking at Data, Function, People, 
Time and Motivation; each of these he applies at different abstractions when 
looking at an enterprise. These views, whether based on Zachman or on 
balanced scorecard, are known as contexts.
The manner in which we are considering complex contexts and interactions 
can be equated to Senge (2006) discussing the systems issue of dynamic 
complexity; the whole being greater than the sum of the parts.
Project Context
Financial Context
People Context
Business
Context
Technical
Context
Marketing
Context
Figure 6-12 - Risk Context relationships
This set of six generic contexts and their interactions, Figure 6-12, provide a 
high level set of contexts, these can be considered as a starting point for 
identifying relevant contexts for risk management. These six contexts are 
Business, Finance, Marketing, People, Project and Technical.
When using the UML as a tool to aid understanding of contexts Use Case
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diagrams are used. These describe four main concepts:
• the Use Cases themselves which together describe the behaviour or 
desired achievement of the context,
• the System Boundary which encapsulates the Use Cases and therefore 
defines what is inside/outside the context,
• the Communications which represent the interactions of the context with 
the outside world and
• the Actors which are the things or people to which the communications 
connect (in this case these will always be other contexts).
All six Use Case diagrams will now be presented, starting with the Business 
context;
Business context
The Business context provides the overall mission of the company and the 
ways it believes it can achieve that mission
Hnancial
Project
Marketing
Achieve goals
constrains
Generate income
Tenets
Business context
include
Define capability
Deliver capability
Use Assets
Figure 6-13 - Business Context
The overall aim of this business is to Achieve goals within the realms of its 
tenets and it does this by defining capabilities, delivering capabilities, and 
using assets. Therefore the Financial context is interested in Generating 
income, the Project context is interested in using assets, the Project and 
Marketing contexts are interested in delivering capability and the Marketing
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context is also interested in Achieving goals.
Financial context
The Financial context deals with all things relating to the companies money.
Financial context
[Understand asset]
Understand
expenditure People
indude
Understand money Project
Understand incomeBusiness
Client
Figure 6-14 - Financial Context
The overall aim of finance is to understand money which includes 
understanding assets, understanding expenditure and understanding income. 
Understand money relates to the business context as this is the only way in 
which the business can work out if it is profitable or not, understand 
expenditure relates to the People context and understand income to the 
Project context. Understand income also relates to the Client
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Marketing context
The Marketing context considers the scope for sales including ways to 
improve the perception of the company and sales within the market.
Understanding the market includes understanding market share and market 
demand, it also constrains the improvement of market share. Improving the 
market share can be achieved by improving publicity and improving 
reputation. "Brand" is a specific way of considering reputation and can be 
considered separately. The Business context is interested in understanding 
the market whilst the Client will be affected by improvement of market share.
Marketing context
Market shareinclude^
Understand market
Demandinclude:
constraii
Improve market 
. share
Clientin c lu d e
inelude
Improve publicity
Improve
reputationBrand
Figure 6-15 - Marketing Context
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Technical Context
The Technical context is concerned with the product for its full lifecycle i.e. 
from concept through to disposal.
Technical context
Understand
Requirements
f  "include-Provide product
Project
include'
Understand design
constrains
Analysis Build product
People
Safety analysis Performance
Security analysis
Figure 6-16 - Technical Context
The Technical context is focused on providing products. To provide products 
the company must understand the requirements, develop a design and build 
the product. Within each of these areas analysis will be performed and this 
might include safety, security or performance related. There are obviously 
many other types of analysis but they can generally be classified into one of 
these groups. The Project and People context have relationships with "provide 
product'.
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Project context
The Project context is concerned with the management of projects.
Business
Rnancial
People
Technical
include' ^ 7
Manage Project
ipclude
Project Context
Cost
Time
Understand
income
Resource
Figure 6-17 - Project Context
The Project context is focused on managing projects which includes 
managing cost, time, resource and understanding income related to the 
project. The Business context is related to the management of the project 
along with the People context as people carry out the project. The Financial 
context has relationships with the resource, income and cost aspects of the 
Project context and the Technical context relates to the time and resource 
aspects.
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People context
This final context looks at the individuals involved in the organisation.
People context
Experience
Training
Marketing
Technicalinclude;include
Competence
Business
Motivation
Project
Financial
Figure 6-18 - People Context
The People context focuses on competence. Competence can be seen as the 
amalgamation of training or underpinning knowledge with experience or the 
skills developed through having applied that knowledge. A person's 
competence can also be affected by their motivation or attitude to work. The 
actors shown on this diagram cover all of the other contexts giving the People 
context the most complex set of interactions.
6.7.2 Context Conclusions
These six contexts provide a generic start point for understanding an 
enterprise however, they are not designed to represent any specific 
enterprise. As such they must be tailored to represent the enterprise in which 
risk management is being carried out. Approaches to the application of these 
contexts have been discussed in putting risk into context Brownsword and 
Setchi (2007).
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6.7.3 Risk Evaluation
This section provides further information on considering scenario analysis and 
the factors which cause and control risk.
The terms Hazard and Effect, from the previous chapter, are more relevant to 
the Risk Evaluation process and will be used within the example scenarios. It 
must be remembered that any Risk Evaluation will be relative to the viewpoint 
of the Risk Analyst and this is where the Tailored Context can be very useful 
for focusing the mind of the analyst to ensure that the right analysis is carried 
out for the right reason.
Scenarios provide a method of considering the behaviours that may lead to or 
result from a risk and we will discuss both a causal and effect scenario.
« Hazard » « Hazard» « Hazard» «Risk»
Ignition 
-------------1-------
Oxygen 
-------------1------------
Fuel 
-------------1------------
Fire
-------------1------------
surroundsQ
U U
ligljtsQ
starts ()
Figure 6-19 - Risk Evaluation example Causal scenario
Lets firstly consider a causal scenario in which Oxygen and Fuel come 
together with an Ignition causing a Fire. The scenario can be used in two 
ways initially. It provides an approach to understand how to cause fire this 
could be very useful in the event that we want to keep warm. It also provides 
a means to understand how to stop the fire occurring - remove Oxygen or 
Ignition or Fuel very useful for firemen to know when fighting a blazing house. 
This scenario provides a qualitative understanding of one cause of the risk - 
Fire - there may be numerous other scenarios leading to Fire which also need 
to be understood. The initial understanding via qualitative means can be used 
to lead on to quantitative definition which can be used to gather snapshot and 
trend data related to the risk.
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«Risk» « Effect.. « Effect»
Fire
-------------1------------
Furniture 
-------------1------------
Structure
burnsQ
U
burnsQ
de-stabalises ()
Figure 6-20 - Risk Evaluation example Effect scenario
Once the Fire is burning an Effect Scenario will show what happens next. In 
this case we will consider a Fire in a house fire, the Fire burns the Furniture 
and Structure of the house.
Again this provides a qualitative understanding of the effect of the Fire in this 
scenario, it is obvious in this case that we could move on to understand 
quantitatively the loss based on the occurrence of the risk. It is possible to use 
SysML parametrics to carry out this analysis in a bespoke manner as 
discussed in 'Formalising risk assessment through the use of SysML 
parametrics' by Brownsword and Perry (2009) however, SysML is not the only 
approach to carrying out the qualitative analysis but it does have the 
advantage of providing a Formalisation consistent with use of UML.
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Model
Control
cause ►
{Incomplete}
Risk
Business
Life Cycle SafetyProject
Technical
Non-Safety
Business
Standard
Factor
FinancialCompetence
Figure 6-21 - Risk factor overview
There are a number of factors which may both cause and control risk, some of 
these factors are Standards, Life cycle, Business and Competence each of 
these affects different and sometimes identical categories of risk discussed 
further in picturing risk Brownsword and Setchi (2005). Each of these factors 
can be considered at any point within a cause or effect scenario. These 
factors are similar to the categorisations within the Taxonomy-Based Risk 
Identification report by Carr et al (1993) where they have identified factors 
within each of the basic engineering processes and are used in a similar way, 
to support causal analysis.
6.8 Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to define the processes required to carry out 
risk management using a multi-view approach. This has been achieved 
through the application of the 'Seven Views Approach' which has been used 
to formalise and communicate the processes for risk management whilst 
providing a consistent method to identifying concerns, defining risks and 
evaluating their cause and effect.
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R isk  P rocess 
Concern ID
~M identifies concerns aboutRisk Process 
Context 10
delines views to be taken of System
records detail
^  improves theRisk Procest 
System Modelling
R isk  P rocess  
Risk Treatment
Risk Process  
Risk Definition
Defines detail of » oRisk
m a y
provide
Classification Perception
provides 
probability of ^  shows the severity of the
Chance to Occur
leads to ► has anHazard Outcome Effect
relates to 
probability of
Causal Scenario
investigates ►Evaluation  
Cause Evaluation
Stimulus
Evaluationinvesliqates
Effect Scenario ‘ Effect Evaluationrelates to the probability of ►
Figure 6-22 - Risk Ontology with processes
By providing these processes in a common language which is widely 
accepted for process modelling and mapping them to the terminology defined 
in chapter 4, Figure 6-22, a clearer understanding of a risk and the 
management of risk can be understood. This may be applied directly in 
industry, as is the case with the FDF/Seafish or for teaching - allowing 
students to better understand and question the terminology that they are 
presented with.
Using this common language to describe the output of the processes as well 
as the processes themselves is a major improvement enabling consistency 
across process and implementation.
The following chapter will detail examples of the application of the processes, 
contexts and taxonomy defined here.
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7 Case Studies
7.1 Introduction
A number of Case studies have been carried out during this work to support 
the definition, development and evaluation of the Ontology and Processes. 
The case studies have been carried out using a variety of applications to 
ensure a general nature in the processes and definitions already presented.
The objective of this chapter is to demonstrate the applicability of the 
processes and ontology. This objective will be achieved through the 
presentation of two paths through one of these case studies showing the 
processes applied in a pragmatic but formal manner. These paths are based 
on the application of the Ontology and processes to a charitable organisation. 
The first path looks at a health and safety concern and the second at a 
governance concern. The application of the processes to this organisation 
shows the benefit of using a formalised approach to the management of Risk 
and the ability of the processes to apply to different types of Risk.
7.1.1 Background
Charitable organisations must not only ensure that they are financially viable 
(that they have a business case) but also that they meet the needs of the 
beneficiaries of the charity while conforming to the rules set out by the charity 
commission.
Kings Norton Parish Church, winners of the 2005 BBC 2 Restoration 
programme, is such an organisation. Not only is it the custodian of two lovely 
restored buildings it is also a team parish, meaning that there are a number of 
staff members (clergy) to look after four churches, their congregations and to 
spread the word through the wider public.
The Kings Norton Parochial Church Council (KNPCC) has identified the need 
to improve the way in which risk management is carried out.
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7.1.2 Case study tactics
This study will be carried out using an ethnographic/participant observer 
approach discussed by Yin (1998), the researcher is already an established 
member of this community. Participants in the study will not be aware that 
research is being carried out.
The study will record the use of the ontology and processes defined for risk 
management. The application of the processes will be led by the researcher 
along with a small number of other members of the community, these 
members understand the need to carry out risk management and are happy 
to trail the processes. The data created through the use of the processes will 
be collected in two ways. General knowledge regarding the activities and 
relationships within the organisation will be stored in a relational database 
whilst information regarding the risks will be stored in the organisations 
enterprise architectural/risk management model.
The main aim of this study is to understand the practicality of using the 
ontology and processes, understanding firstly whether the processes can be 
applied in a pragmatic way and secondly whether they are flexible enough to 
deal with changes in the current situation in a timely fashion.
A benefit to this study will be the lack of existing risk management processes 
within the organisation. This lack will reduce the cultural change issues 
associated with the implementation of different approaches.
It is recognised that bias maybe introduced into this study due to the 
researchers ability to guide events. This will be mitigated through the use of a 
team approach to the approach followed ensuring that the processes and 
ontology are not forced onto the work which is to be carried out.
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7.2 Approach
The processes have been applied using the more pragmatic ordering 
recognising the fact that work has been carried out before and that there is 
some understanding of the concerns that exist. For this reason the case study 
will be discussed in three main sections.
1. The initial processes carried out identify the first set of concerns, 
contexts and risks. The risks which will then be taken forward and 
discussed further are an health and safety issue and a governance 
issue.
2. The health and safety risk shows the consideration of people’s needs in 
relation to the physical structure of the building and although other 
concerns are raised which could affect the solution the processes are 
adaptable enough to include concerns from other contexts.
3. The work to solve the governance risk shows how information can be 
recorded and retained to enable future concerns and risks to be 
evaluated in a more efficient way, it also supports the definition of a 
parish wide mission and the definition of job specifications for clergy.
Each section will be preceded by a sequence showing the order in which the 
processes from Chapter 6 have been implemented.
The first of these sequences can be seen in Figure 7-1 below.
:System
Modelling
context requiredQ
:Concern ID Risk Definition Evaluation :Risk Treatment
initial concerns()
Figure 7-1 - Initial Process Instance View
This work starts by executing the Concern ID process, it is expected that this
in truth is where most applications will start, one of the reasons for this is that 
it provides direction and scope to begin where contexts and systems models 
do not exist, this will then be expanded in future iterations to encompass other 
areas of concern. Following the initial identification of concerns high level 
contexts are suggested before ensuring that any immediate risks have been 
defined.
7.2.1 Initial Concern Identification
The initial concerns were elicited during a meeting of the KNPCC (as the 
governing body of the organisation).
Child protection :Concern
[Identified]
UID = C1
Nam e = Child protection 
reference (source) = Deanary 
Description = All child protection
Information View:: 
Concern
UID < ------- __
Name
Description
reference (source)
Urn :Concern
[Identified]
UID = C2  
N am e = Urn
Description = Urn m ay fall on someone  
reference (source) = PCC m em ber
Health & Safety Concern
[Identified]
UID = C3
N am e = Health & Safety
Description = Covering electrical and trip hazards 
reference (source) = PCC m em ber
:Concern
UID = C4
Nam e = Parish Review
Description = Parish profile is out of date
reference (source) = Team Rector
:Concern
UID = C5
N am e = Clergy numbers
Description = Ability to replace Clergy mem ber due to leave 
reference (source) = Team Rector
Figure 7-2 - Initial concerns
It can be seen that the initial concerns, Figure 7-2, vary in scale including 
governance, staff numbers, health and safety (a matter for any organisation 
with buildings and people) to an Urn. An explanation was required to 
understand what the Urn concern was, it suggested some large pot waiting to
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fall on some unsuspecting passer by, in actual fact it is a hot water urn which 
is located near a children's play area and could be occasionally left 
unattended whilst the children play. This is obviously a health and safety issue 
although focus is required, analysis and categorisation of concerns will take 
place at another point.
It is imperative to ensure that the terminology used throughout the application 
of the processes is consistent with that defined in the ontology. Here the term 
Concern is being used and the direct reference from the Information View for 
the processes has been highlighted, the reference helps to ensure that the 
correct terminology is used at all times.
7.2.2 Initial Context Development
With a number of concerns captured an overview of the organisation was 
required to give some scope to these concerns. A number of contexts in 
which the organisation works gives some focus to this and will enable a 
considered approach to the definition of structure and behaviour during future 
process execution.
Provision
Places
People Rnancial
Governance
(Core)
Figure 7-3 - Context identification
In this case only the high level contexts have been defined initially, Figure 7-3. 
These provide a start point for further consideration once a better 
understanding of the organisation has been achieved. These contexts may 
also be used to focus future work so that it considers specific areas in which 
the organisation works rather than floating around ideas which may never 
bear fruit.
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7.2.3 Initial Risk Definition
In the first instance the risks identified are the current priorities based on the 
situation that the organisation is in and those which are likely to show results 
in a reasonable time frame.
Information View:fiisk
UID
Name
Description
Outcome
Chance to occur
Classification [0..*]
Perception [0..*]
No new clergy :Risk
UID = R2
Outcome = No new clergy
Description = No new clergy for the parish
Classification = Resource
Chance to occur = Unknown
Perception = No new clergy will be perceived as a loss of clergy for the parish
Scalding child :Rlsk
UID = R1
Outcome = Scalded child 
Description = Hot water on child 
Classification = Safety
Perception = No-one wants to see a child hurt 
Chance to occur = Unknown
Figure 7-4 - Risk Definition
Again terminology is key, at this point Risks are being defined and the 
terminology used to define them must be from the Information View and 
therefore the Ontology. It is interesting that in both these risks, Figure 7-4, the 
Chance to occur is unknown this will be the case with many non technical 
risks as it is almost impossible to calculate the probability and where it is 
possible it tends not to be accurate. The only way to get close would be to 
base the chance to occur on a fraction of the number of children recorded to 
have been scalded in a set time frame, or to ask when it last happened in this 
building or those like it. The problem with all of these approaches is twofold; 
firstly there are so many variables that the chance to occur that is recorded 
will not reflect the true chance to occur of that outcome and secondly the time 
spent calculating the chance to occur is wasted as the perception and 
classification of the outcome mean that something will be done whatever the 
chance to occur actually is.
Having defined the risk it is also worth recording where it came from, this may 
be a relationship to part of the system model, context, another risk or concern.
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«trace •>
(from Concern ID 1 - Initial Concern Identification)
■trace'
(from Concern ID 1 - Initial Concern Identification)
«trace
UID = C4
Name = Parish Review
Description = Parish profile is out of date
reference (source) = Team Rector
Concern
[Identified)
UID = C2 
Name = Urn
Description = Urn mayfall on someone 
reference (source) = PCC member
Urn Concern
UID = C5
Name = Clergy numbers
Description = Ability to replace Clergymemberdue to leave 
reference (source) = Team Rector
Scalding child :FBsk
UID = R1
Outcome = Scalded child 
Description = Hot water on child 
Classification = Safety
Perception = No-one wants to see a child hurt 
Chance to occur = Unknown
No new clergy :Risk
UID = R2
Outcome = No new clergy
Description = No new clergy for the parish
Classification = Resource
Chance to occur = Unknown
Perception = No new clergy will be perceived as a loss of clergy for the parish
(from Concern ID 1 - Initial Concern Identification)
Figure 7-5 -  Risk - Concern Trace
In this case, Figure 7-5, both risks are based directly on the concerns that 
were raised. Although this is the case currently it is possible that other areas, 
structures or needs will be identified later that either re-enforce the definition 
of the risk or affect one of its attributes, possibly the perception or 
categorisation. This supporting information can be added when it is identified 
either during the execution of the systems modelling and context id processes 
or when next the risk definition process is carried out.
At the conclusion of the initial process execution a number of concerns, 
contexts and risks have been identified, each may raise many questions. The 
following will begin to ask some of these questions by both re-applying the 
processes used here and expanding the investigation through the evaluation 
and treatment of these two Risks.
7.3 Health and Safety Risk
The first path to be presented will consider the case of a child being injured 
through scalding. The development of a system model will enhance and 
support the evaluation of the cause and effect of the Risk before solutions, if 
required, are considered.
The added complication of extra concerns being raised which affect possible
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solutions to this Risk will also be discussed and an approach to incorporating 
these described.
Changes happen even in the most stable of situations, in this case the 
expected processes have been presented enabling a comparison later when 
extra inputs threaten to unbalance the approach.
Evaluation:Concern ID :Risk Definition :Risk Treatment:Context ID :System
Modelling
ref
Initial PIV
causal evalulationQ
effect evaluationQ
Additional concern()
Figure 7-6 - Scalding child Process Instance View
Following the initial processes, already covered, more detail was added to the 
areas directly related to the 'Scalding Child' risk, Figure 7-6, before re-visiting 
the definition of the risk to ensure all areas had been covered in the depth 
available. Both cause and effect evaluations were carried out based on the 
system model before considering changes to the system model that may 
provide solutions to the Risk.
7.3.1 Understanding the System
Understanding the current situation and recording the terminology behind it 
are the objectives of this execution of the system modelling process. In this 
case the process will firstly look at the terminology before organising the 
terms to create a representation of the current situation. The focus of the 
process will be within the places context that is focusing on the buildings 
areas within.
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It is important to understand the terminology and concepts currently in place 
as these will provide the consistency behind any populated views or 
representations of the current situation. Ideally this information would already 
exist within an Enterprise Architecture (EA) as described by (Zachman 1997) 
or (Holt 2009) however, in this case there is no such EA, much of the 
information is tacit knowledge, as such the process will be used to record the 
information rather than to identify from existing sources. The process will 
begin by recording some of the terminology used within the organisation.
Hawkesley
Resource
TechnicalFurniture SoftwareBuilding
Infrastructure
ImmanuelSt Nicolas Restored
buildings
Figure 7-7 - Infrastructure
It is important to understand the concepts within the infrastructure to define 
what the organisation has before trying to arrange it and place it in specific 
locations. It is also important to know that the organisation does not own all of 
the resources that it uses, some of them are hired and as such only available 
at specific times and places.
Buildings are of obvious importance, the diagram in Figure 7-7 aids in the 
understanding of the buildings which are considered to be of relevance, this 
means that there may be other buildings not shown in this diagram but could 
be equally as important in another view.
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Aisle
Area
Children Fair trade stallmusic groupCoffee
Resource
Building
Figure 7-8 - Areas within buildings
Within the buildings themselves there can be designated areas, Figure 7-8. 
These areas have their own needs, again a complete picture will be built up 
over time with areas added as required. The coffee and children's areas are 
the two that are of specific note here but it is useful to record as much 
information as possible to help with future work and to understand the 
language and groupings within the organisation.
Having defined terminology it is possible to populate views with information 
representing real situations. A populated view uses the terminology defined to 
build up a picture of the location in which the concern, the Urn, and the 
Outcome, a scalded child, reside. In this case this means focusing on the 
furniture supporting the Urn, the area that it is within and other surrounding 
areas.
Serving 
sits on ►  bench 1 :
--------------------  Fijrniture
Serving bench 2 furn iture
Figure 7-9 - Population - St Nicholas Urn Concern
The Urn itself is a large metallic container which holds, heats and boils water. 
It is located on a serving bench which has another bench adjoining it. It is 
useful to note that none of these items are secured and each can be moved
Urn furn iture
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independently. Details which are relevant to the risk may be included for later 
use, in this case useful information may be height, weight, max temperature. 
The Urn has been highlighted in Red, Figure 7-9, to show it is related to the 
risk and concern enabling it to be related back to the concern and risk directly 
if desired.
R1 Solutions "Coffee area
R1 Solutions::Children Area
Soft toys
is open to
object Population - St Nicholas Urn C2 J
Urn :Furniture sits on i
Serving bench 2 furniture
Serving 
bench 1 : 
Furniture
Figure 7-10 - Population - Urn in area
Figure 7-10 shows the two of the areas within the St. Nicolas building, more 
importantly it shows their proximity to each other, it is also a good example of 
how concerns may manifest themselves on these diagrams when the 
concerns related to physical objects.
If this information had been captured previously it would have been used as 
part of the decision as to what the risk was in relation to the Urn. This shows 
that the information can be used either to help in the elicitation of concerns 
and risks or their understanding and evaluation.
7.3.2 Scalded child situation evaluation
The following evaluations show the behaviour that may cause the outcome to 
occur and the effect following an occurrence.
A number of scenarios were considered for causal evaluation these included:
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• A child pulling the tap on urn
• A child pulling tap on urn after moving table (barrier)
• A person falls into the bench and knocks the urn off.
• A child pulls urn over
It was agreed that a child pulling over the urn follows the same sequence as a 
child turning the tap on. The difference between these scenarios will be in the 
effect - the things that happen after a child has been scalded.
The following diagrams show and discuss the three remaining scenarios.
I
Child
Leaves soft toy area()
Enters coffee area()
Pulls tap()
Water scaldsQ
Urn :Furniture
Figure 7-11 - Child grabs tap on urn
In the simplest case, Figure 7-11, a child may leave the children's area move 
directly into the coffee area and pull the tap on the Urn. This case assumes 
that the child can reach the tap. The most remarkable thing in this scenario is 
that there is nothing to block the path between the two areas.
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I
C hild
T ab le  :Furniture
Leaves soft toy a re a ()  
m oves () n
i y * 1 3
Ip*
enters coffee a re a ()
pulls tap<)
w a te r sca ld^Q
Urn :Furmture
Figure 7-12 - Child grabs tap with table
On some occasions a table is used to block the access to the serving section 
of the coffee area, this is seen as an extra action that the child will have to 
perform, Figure 7-12.
The intention of these scenarios is to show what may happen in the lead up to 
the outcome occurring. These scenarios may in future uses of the processes 
be used to inform more detailed and even calculation based information, but it 
must be remembered that they only show one possible route rather than all 
possible routes to an outcome, hence the presentation of three scenarios 
giving a wider understanding of the different stimuli which may lead to the 
outcome.
Urn :FurnitureServing bench 
1 :Furniture
ChildPerson
falls intcj()
falls off()
water empties onto 
floor()water burns()
Figure 7-13 - Person falls into bench
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In this case, Figure 7-13, a person falling into one of the serving benches is 
considered, this action forces the Urn to fall off the serving bench spreading 
water over the floor and burning one or more children.
There is a temptation to start to surmise which of these scenarios may best or 
preferable, this is generally followed quickly by better adding in solutions that 
could improve the situation. Defining solutions, making changes to the current 
situation, is the remit of the 'Risk Treatment' process. Solutions should not be 
presented at this point as they invariably add confusion to the current 
situation. In the worst case confusion results in either no or the wrong action 
being taken where real danger is present.
7.3.3 Effect evaluation
The effect evaluation looks at the events that follow the occurrence of an 
outcome, again this should reflect the current practices or procedures. It is still 
likely that more than one scenario will be expected for the effect as in most 
cases there will be more than one way to address the outcome.
:Child :Person
Scalds()
i
' assess injuryQ
Emergency accident book
services 
-------------1------------ T
administer first aid() r*---------------
alt j k
[m insr treatQ
[major]
‘carts O'
treatQ
records in() Tl
Figure 7-14 - Effect evaluation
There are two ways in which burns can be dealt with in this organisation; the 
difference between them is shown in the 'alt', alternative section of Figure
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7-14. For minor injury the first aider will treat the child where as for a major 
injury the emergency services will be called. Incorporating two options in a 
scenario in this way can be very useful for small variations, however when 
larger or more complicated alternatives are possible they can become 
unwieldy - adding complication rather than clarifying a situation.
It was expected that before any evaluation was carried out more definition
may be added to the risk however in this case no information that will improve
the definition of the risk has been identified.
7.3.4 Treating the risk of scalding a child
Having identified both causes and effects of the outcome the risk treatment 
processes uses the preceding information as a basis to decide whether 
mitigation, solution or treatment should be considered. Treatment could mean 
changes to either cause or effect, the ideal is to remove the possibility of the 
Outcome or make the Chance to occur zero. When the chance to occur can 
not be reduced to zero treatments ensure that sufficient procedures are in 
place to be exercised should the outcome occur. As this outcome could cause 
serious injuries resulting in the attendance of the emergency services it is 
agreed that treatments for the risk should be considered. Seven possible 
treatments have been identified;
1. Current (with table to reduce access)
2. Remove urn (move to another location)
3. Soft area in North pews
4. Soft area in South pews
5. Secure serving furniture and add door
6. Replace urn with fixed plumbed boiler on wall
7. Do not leave urn unattended.
By way of this example two of these options will now be discussed further, 
these will be options 4 and 6.
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barrier ftjrnrture
b a rr ie r : 
ijrn iture
Soft toys
b arrier: 
iirniturr
barrier .Furniture
Coffee area 
object Population - St Nicholas Urn C2 J
Urn :Furniture I sits on ► Serving bench 1 : 
Furniture
Serving bench 2 :Furniture
------------------- '----------------------Cb.
Soft area in south pews (aisle)
Where would opening in pews be, center 
or to the door?
Figure 7-15 - Risk Treatment - Scalded child - Solution 4
This solution, Figure 7-15, shows the use of other areas within the church to 
provide a separation between the children's area and the coffee area. These 
solutions have been discussed with affected parties and questions raised. 
Questions such as, will the main entrance door and step attract children and 
present concerns, what sort of barrier will be used, is it a problem that this will 
increase the distance to the toilet and the quiet area where carers take crying 
children. The fact that these queries include items or areas not shown on this 
diagram is not a problem; quite the reverse the identification of the areas will 
support the improvement of the system model in another iteration of the 
process.
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— k
Replace Urn with 
plumbed fixed 
boiler
>
Coffee area
Water boiler:
Furniture
Children Area
a
Soft toys
is open to
Serving bench 2 : Serving bench 1 :
Furniture Furniture
Figure 7-16 - Risk Treatment - Scalded child - Solution 7
Suggesting that the urn should be replaced with a fixed boiler, Figure 7-16 
met with resounding agreement, rather than issues or questions being raised 
statements were along the lines of; won't this be more environmentally 
friendly, this will save others having to move the urn to empty it, this will save 
money, the only negative point was that holes would have to be created in the 
wall to enable fixing and plumbing.
fcv
Does this risk require treatment?
No
Parents should be watching
at some services table is used to obstruct access
Yes
Perceived that if someone could be hurt we should do 
something about it.
Figure 7-17 - Treatment - Scalded child
The decision now has to be made whether to treat this risk or not. There are
arguments for both for and against including:
For - perception that if someone could be hurt something should be done
about it.
Against - Carers should be watching, in some situations a table is used to
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obstruct access.
Both of these options could provide a reasonable solution in the way of a 
treatment for the risk, however to select a solution at this point would be 
premature. These solutions have been defined to solve the problem from the 
context of the place or building, their impact on the other contexts has not yet 
been considered.
7.3.5 Additional Concerns
This case study was all going well, it was selected as a 'simple' concern to 
look into, it was according to plan, everyone was happy... and then, as 
happens with most projects, plans and operations something else cropped up. 
Another concern was raised which was obviously linked to this risk. The 
concern was about the amount of space available in the children's area, more 
importantly one of the provisions is a group which has outgrown the space. It 
was recognised that this concern may increase the chance to occur posed by 
the 'Scalding child risk' as tiny tots, the group, was regularly having 18 
children in the space whilst the urn was on.
Information View:: 
Concern
Concern
UID = 11
Name = Tiny tot space
Description = Not enough space during tiny tots 
reference (source) = Honorary Curate
UID 
Name 
Description 
reference (source)
< ---------------------------
Figure 7-18 - Concern Identification Revisited
This concern, Figure 7-18, had the potential to throw the work out of control 
as it may bring in other concerns and the treatment work may have to be re­
iterated or completely re-done. Using the modular processes and robust set of 
terminology defined in this work means that this is not the case. Using 
processes in this way anticipates changes and additions such as this and in 
this case it could even be considered to be timely providing needs for the 
provision context against which solutions will be evaluated.
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7.3.6 Scalded child Solution evaluation
The provision context is directly related to the additional concern and as such 
provides extra needs which to be considered. The main focus here is on 
available space and this is two fold, there must be more physical space for the 
children's area without reducing the overall seating capacity of the building. 
Therefore each solution will be evaluated using parametrics based on number 
of seats and amount of open space.
Most of these solutions do not have any relationship with finance as there will
be no capital outgoings. There is one however which does; solution option 7 
suggests the purchase of a fixed and plumbed boiler unit and the financial 
implications of this must be understood.
The cost of a boiler of this sort is in the region of £400 however the running 
cost should be lower balancing this out over time. These costs including fitting 
will need to be considered if this is thought to be a viable solution.
Something happening to a person in a place was the original reason for the 
identification and definition of the concern and risk. From this point of view this 
context can be considered to have been covered. It is worth however looking 
a little further at this as there are a number of points to understand.
1. this risk supports the definition of a relationship between the people and 
places contexts
2. other people interact with the urn, not just children
There is no direct relationship to governance as this is a place and people
issue and the effect on the contexts are not significant enough to have 
repercussions through all contexts at this point.
7.3.7 Health and Safety Risk Conclusion
Solution selection is not within the remit of risk management only the 
provision or suggestion of solutions. The selection of a solution must be the 
responsibility of the whole organisation working with the broadest knowledge 
of what it is trying to achieve. As such risk management provides the
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background information material and ability to monitor treatments.
In this case the solution selected by the KNPCC due to the additional size 
concern presented by the tiny tots group was a joint solution that of solutions 
4 and 7. This provided the best all round solution as it gives more space to the 
children's area and therefore the tiny tots group whilst also moving them away 
from the hot water supply. The installation of a fixed boiler also helps to move 
the boiling water out of the reach of children whilst saving the organisation 
money overall and on a rolling basis. Currently solution 4 has been 
implemented.
7.4 Parish review
The second path through the case study looks at a governance and mission 
concern covering the need to understand the remit, structure and working of 
the whole organisation.
This path through the case study has been defined to provide a solution, 
however as the study progresses it becomes obvious that the solution to this 
concern and risk will identify a host of others. This is expected in the early 
stages of Risk Management. A boom in the number of concerns and Risks at 
this point can be considered healthy. The expectation then is for the rate of 
increase of concerns and risks to reduce in time.
Context ID System Concern ID Risk Definition
Modelling
Evaluation Risk Treatment
ref J
Initial PIV
causal evaluation()
Figure 7-19 - Parish review methodology
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It is envisaged that the solution to this Risk will be a project, Figure 7-19, and 
as such the solution will not be evaluated against all contexts in this example, 
this will occur during the project itself by the nature of the work to be carried 
out.
7.4.1 Situation evaluation
In constructing the causal analysis the point at which a Clergy member leaves 
a parish provides a starting point, why they choose to leave is not under 
investigation. The investigation is to the cause of clergy members not being 
replaced in this team parish. In a team parish an assessment is carried out 
after a clergy member leaves and a clergy member leaving does not mean 
that there is a vacant position.
Clergy
Parish Review
Bishop
Leaves ()
InitiatesQ
Review missionQ
Review structure()
review needs ()
resultQ
| assess()
outcomes: 
no new clergy 
bad review
evaluation causal:
don't do context
don’t understand structure
don’t understand need
produce bad profile and job desc
effect:
no new clergy 
demotivated congregation
solution:
understand context, structure and need 
produce good parish profile and job desc
Figure 7-20 - Causal evaluation
There are two possible outcomes from the Bishops assessment at the end of 
the review shown in Figure 7-20 this could be a simple yes, no. Yes a position 
will be made available, no, a position will not be made available. It is the 
negative outcome which is of most concern.
7.4.2 Effect evaluation
The effect of no new clergy being appointed could mean a loss of resource 
creating; an inability to reach and service all areas of the parish; over 
stretching of existing resources. This may mean that some needs are not
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catered for.
7.4.3 Treating the risk of not getting new clergy members
There are two options which the parish has do nothing or do something. 
Doing nothing would mean that the bishop would arrange the review and 
provide an assessment based on it. The option to do something would include 
pro-active engagement of the parish in the review, involving as many people 
from and related to the parish as possible rather than only existing clergy.
Bishop
KNPCC
include
Pass review
Improve
governance
lstrain»
Needs to increase clergy numbers
Identify
relationships
Understand 
parish mission
constrain-
Improve parish
include»
Analyse
information
Understand
people
Understand
places
understand
provision
Figure 7-21 - Risk Treatment - No new clergy
This diagram, Figure 7-21, defines the needs of the team review, this is also 
the information required to fill in much of the missing detail in the system and 
context models. In fact it becomes obvious that the needs of the parish review 
are similar to the initial needs of risk management. This can be seen by the 
similarity between the terms used in the contexts and the terms used in the 
needs shown in the diagram above.
Based on the needs of the review scenarios can be developed providing ways 
to fulfil the needs described. These scenarios can have further detail added to 
them enabling them to be used as project plans.
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AnalysisWorkshop
Stakeholders
Identify PeopleQ
Identify places ()
Identify provision()
Rationalise information() 
Request feedbackQ
identify relations hips ()
feedbackQ
incorporate feedbackQ
Analyse relationshipsQ
focus groupsQ
Analyse focused informatior)Q
develop metricsQ
apply metricsQ
identifyoutcomesQ
I
IV3develop profileQ
Develop job specificationQ i
Figure 7-22 - Risk Treatment - No new clergy
The main approach to gathering information in the initial part of this work is to 
be completed through a number of workshops (Figure 7-22), the work uses 
workshops to ensure 'buy-in' providing stakeholders with the opportunity to 
input to the work and therefore have an emotional tie to the future of the work. 
This work is now complete and the information gathered is of great 
importance to the parish. The importance is not only in securing clergy 
resource but in the ability of the parish to understand and manage its 
structure, information and risk in a rigorous and timely fashion.
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7.5 Conclusions
These examples have shown some of the paths through this extensive and 
on-going case study. As this is real and ongoing work there are many 
commonly seen issues which arise which would be impossible to deal with
accurately and consistently without the aid of processes and ontology.
:C once rn  ID:C ontext ID :System
M ode llin g
:R is k  D e fin itio n E v a lu a t io n :R is k  T re a tm e n t
In itia l co n ce rn sQ
C ontext re q u ire d  ()
ex te rna l co n o e rn ()
R 2  c a u s a l e va lua tionQ
R 2  e ffe c t e vq lu a tio n Q
so lu tio n  im p te m e n ta tio n Q
w o rk s h o p ( w o rks  hop ()
R1 c a u s a l e \}a lu a tio n ()
R1 e ffe c t e v ^ lu a tio n ()  
---------
tiny tot()
w o rk s h o p  2()
Figure 7-23 - Project actual Process Instance View
The sheer complexity of this plan, Figure 7-23, showing the execution of the 
processes from only the initial set of work emphasises the fact that without a 
formalised approach the management of risk, risk management would fall into 
disarray providing a stumbling block an inhibitor rather than the enabler that it
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should be.
7.5.1 Evidence collection studies
A number of evidence collection studies were conceived, three of which were 
completed during the investigative stages of this work. This section provides 
an overview of two of the case studies carried out during the development and 
verification of this work. Overviews are provided for the ‘Project risk 
assessment’ and ‘Competence assessment and professional development’ 
studies.
The final study focused on the application of the CORAS IT Security tool 
where it investigated the transferability of the tool to other areas of risk rather 
than the terminology or process for risk management. Details regarding this 
study can be found in Appendix A.
The two studies described comprise of an introduction giving an overview and 
background, the work carried out in the study (including relevant 
documentation from the study) and conclusions of each study providing a 
summary of its contribution.
In addition to the studies described in this chapter the principles within this 
work have been applied within a number of situations. In some cases this has 
supported and improved the work of specific companies within the rail and 
defence sectors. In others cases it has been found that the object oriented 
nature of the techniques worked against the culture within organisation 
meaning that a significant cultural change would be needed before a study 
could be carried out.
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Study 1 - Project Risk Assessment
This case study investigates the risks involved in accepting or tendering for 
projects, this includes considering cost, time, resource and reputation gained 
and lost due to working with specific clients.
Assessment Context
To understand the scope of the assessment the project and business contexts 
have been considered.
With no specific project context in place the generic start point discussed in 
Chapter 2 has been used and tailored to be relevant to this assessment.
people
Technical
Finance
Make profit
Manage project
constrains
Tailored project context
include
inclucte:
include^
include^
Manage cost
Manage time
Manage resource
Manage income
Figure 7-24 - Tailored project context
Only minor adjustments to the context have been made to the diagram in 
Figure 7-24. The requirement of make profit has been added, this requirement 
will constrain the assessment ensuring that the final output is related to profit.
The organisations development providing time and cost savings. The 
existence of the business context means that only minor alterations have 
been made.
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Business requirements
Assist local 
community
Local Community
iptlude»
Carry out researchProject
Promote excellence include»
Academia
extend
< constrains Obtain funding
People
include
Rinding body
meet tenets
Provide services
■ constrains »
include
Provide consultancy
Make money
Rnancial iusiness community
Provide training
Figure 7-25 - Tailored business context
The minor alterations to Figure 7-25 relate to the association of contexts 
specifically the project context must be seen here. The people and financial 
contexts provide a completeness and support the need to further define these 
contexts as and when required.
The system view provides an understanding of the structures in place within 
the organisation relating to the assessment of project risk.
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works
for
works
on
Project Specific
Days charged  
Days uncharged 
Days worked 
Project income 
Charge out rate 
Uncharged cost
Motivation 
Evidence record 
Competence score 
Evidence score 
Motivation score
Person
Days to work 
Nl: float 
Salary
Company cost 
Tax
Company specific
Consum able cos 
Equipment cost 
Utility cost 
Building cost 
chargeable time 
No. of employees 
Overhead 
Profit Margin: int
Company
No. people  
Project profit 
Stage: Stage  
Total project income 
Total uncharged cost 
Total days charged  
Total days worked  
Total uncharged days 
Project overhead: int 
Profit value
Project
Figure 7-26 - System view
The system structure is taken from the company enterprise architecture which 
provides all of the information regarding the structure and processes 
associated with running of the organisation. The diagram in Figure 7-26 is a 
extract from the enterprise architecture which has been further developed to 
ensure that all relevant information from the assessment to be carried out can 
be collated and retained.
The constraint view provides the mathematical operators and their associated 
variables and formulas for implementation in the network
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Constraint 
Person Cost to 
Company
Constraint 
Project Worth
PI - Project Income 
PP - Project Profit 
PO - Project Overhead
CC = Company cost 
Nl = National Insurance 
S = Salary
PP = P I-P O (): void
Constraint 
Project Cost to company
Constraint 
Person cost to client
Constraint 
Company Profit
CC - Company Cost
DW - Days worked
PO - Project Overhead
NP - Number of people on project
DC = Days Charged
PPI = Person income/project
CR = Charge out Rate
PM - Profit Margin 
PO - Project Overhead
PM = P O *1 .3 (): voidPPI = D C *C R (): void
For {NP} PO = P O +C C *D W (): void
PI - Project Income
PPI - Person income/project
NP - Number of People on project
For {NP} PI = PI+PPIQ : void
Project Revenue
Constraint
PO - Project Overhead 
PM - Profit Margin 
PP Project Profit 
V - Value
IF PP<0 Then V= High Risk()
IF PM>PP>=0 Then V= High Risk() 
IF PP=PM Then V= Medium Risk() 
IF PP>PM Then V-  Low RiskQ
Profit achieved
Constraint
Figure 7-27 - Constraint view
The majority of the constraints defined in Figure 7-27 are addition and 
multiplication based operators. Profit achieved is slightly different, it provides 
an enumeration of the values calculated to this point. The enumeration gives 
a high, medium or low result as the final output of the risk assessment.
Parametric view
The parametric view enables the constraints defined above to be 
implemented as a network shown in Figure 7-28.
Project revenue
Charge out rate [PPI]
Days Charged 
( D C ^
No. People
r  srofit achievedProject cost to ^  
company
Project worthPerson cost to 
company
National Insurance
[PO][CC]
Risk
Value
Salary
Tax
Days Worked f  Company profit
Profit
target
Figure 7-28 - Parametric view
Running the network with all the inputs present will provide an output of risk 
value from the network
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Conclusions Study 1 -  Project Risk Assessment
This case study exercised the context identification and system development 
processes from the process set defined in Chapter 5. It also investigated the 
use of the SysML parametrics as an approach to developing bespoke risk 
assessments. The work on formalising risk assessments has been taken 
further since this case study was carried out. The latest status is discussed in 
the paper Formalising risk assessment through the use of SysML parametrics 
Brownsword and Perry (2009).
This study supported the need to identify relevant contexts within which an 
assessment will be applied. The study also highlighted the need to investigate 
the effect of the assessment on neighbouring contexts.
The study enabled further definition and clarification of the terms concern and 
risk and the need for separation between the concern identification and risk 
definition processes.
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Study 2 - Competence assessment and professional development
This case study investigates competence and professional development as an 
area to which the concepts of risk may be applied.
Competence and professional development are areas not normally associated 
with Risk or Risk Management. This case study shows that the same 
principles are used within competence assessment and risk assessment, the 
major difference being that the competence assessment looks for favourable 
outcomes i.e. how good an individual is, where as a risk assessment tends to 
look for flaws and failures, this ability to consider both sides of risk is 
discussed further by Hessami (1999) in Risk - A missed opportunity?
This study starts by understanding the need for the competence assessment 
within the organisation before looking at some of the features of the system.
Assessment Context
The first thoughts in this study were to define the need 'why carry out 
professional development', Professional development is one of the main 
reasons for carrying out competence assessments, In this case the need has 
been defined using a use case diagram, Figure 7-29.
Org
Individual
Business
requirements
Motivation
con:
Improve
Competence
i trains
Personal Development
include^
Increase
Competence
Demonstrate
competence
Figure 7-29 - Personal Development
The most important thing to understand when undertaking any work is 'why is 
this work being carried out'. The intention of the diagram above is to answer
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that question, in this case the work is being carried out to Improve 
competence of an Individual this is likely to be a member of staff, but may 
include students or the wider public.
It is important to know why the work is to be carried out however, this is rarely 
of any use without knowing what has to be done; again in this case 
competence must be both increased and demonstrated.
This has provided an understanding and record of the need for professional 
development and competence assessment to be carried out. This approach, 
using use cases to represent requirements or needs, has been used in many 
applications providing repeatability in the identification and recording of 
needs. Repeatability is one of the main concepts behind formalisation and as 
such this may provide a worthwhile approach to defining the needs of a risk 
assessment. The semantics behind the diagram above further support 
formalisation through the understanding of needs and contexts.
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System
Having the understanding of why the organisation wants to carry out 
professional development still does not explain how they are going to do it. 
This work started by analysing a number of competence frameworks and 
standards in order to understand the terminology and approaches taken by 
others to competence assessment.
Many frameworks and standards including ISM (now part of SFIA), SFIA and 
UK-SPEC follow similar approaches.
Attitude
Skill
Knowledge
Competence
Figure 7-30 - Competence
Competence in Figure 7-30 has been defined as comprising of Knowledge, 
Skill and Attitude in many more recent cases the Attitude has been removed. 
Knowledge can be demonstrated through education, training and 
qualifications and provides the basis for competence. Skill is the persons 
understanding of their own domain and the way in which knowledge should be 
applied within it, Skills are often related to specific tools, techniques or 
products and as such can become a very long and daunting list. Attitude is the 
way a person approaches their work and relates it to moral and ethical 
standards.
This definition still leaves competence as a complex concept and difficult to 
repeatedly measure without gaining conflicting results.
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Maps to
relates
Produces ^
Work
Competence
Evidence
Evidence
Record
Professional
Standard
Figure 7-31 - Competence evidence
Figure 7-31 shows the generally accepted view of competence, that 
demonstration of competence is via the presentation of evidence. Evidence is 
to be based on work which has been carried out by the person under 
assessment. The difficultly in many cases is clearly relating evidence to the 
professional standard.
helps record ►must map to
Competence
IEE
SHA
OrganisationISM Company
Actual modelReference
model
Figure 7-32 - standard - work - competence
To support the clear definition of evidence mapped to standards it is useful to 
have an organisational model that bridges the gap between work carried out 
and the competencies required for demonstration by the relevant standard. 
The diagram in Figure 7-32 proposes a high level view to support this idea 
showing that the organisational model supports the recording of competence 
against the professional standards by providing a mapping between the 
organisational competencies and the professional standard.
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Conclusions Study 2 -  Competence Assessment
This study supports the concept that risk assessments are domain and 
application specific and that although many standard risk assessments from 
SWOT to Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) exist it each has a 
specific purpose and should be used outside its scope with care. Competence 
assessment is a domain specific risk assessment for professional 
development.
The context and system diagrams set out the information required in the 
assessment of competence. It can be seen by the levelling system in place 
which is used to assess candidates that there is no space for lack or negative 
competence. This sets competence assessment apart from many risk 
assessments as it is focused on looking at how well someone can do their 
work rather than how badly or how likely they are to fail.
7.5.2 Interpretation/Evaluation of Case studies
There are a number of benefits which can be observed when using the UML 
within the case studies discussed. These benefits are based on the 
fundamental principles that the UML itself. The benefits focus on:
• ‘views’ ensuring that multiple contexts have been considered, these may 
include hierarchical, positional and procedural views.
• consistency ensuring that the knowledge and understanding which has 
been assimilated provides a consistent set across behavioural and static 
aspects. This consistency provides confidence that the ‘views’ have 
meaning and relevance.
• Integration -  the UML with the SysML parametrics enables the reduction in 
the gap between contextual and scientific domains.
Many of the approaches and languages discussed in Chapter 4 provide 
consistency within their own domains, IDEF 3 for processes and IDEF 5 for 
ontologies for example, however they do enable clarity of checking across the 
boundaries of domains which the UML with its extensibility provides.
The use of the 7-views approach to process modelling has also provided 
benefits within the case studies. The strongest example of these benefits can
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be seen in the ability to re-organise or efficiently update the ordering of the 
processes when unforeseen circumstances arise. Obviously this ability to 
update the ordering of the processes would be much more complex had the 
processes been lacking in their definition. Without the knowledge of the 
relationships between artefacts and between artefacts and activities the time 
to re-order would be inc'reased dramatically.
This work has focused on the contextual issues associated with the 
understanding of concerns and risks. The intention is not to suggest that 
specific tools such as FMEA, SWOT, FTA etc. should not be used. The 
intention is, however, to provide a framework to ensure that these detailed 
tools are applied in relevant and focused ways. There have also been a 
number of domains which have not been incorporated in detail within this 
work including Human Factors (HF) and project management. This is due to 
the body of knowledge which already exists in these areas. Again, it is the 
intention of this work to provide a framework to integrate with the current 
thinking in these areas.
7.5.3 Summary
These case studies have enabled the generation and understanding of 
knowledge regarding risk management. They have in this way aided in the 
definition of the processes, methodology and ontology defined by this work. 
The table below shows the UML constructs used within each study and 
identifies benefits provided in each case.
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Table 7-1 -  Case Study Usage of UML
UML construct Project Metrics 
Use/benefit
Competence
assessment
Use/benefit
CORAS tool 
(Appendix A) 
Use/benefit
KNPCC
Class diagram Clarity o f 
business structure 
enabling 
development of 
metrics
Clarity of system 
structure 
including 
definitions
Definition of 
assessment scope 
and visualisation 
of stakeholders
System concepts 
definition,
Object diagram Issue and risk 
capture
Deployment
diagram
Visualisation of 
locations within 
system
Component
diagram
Visualisation of 
constructs within 
system -  without 
location
Use case diagram Clarity o f reason 
and scope for 
carrying out 
project 
monitoring
Clarity o f context 
and business 
justification for 
carrying out 
competence 
assessment
Visualisation of 
situation analysis 
including 
definition of 
threats and 
identification of 
treatment
Identification of 
system and 
assessment 
contexts
Sequence diagram Visualisation of 
cause and effect 
scenarios
Parametric
diagrams
Visualisation of 
mathematical 
operators and 
formula
Although there is value in using each of the diagram types identified in
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Table 7-1 individually, a more intangible yet valuable benefit is realised when 
the diagrams are used together to ensure consistency. This can be achieved 
by following the consistency checks set out within the UML specification. The 
multiple, holistic and consistent aspects of the UML provide unique benefit 
regarding the use of the UML rather than other approaches such as those 
discussed in Chapter 4. For clarity this is due to the lack of internal 
consistency between multiple views within many other techniques or loosely 
coupled approaches such as IDEF standards.
The objective of this chapter was to demonstrate the applicability of the 
processes and ontology defined in this work.
This has been demonstrated through the two paths discussed within this 
chapter; the first investigating an health and safety issue relating to scalding 
injuries of children and including wider issues into the risk definition and 
solution space in a timely fashion based on the information available; the 
second investigated governance and resource issues which has prompted an 
information gathering exercise and review of the whole organisation.
The availability and application of the processes and ontology have been 
shown to benefit the organisations through improved understanding and 
communication through formalisation, this in turn has enabled the 
identification of relevant concerns and will provide more efficient evaluation of 
future risks.
Outside this work the principles defined within are continually applied within 
Brass Bullet Ltd. supporting project and business development. They have 
also been applied by the author within governmental and professional bodies 
and engineering organisations within the rail and defence sectors.
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8 Conclusions
8.1 Introduction
Chapter six described two threads through one of the case studies carried out 
during this work, it concluded that the processes and ontology defined by the 
work could be used ir; a pragmatic way to provide a formalised approach to 
the management of risk. This chapter collates the conclusions from each 
chapter and shows where each of the overall objectives of the work have 
been meet. It also defines further work which could be carried out to further 
develop this work.
8.2 Case study evaluation
The case study supports the overall objective of this work. It shows the 
benefits of using a formalised, pragmatic approach to risk management. This 
is highlighted by the ability to change the methodology in a pragmatic way 
without losing control of the risk management activities or association with the 
items within the study.
The study applied all of the processes defined within chapter 6 with negligible 
issues in the application. Issues with the use of these processes and ontology 
are related to the culture of the applying organisation rather than technical 
issues with the activities and artefacts within the processes. The cultural 
issues include a lack of basic understanding of the terminology to be used, a 
lack of ability to abstract away from details and the inability to be open to a 
different way of working.
In the main case study the application of the processes defined in Chapter 6 
And ontology defined in Chapter 5 enabled the organisation to understand 
and prioritise concerns before establishing risks vastly reducing the number 
and complexity of the risks faced.
Limitations with this work include:
• The cultural change required in many organisations to use a pragmatic 
methodology for risk
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• The perceived lack of application of the processes and ontology to 
engineering and business applications due to the main study not 
directly residing in one of these domains.
It is reasonable to generalise the results of this work suggesting that the 
processes and ontology defined within will apply to engineering and business 
based organisations. This ability to generalise is based on the observations 
made within engineering organisations where the principles behind these 
processes have been applied and the relationship between the processes and 
ontology and the international standards which are already general in nature.
8.3 Summary of Chapters
Chapter 1 presented the aims and objectives of this thesis detailing the 
contribution of each chapter.
Chapter 2 presented issues with the risk management process and the 
underlying terminology associated with risk management which exists in 
general literature and standards. The chapter identifies the need for a 
formalised approach to the processes and terminology of risk. It also 
concludes that as tools and techniques are for the most part industry and 
application specific therefore the detailed implementation of risk assessment 
would not be considered by the rest of this work.
Chapter 3 presented the methodology for the research and recognises the 
need for a phenomenological perspective and identifies issues with using a 
phenomenological in a generally positivist domain.
Chapter 4 discussed the requirements for a model based framework to 
formalise risk management and proposed the Unified Modelling Language 
(UML) as a language capable of delivering this formalisation. Formalisation in 
this work ensures that consistency, repeatability, multiple views and pragmatic 
application are all considered. This chapter identifies the UML along with the 
Systems Modelling Language (SysML) profile of the UML as the only tool,
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from those investigated by this work, to fulfil all of the requirements defined. 
The tools considered exhibited two main weaknesses, either their focus was 
on static or behavioural modelling or a lack of consistency was identified 
meaning that consistency checking between ontology and process views 
would become increasingly complex.
Chapter 5 defined risk and presented an ontology for risk management 
incorporating the definitions and relationships for terminology which is often 
confused and mis-used. The ontology of any industry is fundamental. Without 
a clear understanding of the terms used within the domain and the 
relationships between those terms it is difficult to clearly communicate within 
the domain and almost impossible to teach. This ontology provides the ability 
to improve the teaching of risk management at a grass routes level.
Chapter 6 defined the processes to be use when implementing risk 
management. The chapter presented requirements, behaviour and 
information views of the risk management processes, ensuring that multiple 
views can be considered and consistency check when applying the 
processes. The use of object orientation ensures that the processes support a 
multi-view, consistent application whilst modularisation ensures that they can 
be used in a pragmatic manner. Following the definition of the processes 
theoretical and pragmatic methodologies for their application have been 
defined, the pragmatic methodology is based on the use of the processes 
within case studies.
Chapter 7 demonstrated the application of the processes and ontology 
through the presentation of two threads within one of the case studies 
completed during the execution of this work. These threads show the 
applicability of the processes and ontology to organisational, project and 
health and safety issues.
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8.4 Conclusions by Objective
The primary aim of this thesis was to develop a formalised approach to the 
management of risk using a model based approach. This addresses the lack 
of formalisation across risk management in many industries, applications and 
education.
To achieve the overall aim both terminology and processes related to risk 
have been understood and formalised. Formalised ontology and processes 
have been developed and demonstrated through a number of threads 
abstracted from a case study.
This section maps the main conclusions from each chapter to the Objectives 
set out in Chapter 1. It explains where each has been defined and details why 
the cases study threads show that these definitions, approach and 
methodology provide a formalised approach to the management of risk.
• Chapter 2 - the purpose of which was to review and understand the 
terminology and processes related to risk management. Has presented 
a view of risk management which has at a high level been unchanged 
for many years. The changes that have been suggested and made in 
this latent period have confused the terminology and process further. 
This chapter has highlighted the process confusion and issues with 
terminology enabling an improved definition to be made.
• Chapter 4 - the purpose of which was to discuss the requirements for a 
model based framework for the formalisation of risk management and 
propose a framework which fulfils the requirements. Has identified and 
justified a formalisation tool which is not only relevant to risk 
management but to all areas requiring formalisation of ontology and 
process.
• Chapter 5 - the purpose of which was to define risk and present an 
ontology for risk management. Has presented a clear concise candidate 
definition for risk and shown the ontology in which this definition resides. 
This provides a clear set of terminology enabling improvement of the 
implementation and teaching of risk management.
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• Chapter 6 - the purpose of which was to define the processes required 
to carry out risk management using a multi-view approach. Has 
presented multiple views of the key processes required to carry out risk 
management. These views have provided a modular, consistent and 
multi-view approach to risk management.
• Chapter 7 - the purpose of which was to demonstrate through 
application the applicability of the processes and ontology. Has shown 
the application of the processes and ontology to business and health 
and safety issues. This has enabled the improved management of risk 
within the organisation under consideration.
8.5 Contributions
The individual contributions made by this work are:
• Provision of independent interpretations and analysis of international 
standards related to risk management.
• Provision of improved access to relevant areas of international 
standards and frameworks through the overview models described.
• Provision of a comparison of description languages for formalisation.
• Provision of a related view of the terminology of risk management.
• Provision of a set of risk management processes, including their 
behaviour, requirements and artefacts using the seven-views approach.
• Provision of a pragmatic methodology for processes application 
enabling pro-active management of change.
• Provision of a worked example approach to the application of the 
processes and ontology through the case study.
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8.6 Further work
This section defines a number of opportunities for further work within 
academic and industrial arenas.
8.6.1 Academic
It is expected that industry and application specific ontologies will be defined 
and mapped to the ontology within this work. This will provide an improved 
communications medium for those working in different sectors ensuring that 
consistent meaning is interpreted when different words are used. The 
ontology within this work may also be updated specifically with reference to 
the use of the term 'Hazard' as it is not yet clear as to whether a hazard is a 
risk but from another stakeholders perspective or if it is a cause of an 
outcome. There is a specific need for further research into the generic 
concepts and definitions of hazards with the purpose of enabling a clear 
relationship to be drawn between hazards and risks.
With so many authors defining tailored risk assessments a formalised 
approach to the definition of bespoke risk assessments to complement the 
risk management approach defined within this work would is required. Such 
an approach should provide improved re-use of existing assessments, 
improved understanding of the relationship to the system under consideration 
and clear traceability between bespoke and generic risk assessments. This 
may include the modelling and tracing of existing risk assessments providing 
a clear understanding of how they related to the source and product variables 
with which they are concerned.
The use of a formalised approach to risk should support the definition of 
complete sets of risks for products and systems. However there is a 
complexity in the verification of completeness of these sets of risk. The 
application of an additional tool such as metrics to the risk set to give 
confidence merits investigation.
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8.6.2 Industrial
The processes and ontology defined within this work are regularly applied 
within Brass Bullet Ltd and the Kings Norton PCC. This approach is adding 
value to the management of financial, organisational and project risk within 
these organisations. Interest has been shown by the IET and NCC in applying 
the processes and ontology to the Enterprise architecture and Systems 
Engineering project which they are undertaking. This is will investigate the use 
of the processes within the change management aspects of enterprise 
architecture.
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A. -  Restoration project study 
Introduction
This appendix provides an overview of the case study which investigated the 
relevance of the CORAS tool to risk management outside of the IT Security 
sector for which it was designed. In this case the tool has been applied to the 
Kings Norton restoration project.
Restoration project business risk
The restoration project case study focuses on the use of Strengths 
Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) analysis as a basis for 
defining a business case to justify the sustainable re-development of heritage 
buildings.
The case study presents the workshop results and investigates the 
relationships between the areas identified within the workshops. The analysis 
uses mappings and weightings to priorities the strengths and opportunities for 
inclusion in the business case.
The CORAS methodology (Vraalsen et al 2004) for carrying out security 
analysis was also applied to this case study to analyse the ability to apply the 
assessment tool outside its intended domain. This analysis was carried out by 
Boiss (2005).
KN restoration
Kings Norton Parish is a diverse community with a range of incomes, living 
standards and backgrounds. The Old Grammar School, Saracen’s Head, St 
Nicolas Church, its churchyard and The Green together form one of the 
largest complex of medieval buildings in Birmingham, and are therefore a 
matter of immense pride and tradition for the local community. However, 
funding and usage issues mean that the buildings are in need of repair, 
restoration, conservation and maintanance.
The Kings Norton Parochial Church Council is responsible for these three 
significant buildings. Together with the local community, the church created a 
vision for restoring these buildings and improving the provision and utilisation
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of these facilities. The Kings Norton Restoration Project is the tangible form of 
that vision and has grown out of many years of work by volunteers on the 
buildings.
The project is particularly concerned with the restoration and conservation of 
the Old Grammar School and the Saracen’s Head. The Old Grammar School 
is a beautiful timber-framed structure that has sadly fallen into decay and is on 
English Heritage's "at risk" register. After continuing as a school for 
approximately two hundred years, the building fell into neglect at the 
beginning of the 19th century. Repairs were made in 1910 when a new 
external staircase was put in and again in 1951 after vandalism and further 
decay had taken their toll.
The nearby Saracen's Head was quite possibly the largest house of the royal 
manor during the 16th century. Currently being used as Parish offices and 
structurally intact, the house boasts highly decorative medieval workmanship, 
and the sophisticated building techniques confirm that the property held high 
status.
Through the Restoration Project, the community, Church, Sponsors and all 
well wishers hope to realise the dream tha t:
“The Grammar School would be restored and reopened as an educational 
facility for school parties. Classes on local history and how children were 
taught in the time of Thomas Hall would be held. In order for this scheme to 
work, the Saracen's Head will also need restoring, to provide facilities, 
disabled access, toilets, etc. The Saracen's Head will also function as a 
mixed-use community facility for Parish and secular activities, serving the 
people of Kings Norton.”
The core aims and goals of the Project can be broken down into four key 
areas:
• Heritage: To conserve and restore all that is most valuable in the local
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heritage;
• Community: To develop full use for very varied church and community 
needs;
• Education & Training: To develop full access and interpretation of the 
buildings and other local heritage; and
• Sustainability: Conserve and restore the rich local heritage and ensure 
that the buildings have a sustainable future.
In August 2004 Kings Norton’s Saracen’s Head together with the Old 
Grammar School won the second series of the BBC2 Restoration programme. 
In addition to the money raised by this programme the Heritage Lottery Fund 
(HLF) approved the restoration proposals for the HLF grant application Stage 
1. The project team is currently working towards the Stage 2 grant application 
which it was hoped would be completed towards the end of 2005 but is still 
awaiting final approval.
The Restoration Project means a lot to the Church and the people living in 
and around Kings Norton; Hence the considerable time, money and human 
effort being invested in this project to produce effective results. This project 
not only reflects the economic aspirations of the community but is also closely 
woven into its emotional fabric. For a project of this scale which will have a 
significant economic and quality of life impact on the whole community, it is 
important to perform risk analysis and management, to prepare for and be 
aware of the weaknesses and vulnerabilities in this project. The risk analysis 
must be taken into acount in any decision making process related to the 
project. Where the level of risk is high mitigating control measures should be 
put in place.
Restoration Project Context Identification
At the heart and soul of this project is the need to restore and conserve 
historic buildings, at the same time finding full use for them. Various groups of 
people like the Church, Management Committee, Architects etc come 
together to arrive at a Business Plan for the project. The plan is based on 
various feasibility criteria and have to satisfy certain requirements along with
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R e q u ire m e n t^
Church & Community
Restoration and Sustenance 
Plan for the two buildings
Analysis Experts/ 
Consultants
Analysis Reports
Consultants/
Surveyors
Builders/
Architects
KNPCC Management Sponsors/
Committee Financers
upholding the main aims of the project.
Figure A-1 - Project view
Figure A-1 uses UML models and text (Broendeland and Stolen 2004), the 
requirements are those related to the ultimate customers of this project, such 
as the Church and the local community.
Identify Context, as discussed in a paper on Risk Scenarios by Vraalsen et al
(2005), involves the activities below:
• Definition of Risk Management Context;
• Evaluation of Target;
• Stakeholder Identification;
• SWOT analysis; and
• Asset Identification and valuation.
Throught these activities the following will be identified:
• The target owners for risk analysis;
• Purpose of this analysis;
• Assets;
• Scope of the analysis; and
• Risk acceptance criteria.
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The first of these activities - definition of risk management context - involves 
documenting meta information about the process and includes:
• Process Information;
• Domain metrics; and
• Risk acceptance criteria.
Process Information details how and when analysis is completed. For the 
Restoration Project, the risk analysis and management process is based on 
discussions with the local community and the management body. The 
information obtained is used for analysis.
The Domain Metrics which need to be defined for the Restoration project are 
as follows:
• Asset Values;
• Consequences Values;
• Frequency Values; and
• Risk Levels.
The final goal of the Restoration Project is the conservation and sustenance 
of the medieval buildings. Due to the nature of the project and the intangible 
nature of the assets, it is important to keep in mind that the values being 
defined here are qualitative in nature rather than quantitative, being based on 
historical and statistical data. Table A-1 shows the asset values identified for 
the project as a result of analysis based on workshops carried out with 
representatives of the people of the church.
Asset Value Description
Very Low If it does not in any way hurt or reflect the 
sentiments of the community.
Low If it does not in any way hurt or reflect the 
sentiments of the community.
High If it is associated with the sentiments of the 
community.
Very High If it is associated with the sentiments of the 
community and is important for the restoration of 
the buildings.
Table A-1 Asset Values
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Time, Cost and Quality are three factors on which the Restoration project 
cannot compromise. Hence the consequence values, shown in Table A-2, are 
defined in terms of these three factors.
Consequence
Value
Description
Insignificant If it does not in any way affect the cost, quality or length 
of the project.
Minor If it does not in any way result in the loss of time, cost 
or quality.
Moderate If it involves more costs than estimated.
Major If it delays the process and sabotages the chances of 
grant approval.
Catastrophic If it causes delays, increases the costs of service and 
also reduces the quality of work. E.g. Failure of Stage 2 
Submission, Level of eligibility < 100%, failure of the 
grant application, etc.
Table A-2 Consequence Values
Frequency values are ranges defined by quanatative data described through 
examples or probabilities on a continuous scale. Table A-3 defines the 
frequency values for the Restoration Project.
Frequency
Value
Description( Probability)
Rare The probability of which is not likely at all.
Unlikely The probability of which is not very likely.
Possible A situation which could happen within the application 
period.
Likely Highly possible.
Certain Will happen within the application period.
Table A-3 Frequency Values
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At this stage, though the risks have not been identified yet, their levels need to 
be judged. These levels are identified in the form of a matrix as a function of 
Frequency and Consequence value to the Risk Level (Braber 2005). This 
matrix, shown in Table A-4, clearly gives the four Risks Levels will be applied 
during the course of this analysis.
Consequence
Insignificant
M
inor
M
oderate
M
ajor
Catastrophic
Rare Low Low Low Moderate Major
Tl
0o
Un-likely Low Low Moderate Major Major
C
0
Poss-ible Low Moderate Major Major Extreme
—j
O< Likely Moderate Major Major Extreme Extreme
Certain Moderate Major Extreme Extreme Extreme
Table A-4 Risk Levels
Risk acceptance criteria. The Restoration project has qualified for the HLF 
Stage 1 and is currently working towards the completion of the application for 
the Stage 2 grant. One of the requirements for this Stage is that all 
permissions, including full planning permission and listed building consent 
have been obtained. The risk acceptance criteria for the Restoration project 
can be visualised using the CORAS tool and Table A-5 shows an export of 
that visulisation.
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Type: Table
Name: Risk Acceptance Criteria
Short description: Identifying the levels of acceptance
Concern: Risk management Context
Viewpoint: Engineering
Finalised:
Full description:
Category RMC
Criteria ID Description
C1 If ‘Risk Level’ is equal to ‘Low’ then ‘Accept the Risk’
C2 If ‘Risk Level’ is equal to ‘Moderate’ then ‘Monitor the 
Risk’
C3 If ‘Risk Level’ is greater than or equal to ‘Major’ then 
Treat the Risk’
Table A-5 Risk Acceptance Criteria
The second of the activities - Evaluation of Target - details the focus of the 
Risk Assessment.
Type: Table
Name: Restoration Project-Target of Evaluation
Short description: Identifying the Target of this analysis
Concern: Target of evaluation
Viewpoint: Information
Finalised:
Full description:
Category ToE
Target The Restoration Project in general and the two 
buildings, The Old Grammar School and the Saracen’s 
Head, in particular
Client The Church and the Community
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Service/ Function Description of which parts of the system or organisation 
in question are being analysed, including e.g. 
references to diagrams or other relevant 
documentation.
Quality aspects Restoration and Sustenance of these buildings, their 
availability for community use.
Table A-6 Evaluation of Target
Using the CORAS Tool the evaluation of the target can be expressed in a 
tabular form as shown in Table A-6. This clearly identifies and demarcates the 
Target, Client, Service and Quality aspects involved in the project.
The third activity - Stakeholder Identification - is used to identify groups with 
an interest in the project. Stakeholders can be catagorised into groups such 
as Customer, Sponsor and Supplier and are defined in Figure A-2.
Stakeholder
zs
Sponsor
;zv
Supplier
Community Internal
“ TV
External
is :
Church | | Architect | | Consultant |
Surveyor
Figure A-2 - Stakeholders
The CORAS tool allows an expansion of this diagram using a table to give 
specific information about each stakeholder.
The fourth activity - SWOT Anaslysis -  involves the understanding of 
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats from Stakeholder 
perspectives. A workshop was conducted with Stakeholders in order to 
understand the current position and best direction for the Project. The 
objective was to identify the opportunities which can be successfully exploited 
and any strengths which will aid in their exploitation.
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SWOT
«E n terp rise  Assets?>
Restoration o f the \
buildings «Enterprise O pportunity»
Chances for increased Incorr 
and use o f the buildipgs
« S tak eh o ld e r»
Church
«E nterp rise  Asset>s—■ 
Increased facilities and
«E nterprise W eakness»
High maintenance costs of 
hejmildings
« S tak eh o ld e r»
Community
«Enterprise S trength»
Committed and Concerned 
local authorities and the 
Community
«E nterp rise  A s s e t»  
Faith, Trust etc
«E nterp rise  T h re a t»
Failure to be successful in die 
second stage of the HLF 
Programme« E nterp rise  A s s e t»
Historical/Architectural 
Significance
Figure A-3 - SWOT Analysis
The outcome of the SWOT workshop has been modelled using the CORAS 
Tool. Figure A-3 shows the stakeholders to the right of the diagram, their 
SWOT in the middle and Assets on the left. These Assets are the major areas 
of interest highlighted by the SWOT.
Asset Identification and valuation, the last of the activities, identifies the 
Target’s features requiring protection. These so called Assests are the basis 
for the rest of the analysis (Braber 2006). The CORAS tool has been used to 
classify the various assets of the Restoration Project as shown below in Table 
A-7.
Type: Table
Name: Identified Assets
Concern: Assets
Viewpoint: Organisational
Full
description:
Identification and Valuation of the Assets
Asset ID Description Category Value
Historical
Significance
The buildings are part of one of 
the largest complexes of 
Medieval buildings in
Other Very High
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Birmingham
Architectural
Significance
Reflections of an important 
period of English Architecture.
Physical Very High
Source of 
solidarity
Human Very High
Commitment
and
Collective
Ownership
Human Very High
Faith and 
Trust
The Church is the cornerstone 
of faith and trust for the 
community.
Human Very High
Tradition Human Very High
Sense of
Pride/Village
Identity
Human Very High
Education 
and training
Other Very High
Income From guided tours to the sites Physical High
Table A-7 Identified Assets
It is important to note that the ultimate goal of the analysis is to understand 
the main concerns of the stakeholders in relation to the assets. The value of 
each asset is agreed by the stakeholders involved with the project.
Using the UML in accordance with the CORAS Methodology, assets that have 
been identified for the Restoration Project can be modelled. This model, 
shown in Figure A-4, provides structure and shows relationships between the 
various assets.
Page 182 of 214
« A s s e O >  
Restoration and Conservation « A s s e t »  
Emotional A ttachm ent
« A s s e t »  
Facilities and Services
t l i
« A s s e t »
Income E duca tion  and« A s s e t »  « A s s e t »
Historic A rchitectural
Significance Significance
T ra in in g
« A s s e t »  
Pride and
« A s s e t »
TraditionSource of Com m itm ent and ^ i t h  and T rust Village Identity
solidarity  Collective Ownership
CHURCH C O M M U N IT Y
Figure A-4 -  Asset Diagram
For the Restoration Project the stakeholders are the Church, the Community 
and the Suppliers. The assets can be categoriesed into three groups 
according to their nature. These are: Restoration and Conservation related to 
the Church Stakeholder; Emotional Attachment related to the Community 
Stakeholder; and Facilities and Services related to the Suppliers.
Restoration Project Risk Identification
Risk Identification in the CORAS methodology involves threat identification, 
identification of vulnerabilities in the system and identification of unwanted 
incidents. These three tasks involve structured brainstorming in the which 
relevant stakeholders will participate. Applying this to the Restoration Project, 
threats, see Table A-8, and vulnerabilities, see Table A-9, have been 
identified. Now identified these threats and vulnerabilities must be analysed to 
understand how threats may exploit the vulnerabilities resulting in Unwanted 
incidents and Threat scenarios, also detailed in Table A-8.
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Type: Table
Name: Threat Table
Short description: Detailed Investigation
Concern: Threat
Viewpoint: Engineering
Finalised:
Full description:
Threat ID Scenario
Volunteers Volunteers losing interest due to the length of the 
process, lack of motivation and by the level of 
responsibility.
Community Having low confidence in the authorities but keeping 
unrealistic expectations of the project.
Bad Weather Resulting in the delay in the surveys and analysis, 
leading to inaccurate results.
Faulty Equipments Resulting in the delay in the surveys and analysis, 
leading to inaccurate results.
Third Party Third Party consultants may be unavailable or may 
not misunderstand the exigency of the tasks
Involvement of too 
many people
May lead to sense of competitiveness and non-co- 
operation amongst the various groups of people, 
spreading resentment and unhappiness.
Criteria for eligibility Makes it appear a Herculean task, requiring huge 
amounts of time, manpower (paid/unpaid) and other 
resources.
Commercial-isation The actual aim being compromised due to the 
project becoming a commercial enterprise.
Stretched
Resources
Due to the time required by the application process, 
already-scanty resources being stretched.
Table A-8 Threat Table
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Type: Table
Name: Vulnerability Table
Short
description:
Detailed Investigation
Concern: Vulnerabilities
Viewpoint: Engineering
Finalised:
Full description:
Vulnerability Asset
Lack of resources
Poor condition of the buildings
Poor access facilities
Time Constraints
Unfavourable Ground Conditions
Accuracy and effectiveness of the surveys
Motivation
Understanding and Co-operation between the people 
involved.
Table A-9 Vulnerability Table
The way in which threats can exploit vulnerabilities is highlighted by the use of 
the models and tables in the CORAS Tool and is depicted using threat 
scenarios.
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« in it ia te s » «In c id en t S cen a rio »  
Delay in Grant Approval
« i n c l u d e s »
« In c id e n t S c e n a rio »  '
Delay in Submission of 
Stage 2 Application
« i n m a te s »
« T h re a t  S cen a rio »
Resulting in the delay in the 
surveys and analysis and/or 
leading to inaccurate results.
'■■<;<includes»
« in itia te s» ..-
■-..<<initiates»
« T h re a t  A g e n t»  
Bad Weather
« In c id e n t S c e n a rio »  
Eligibility< 100%
V ulnerabilities:
-Poor Condition of buildings 
-Poor Access facilities 
-Unfavourable Ground conditions
« In c id e n t S cen a rio »
Rejection/ Failure of Stage 2 
Application.
itorical/Architecture 
Significance
«In c id en t S cen ario »
Reduction in the Grant 
Monies Income for Sustenance of 
the buildings
« A s s e t »  
Education and Training
Figure A-5 -  Threat Scenario ‘Bad Weather’
Figure A-5 represents an unwanted incident model using the threat of Bad 
Weather. Bad Weather exploits the weaknesses existing in the system such 
as poor building conditions, poor access facilities to the buildings and 
unfavourable ground conditions. These vulnerabilities, when exploited by bad 
weather, aggravate the situation and this might result in the of delay in 
ongoing surveys or in the inaccuracy of the results. This in turn might delay 
the submission of the application or affect project eligibility causing rejection 
of the application or the reduction of the grant money.
During this stage in the project, it becomes imperative to have a clear idea of 
all possible dangers that the project may face and to plan countermeasures, 
so that the project aims are not compromised and the project does not suffer 
in terms of time, quality or costs. The modelling of unwanted incidents aids in 
this, and once a clear picture of all possible threats has been drawn, it 
becomes easier to prioritise these as risks and develop corrective treatment 
measures.
Page 186 of 214
Restoration Project Risk Analysis
An unwanted incident which has been assigned a consequence and 
frequency value is classified as a Risk. The Consequence and Frequency 
Values which are used to calculate a Risk Level have already been decided 
upon during Context Identification. The same values are now used during the 
analysis to prioritise the risks and predict the extent of damage they may 
cause.
Risk to 
National 
Heritage
C
« In c id e n t  S c e n a rio »  
Delay in Grant Approval
« A s s e t »  
Education and Training
Figure A-6 -  Risks and Assets
An unwanted incident may harm many assets. However, according to the 
CORAS Methodology, any risk is associated with only one asset. Depending 
on the stakeholder perspective and the assets being considered, the 
treatment measures can also vary. Due to the nature of the project it is wise to 
consider all the opinions and prioritise them according to their impact and 
level.
To understand the consequence and frequency of the risk we must take each 
Asset - Unwanted Incident pair. Taking the example of the ‘Income’ Asset and 
the ‘Failure to generate enough money for the sustenance of the buildings’ 
Unwanted Incident. This risk has been categorised as ‘Major’ from Table A-2, 
and attributed a frequency of ‘Likely’ from Table A-3. Overall this equates to 
the risk level of ‘Extreme’ based on the definitions in Table A-4.
It is expected that with this risk level the project will require further work to be
Historical/Architecture
Significance
Risk to the 
aims of 
CHURCH
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completed in this area to fully understand what affects the risk and any 
variations to the unwanted incidents. It is also possible that this risk will be 
grouped with other risks which may, although affecting different assets, be 
caused by similar Unwanted Incidents.
Restoration Project Risk Treatment
Having identified and acknowledged the risks that require corrective 
measures, the next step is Treatment Identification and Implementation. 
Treatment Identification is concerned with understanding and evaluating 
possible ways to reduce the risk level; Implementation considers ways to 
implement the chosen Treatment.
As discussed risk is a function of frequency and consequence. Hence, the 
reduction of risk will be achieved through the reduction of either the 
consequence or the frequency value associated with it. There are three 
directed approaches to the treatment of risks:
• Reducing risks by reducing either the Frequency, Consequence or 
both;
• Transferring Risks e.g. By Insurance; or
• Not performing the Risky Activities.
The first two options are plausible and logical but the third, in the case of the 
Restoration Project, cannot be considered as it is imperative that all the 
surveys and studies, which have major risks associated with them, need to be 
successfully carried out.
The evaluation of these treatments involves taking each unwanted scenario 
and modelling the treatments in the same way. Consider the threat of 
‘Volunteers’ which poses a possible threat of ‘Losing interest in the process 
due to the duration of the application procedure and the level of responsibility.’ 
If this unwanted scenario transforms into reality, it will directly or indirectly 
affect the assets identified for this project. Suitable corrective measures for 
this scenario could be:
• Regular meetings with the volunteers involved in the project which 
involves exchanging views and keeping everyone up-to-date with the 
status of the project;
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• The management being transparent with the volunteers; and
• Showing appreciation and encouragement.
Once the Control Measures have been identified, the feasibility (e.g. 
compatibility, user acceptance) and effectiveness (e.g. degree of prevention 
and level of risk mitigation) of the recommended corrective measure, 
discussed above, needs to be analysed.
« A s s e t »  
Education and Training
« A s s e t »
Historical/Architectural 
Significance
« A s s e t »
Income for sustenance 
of the buildings
c d n c id e n t S c e n a rio »
« in m a te s »
Delay in the submission of Stage 
2 Application. •.
<<;T reatm en t»  « In c id e n t  S c e n a r io »
Showing appreciation Delay in grant approval
and encouragement.
« i n i t i a t e s »
« T h r e a t  S c e n a r io »
Losing interest due to the length 
of the process, lack of 
motivation and by the lever o f  
responsibilities.
« R e d u c e
« T r e a tm e n t» o
« T  reatm en t»
« In c id e n t  S c e n a r io »  
Failure of Stage 2 Application
Regular meetings with 
the volunteers
« R e d u c e  \  
F requency» \
The Management being 
transparent with the
volunteers
« R e d u c e  F req u en cy»
« T h r e a t  A g e n t»  
Volunteers
Figure A-7 -  Treatment Model
The Treatments can be modelled to understand the threats that they help to 
reduce, as shown in Figure A-7. The risk can be re-analysed with each 
treatment, or combinations of treatment, allowing an understanding of the 
effect of the treatment on the overall risk level. Once a risk level has been 
reduced to an acceptable level a cost-benefit analysis is conducted to 
measure the effectiveness of this corrective measure or control strategy 
regarding the costs involved. The outcome of the cost benefit analysis may 
either suggest that treatments should be implemented, or that they would be 
prohibitively expensive and that other alternative treatments should be 
considered.
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Conclusions -  Business Risk
The main conclusion from this study is that although many groups set out with 
good intentions many risk assessments are not clear on the route they should 
take to ensure that they are completed to a sufficient level of rigour to enable 
sound arguments to be built up to justify decisions.
The study supported the need to understand both the context of the 
assessment and the need for an understanding of the system. Had these 
been in place the initial identification section of the study could have been 
carried out in less time and to a higher level of rigour.
The application of the CORAS tool concluded that although some of the 
terminology did not trace directly as it was domain specific to the software 
security space the tool could be used to support a business level analysis.
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B. - Modelling Language Overview
Introduction
This Appendix provides an introduction to the constructs and usage of the 
Unified Modelling Language (UML) and Systems Modelling Language 
(SysML) diagrams. Initially it provides a brief overview of each of the thirteen 
UML diagram and nine SysML diagrams. Following each overview is a more 
detailed description of each of the diagrams used within this work.
The diagrams used within this work are:
UML
• Class
• Use Case
• Activity
• Sequence
• Deployment
SysML
• Parametric diagram
• Constraint block
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UML Overview
This section provides an overview of each of the six structural and seven 
behavioural diagrams
Structural Diagrams
Class 1
Class 1
:Class2
Class 2
Package 2
Class 3 Class 4
class diagram composite structure diagram
Nodal
~|Qbi2: Class T
vz.
Node 2
_j Obl4 Class ObiS
deployment diagramcomponent diagram
Behavioural Diagrams
Use case 1
j^Activrty inv 1 J ^ r
Use case 2Activity inv 2
^  State 2
Actor 1
use case diagramactivity diagramstate machine diagram
ecLife linel message ► state 2 state 3state 1£
state 3:Life Iine2 ref
state 2 Interaction 2
state
interaction overview diagramtiming diagramcommunication diagramsequence diagram
Figure B-1 - UML Diagrams Overview
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Static Diagrams
The class diagram provides the ability to show entities and their relationships. 
The relationships may be associations (including hierarchical), generalisations 
or dependencies.
The package diagram is generally used to show relationships within a model.
The composite structure diagram has two distinct purposes it realises 
compositions and aggregations, and collaborations which identify 
communications.
The object diagram shows instances of classes and relationships representing 
real life examples of the related classes.
The component diagram shows the modules that would be found within a 
system defined in terms of its interfaces.
The deployment diagram is used to define the location of components by 
placing them on nodes which represent real world aspects or locations.
Behavioural Diagrams
State machine diagrams show the behaviour of a object also described as the 
behaviour during the lifetime of a class. This is achieved by showing the order 
and conditions under which things occur.
Activity diagrams are special types of state machine which are generally used 
to show behaviour within an operation or state.
Use case diagrams are generally used to represent system requirements and 
contexts. They also show interactions with external systems or stakeholders.
Sequence diagrams show life lines, the timeline of an object, and the
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messages passed between them with an emphasis on the logical timing of the 
messages
Communication diagrams also show life lines and messages but the 
emphasis is on the layout or organisation rather than the timings.
Timing diagrams allows timing information to be added to interactions 
showing the time at which a message is sent or a state change occurs.
Interaction overview diagrams allow construction of complex behaviours by 
showing the interactions between many simpler behaviours described in 
scenarios.
Class Diagram
The class diagram provides the ability to show entities and their relationships. 
The relationships may be associations (including hierarchical), generalisations 
or dependencies.
r relates together
OperationAttribute
cgraphic node* 
Interface
«diagram» 
Class diagram
Figure B-2 - Class Diagram Meta Model
Figure B-2 shows the meta model (definition) of a class diagram, which is 
probably the most widely used diagram in the UML, it shows class and 
interface as graphic nodes', it also shows relationship and the three types 
described above. These relationships are dependency, association and
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generalisation. The association has two additional specialisations aggregation 
and composition. An example of the use of each relationships is shown below.
Class name
Class name
attribute 1 
attribute 2  
operation 1 () 
operation 2()
O------
association name
 *
<F
Class
Class with attributes & operations
Aggregation
Composition
Association
Dependency
Specialisation
Figure B-3 - Class Diagram Symbols
The basic symbols to be used on the class diagram are shown in Figure B-3 
the class can be seen to be a box which can have attribute and operation 
compartments added. The relationships are all in the form of lines; the 
dependency is a dotted line with an arrow to show the direction of the 
dependency, the generalisation/specialisation is a line with a triangle at the 
end of the parent class and the association is a plain line which may 
incorporate a name for the association. This line has a diamond added to the 
parent class end to show the two special types of association.
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Right
Landing siteHot air balloon
BurnerHot airEnvelope
Plan
Basket
supports •+  fi'ls ^  creates
Figure B-4 - Example structure
The example structure in Figure B-4 shows all three associations; firstly a 
Flight is made up of one or more Hot air Balloon, a Flight Plan and a Landing 
site. Secondly the Hot air balloon is composed of one Basket, one Envelope, 
one or more Burner and many units of Hot air. The Basket is supported by 
one Envelope and one or more Burner which creates Hot air. The composition 
means that if you take away one of the component parts the whole does not 
exist i.e. if there is no Envelope there is no Hot air balloon.
QuadrupleTripleDoubleSingle
Burner
Figure B-5 - Example classification
Staying with the hot air balloon example there may be types of Burner. Figure 
B-5 shows single, double, triple and quadruple types of burner.
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Aeroplane Hot air balloon
Hot air balloonAeroplane
Basket
Envelope
Hot air
Burner
Fuselage
Wing
Engine
supports
creates
fills
Figure B-6 - Example Mapping
Figure B-6 shows a mapping, an understanding of equivalence, using 
dependencies or associations this shows that the Basket of the Hot air balloon 
is maps to the Fuselage of an Aeroplane, the Envelope to the Wing and the 
Burner to the Engine. This can be very useful for showing equivalence 
between concepts used in different domains or applications.
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is a s s o c ia te d  w ith ►
Classl Class2
Classl “is associated with” Class2
is a s s o c ia te d  w ith  ►
Classl Class2
Classl “is associated with” “one or 
more” Class2
Classl
Class2
Classl “is made up 
of” Class2
Classl
Class2
Classl “is 
composed of” 
Class2
C lassl
~7S~
Class2
Classl “has types” Class2
Class2 “is a type of” Classl
« stereo type»
C lassl
Classl “happens to be a” stereotype
Objectl : C lassl
Ni/
C lassl
Objectl “is a real-life example of” 
Classl
Objectl “depends on” Classl
Classl
is associated with ►
Class3
Class2
Classl “is associated with” Class2 “via” 
Class3
Figure B-7 - Class Relationships Overview
Figure B-7 provides a set of examples as an overview of the ways in which 
the relationships used on a class diagram can be read.
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Activity
Activity diagrams are low level diagrams and are generally used to show 
behaviour within an operation or state.
1. . *
((diagram# ^graphic node*
Activity diagram ^  1 * Region75" £
••graphic node* «graphic path*
Activity node Activity edge
«graphlc node# 
Activity invocation
«graphic node# 
Control node
5
« interrupts
^graphic path* 
Control flow
«graphlc path# 
Object flow
•(graphic node# 
Object
••graphic node*
Interruptibie
activity region
«graphic node* 
Activity partition
Figure B-8 - Activity Diagram Meta Model
Figure B-8 shows an extract of the meta model for the activity diagram. The 
diagram shows Activity nodes and Regions as graphic nodes, it also shows 
Activity edges these are the paths between the nodes.
^activ ity nam e^j
name:type
o
Activity invocation
Object node
Signal
Time signal
Decision or merge 
Control fork or join 
Activity initial node
# Activity final node 
Flow final node
Partition shown as swimlane
Partition shown in activity nodef  (partition name)
I activity node
--------------- ^  Control or object flow
event
Interruptibie region
Figure B-9 - Activity Diagram Symbols
Figure B-9 shows the symbols used on the Activity diagrams. The activities
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are in the form of rounded boxes which are connected together via an arrow.
Consumer
[More to drink]
Glass
Glass
add ice to glass
top up with tonic
add gin to glass
Figure B-10 - Example Activity diagram
Figure B-10 shows the activity diagram for pouring a drink. This shows the bar 
tender adding ice, adding a measure of gin and topping the glass up with 
tonic. At this point the bar tender passes the drink to the consumer who takes 
a drinks until they have finished enjoying each sip.
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Deployment
The deployment diagram is used to define the location of components by 
placing them on nodes which represent real world aspects or locations.
1 is d ip io y& d  on
i  graphic path* 
Dependency
(graphic path# 
Deployment
i graphic node* 
Component
•graphic path* 
Generalisation
[graphic node’ 
Node
•graphic node# 
Deployment spec
•diagram# 
Deployment diagram
Figure B-11 - Deployment Diagram Meta Model
Figure B-11 shows an extraction of the meta model for a deployment diagram. 
It shows that Nodes, Artefacts and Components are depicted as graphic 
nodes whilst the relationships - similar to those in the class diagram - provide 
the paths between nodes.
/ /
Node name
/
• artefact*
Artefact name
•deployment spec*
Specification name
•deploys*
•manifests*
Node
Artefact
Deployment specification 
Association 
Deployment 
Manifestation
Figure B-12 - Deployment Diagram Symbols
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The symbols used on deployment diagrams can be seen in Figure B-12. The 
Node, the location, is shown as a 3D box onto which artefacts, components 
and deployment specifications can be placed. The association is similar to 
that used in the class diagram.
Allotment
0
Bed 1 Bed 3
a
Bed 4 Bed 2
Figure B-13 - Example Deployment
Figure B-13 shows four planting beds in a crop rotation system. This shows 
where each of the beds is positioned within the allotment. It would is expected 
that deployment diagrams show either the current, past or future layout.
Sequence
Sequence diagrams show life lines, the timeline of an object, and the 
messages passed between them with an emphasis on the logical timing of the 
messages.
Page 202 of 214
represents ►
describes communication between ►
describes oocurrance of ►
igraphic path)
Rep»y
igraphic node* 
Stop
(graphic nodei 
Interaction
(graphic path 
Call
«graphic path* 
Event occurence
•diagram* 
Sequence diagram
•graphic node* 
Execution occurence
•graphic node* 
Interaction occurence
Figure B-14 - Sequence Diagram Meta Model
Figure B-14 shows an extract of the meta model for a sequence diagram. The 
diagram shows Frames, Gates, Lifelines, Interactions and Interaction 
occurrences occur as graphic nodes on the diagram. Messages provide the 
paths between events on lifelines.
Interaction / frame
Interaction occurence 
Life line
Life line with... 
execution occurence and...
stop
Asynchronous message 
Message call
Message reply (from a call)
Figure B-15 - Sequence Diagram Symbols
sd name J
ref )  interaction name
[ Life line (
Life line 
I
T
I
X
asynchronous!) 
caii(j ^
replyO
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The symbols which can be used on sequence diagrams are shown in Figure 
B-15. This shows a lifeline as a box with a dotted line extending down the 
page. The messages between life lines are shown as arrows.
$
Water
loop y  ;
[Until distance Achieved]
| Stroke()
U  *
1
1
1
1
I ^  | insert oar()
pull water() ^
1
!
i
i
i
i
1 —
[ extract oar()
i r
Figure B-16 - Example Sequence
Rower
Figure B-16 shows the sequence diagram for rowing. This shows the Cox 
calling the strokes to the rower at regular intervals with the rower reacting but 
inserting, pulling and removing the oar.
Use Case
Use case diagrams are generally used to represent system requirements and 
contexts. They also show interactions with external systems or stakeholders.
•diagram*
Use case diagram
•graphic node* 
Actor
1 *
__________ «graphtc node»
Use case
« yields an observable result to A
0 . . *
Extension Point
0 ..*
0 . 1
«graphic node* 
System boundary
•graphic path* 
Relationship
 ZX—
•graphic path* 
Extend
defines condition for ►
x graphic path* 
Association
•graphic path* 
Include
Figure B-17 - Use Case Diagram Meta Model
Figure B-17 shows an extract from the meta model of a Use case diagram. 
The diagram shows that Actors, Use cases and system boundaries can be 
shown on diagrams as graphic nodes and relationships used to provide paths 
between and across nodes. An association relates a Use case to an Actor 
usually across a system boundary. The Include relationship shows a Use 
case which always occurs when the source use case occurs.
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Name
O
A
Name
«include»
«extertd»
extend*
Use case 
Actor
Association 
Includes relationship 
Extends relationship... 
and with defined extension point
condition, {condition detail 
extension point: name
Figure B-18 - Use Case Diagram Symbols
The symbols which may be used within a Use case diagram are shown in 
Figure B-18. The diagram shows a use case as an ellipse and an actor as a 
stick man. The relationships are shown using the dependency arrow with the 
relationship type in chevrons e.g. « in c lu d e » .
Holiday requirements
Ensure warmth
issle free travel Travel company
; constrain
i^nclude;
Enjoy a break )
Worker
include Inclusive
.accommodation.
Resort
co/fstrain
include
No cooking
Good location
Figure B-19 - Example Use Case
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The use case diagram in Figure B-19 shows the requirements for a summer 
holiday showing the main requirement is to which the W o rk e r  is interested in 
is E n jo y  a  b r e a k , to do this the worker wants H a s s le  f re e  t ra v e l which a T ra v e l 
c o m p a n y  will be interested in selling, In c lu s iv e  a c c o m m o d a t io n  and a G o o d  
lo c a t io n  provided by the R e s o r t . An extra relationship, constrain, has been 
defined to be used on the use case diagram. This relationship can be 
considered to relate non-functional requirements.
The main constraint on the holiday is that it must B e  w a rm  whilst a lower level 
constraint on the accommodation is that there should be N o  c o o k in g  for the 
W o rk e r.
Diagram Relationships
dd deployment diagram )compd System overview )
od System instance )
Component 1
cd System structure J
| Component 2
Opl ) System
^  action operations defined by
Class behaviour defined by csd System structureJop i()
°p2()
System
i Scenarios showing interactions between Scenarios showing interactions between classes
comd scenarioij
Sequence & communication 
diagrams are equivalent
smd Class J
op1()
■*!|o p 2 ( ) be linked together i
= value]
using SEQUENCE DIAGRAMS
ucd  System Context J
Class timing issues defined 
by TIMING DIAGRAM ►ref startup J
System  Context
ref scenariolj
Figure B-20 - UML Diagram Relationships
Figure B-20 shows the relationships between each of the UML diagram, it is 
these relationships which support the consistency which the language 
provides as it enables the consideration of different views on the system being 
considered.
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SysML Overview
i_
The 5 SysML 
structural diagrams
diagram
Figure B-21 - SysML Overview 
Structural Diagrams
Block definition is essentially the class diagram in UML, package and internal 
block diagram are
The block definition diagram is essentially a class diagram and is used to 
show system structure and hierarchy.
The package diagram is used in the same way as the package diagram in the 
UML
The internal block diagram is essentially the composite structure diagram from 
the UML
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The parametric diagram provides the ability to show mathematical constraints 
and organise them into networks which can be exercised providing numerical 
and logical results.
The requirement diagram provides the ability to represent a requirement as a 
block or class.
Behavioural Diagrams
All of the behavioural diagrams in the SysML are commensurate with the 
diagrams of the same name in the UML.
Parametrics
The Systems Modelling Language (SysML) has introduced a new construct to 
the modelling toolbox, that of the constraint block and the associated 
'parametric diagram'. Constraint blocks allow for the definition and use of 
networks of constraints that represent rules that constrain the properties of a 
system or that define rules that the system must conform to.
«constraint»
Force N
f: Newtons Parameters
m: kg
a: m /s A2
constraints IX
{f = m*a} Constraint definition
Figure B-22 - Parametrics - Definition Notation
A constraint block is defined using a block (essentially the same as a UML 
class) stereotyped «constraint» and given a name by which the constraint can 
be identified. The constraint block has two compartments - the constraints and 
parameters compartment.
The constraints compartment contains an equation, expression or rule that 
relates together the parameters given in the parameters compartment. The 
example above defines a constraint called 'Force' that relates the three
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parameters T, 'm' and 'a' given in the parameters compartment by the 
equation f  = m x a', as shown in the constraints compartment. Such 
constraints are defined on a SysML block definition diagram (essentially a 
UML class diagram).
m _kg«constraintProperty»
N ewton :Force
:m/sA2 f :Newtons Q
------------------
Constraint use on a 
parametric diagram
Part containing the 
system elem ent to 
be constrained
Part Name :Part Type
Figure B-23 - Parametrics - Usage Notation
Constraint blocks are used on a parametric diagram using the notation shown 
above. The small squares attached to the inside edge of the constraint 
represent each parameter and provide connection points when linking 
constraints to parts or other constraints.
When used on a parametric diagram a constraint block is referred to as a 
constraint property and each constraint property should be named thus name 
:Constraint name. This allows multiple copies of a constraint to be used on a 
diagram.
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The Escapology Problem
Pum p
controller
Pum p 0 start 
•  stop 
0  reverse
Coffin
Escapologist
Concrete
H ole
Figure B-24 - The coffin escape
This is a classic escapology stunt that has been performed by many people. It 
is also a dangerous one, and escapologists have lost their lives performing it 
because the constraints were not properly understood or evaluated. One such 
performer was Joe Burrus who died 30th October 1990 when the weight of 
the concrete crushed the coffin he was in.
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The Definitions of the Constraints
«constraint" 
Volume
v: m A3 
w: m I: m 
h: m
constraints
{v = w * I * h}
«constraint»
Mass
m: kg 
d: kg/m A3 
v: m A3
constraints
{m = d * v}
«constraint»
Force
f: Newtons 
m: kg 
a: m /sA2
constraints
{f = m * a}
“Constraint”
Pressure
p: Pascals 
f: Newtons 
a: m A2
constraints
{P = f /a }
«constraint» 
Surface area
sa: m A2 
w: m I: m
constraints
{sa = w * 1}
«constraint» 
Fill Time
v: m A3 
r: m A3/s 
t: s
constraints
{t = v /r}
“constraint”
Minus
r: float 
a: float 
b: float
constraints
{r = a - b}
“constraint”
Decision-equipment
pressure: Pascals 
strength: Pascals 
result: Decision Type
constraints
{IF pressure < strength THEN result = yes ELSE result = no}
“constraint”
Decision-breath
breath time: s
fill time: s
result: Decision Type
constraints
{IF breath time >= fill time THEN result = yes ELSE result = no}
“constraint”
Decision-stunt
breath result: Decision Type
equipment result: Decision Type
result: Decision Type
constraints
{IF breath result = yes AND equipment result = yes THEN result = yes ELSE result = no}
Figure B-25 - The coffin escape - parametric definitions
The Use of the Constraints
Hole.Length
- ^  a float
^Decision Type result Decision 
Type E
Coffin.Height
Escapologist Decision
equipment result'
“i I-■ J  Newtons Pascals *—
[]strength
Coffin.Length
Figure B-26 - The coffin escape - parametric usage
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The sizes of the hole and the coffin are calculated and used to determine the 
amount of concrete needed to fill the hole. This volume and the pumping rate 
of the pump are used to determine how long it will take to fill the hole. This 
forms an input to a usage of the 'Decision-breath' heuristic constraint, along 
with the length of time that the escapologist can hold his breath, which returns 
a 'yes/no' decision indicating whether the escapologist can hold his breath 
long enough.
The volume of concrete needed is used, along with a constant defining the 
acceleration due to gravity, to calculate the amount of force exerted by the 
concrete. This force is converted to an exerted pressure using the surface 
area of the coffin, with the pressure then being compared against the coffin 
crush pressure in a usage of the 'Decision-equipment' heuristic constraint to 
return a 'yes/no' result that indicates whether or not the coffin is safe to use.
Finally, the outcomes of these two decisions are used in a usage of the 
'Decision-stunt' heuristic to decide whether the stunt should be performed, 
setting the 'Decision' property of the 'Escapologist' block. In this way the 
parametric constraints are used not only to specify constraints on the system 
but also to allow system requirements to be validated. Indeed it may be 
possible, if parametric constraints can be developed at an early stage of a 
project, to use them to establish whether a project is even possible long 
before detailed and costly development work has been undertaken.
It should be noted that this is only one possible parametric usage diagram and 
is open to significant improvement. However, it gives a good indication of the 
notation and the way that the constraint diagrams in SysML are used.
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SysML Diagram Relationships
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M assRelation
•constraint* 
N ewton's Law
constraints constraints
{m = v  * d} {f = m * a}
parameters parameters
m : Mass f : Force
v : Volume m : Mass
d : Density a : Acceleration
par F iring  R anged
f : Force
d
new ton: N ew ton’s Law
|m : Mass
a A cce le ra tion
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Figure B-27 - SysML Diagram Relationships
Figure B-27 shows the relationships between the SysML diagrams used in 
this work. It shows the relationship to the SysML block definition diagram 
which can be considered to be a class diagram for the purposes of this work. 
The strength of the relationship between the class and block definition 
diagrams provides a central point from which the SysML profile can be related 
to the UML.
Page 214 of 214
